

**Report of a Symposium on Canadian Defence Policy:
Some Critical Considerations**

**Centre for International and Security Studies
York University**

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¹This report was prepared by Ryerson Christie and David Dewitt with the assistance of Ken Boutin, Kyle Grayson, and Abhinav Kumar, along with the technical input of Sarah Whitaker. We are most grateful to the numerous comments provided by many of those who participated in the April 2003 symposium. The symposium titled Critical Defence Review Conference, was held at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto on 11 April 2003. The views expressed in this report are an incomplete reflection of the discussions which occurred at the symposium and through correspondence since then. They are not meant to represent in full the preferences of any individual or YCISS. The Centre welcomes comments. These should be sent via e-mail to <yciss@yorku.ca> .

Foreword

Since the 11 April symposium a number of important developments have taken place, both domestically and internationally, that serve to underscore the arguments advanced in this report.

Internationally the shift in the American orientation in Iraq from war-fighting to peacebuilding and the expanded role of NATO in providing a secure environment in Afghanistan have shown how roles of militaries are evolving, and how the expectations of the international community are changing. The role of armed forces as strict fighting elements is only a fiction. The fact that the majority of US fatalities in Iraq have occurred after the cessation of “war-fighting” illustrates the changing nature of armed conflict. This supports our argument that a defence review will necessitate the adoption of a new force structure commensurate with Canada’s place in the world, its perceived roles and responsibilities, and the nature of threats it is likely to face.

In terms of the newly expanded role of NATO in Afghanistan, as well as the progress being made in the European defence collaboration, we can see the continued move towards the “coalitions of the willing”. This represents the recognition that few states are capable of unilateral military action, either morally or functionally. Thus, the need to field a complete range of combat capabilities is decreasing at the same time as the cost of doing so becomes nearly impossible for all but a minority of states to bear. Canada must make decisions about what capabilities it is prepared to invest in, and which units it will be willing to rely on like-minded states to provide. Additionally, while Canada’s place in NATO should be debated it is our assertion that NATO remains integral to Canadian security planning.

Canada’s recent announcement that HMCS Toronto will be deployed to the Middle East in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom* demonstrates that the operational tempo for the Canadian Forces is likely to remain high. Rather than undercutting the observations made at the symposium, and the arguments made within this document, these events all reinforce our assertion that a comprehensive review of Canada’s foreign and defence policies is required.

Finally, recent announcements have been made about Canada’s ongoing negotiations with the United States on Ballistic Missile Defence. The details of these discussions, while not yet public, reflect the importance of the United States to Canadian security needs. However, it is our assertion that with other major shifts in Canadian security thinking, any decisions must be made in reference to a comprehensive review of Canada’s desired role in the world.

In addition to the events on the world stage a number of crucial developments have taken place domestically. The new Canadian government has made some preliminary declarations of impending foreign and defence policy reviews. While formal announcements of these reviews will likely follow the next federal election, planning for these reviews must begin now, both within the relevant departments and within the private sector. Here our arguments for a foreign policy review to precede a defence review

are both timely and crucial. A debate about Canada's defence needs which follow from the state's foreign policy will be essential to establish the basis for a relevant and sustainable Canadian Forces (CF).

The government also has announced the creation of a new Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, though ultimately what it will look like, what its roles and responsibilities will be, or how it will navigate the perennial debates of provincial versus federal responsibilities have yet to be determined. Certainly the pending movement of some offices from DND to the new ministry will effect the CF, though the exact nature of these effects are yet to be felt. Additionally the appointment by the Prime Minister of a secretary on Reserve issues to the Minister of National Defence will also be a harbinger for changes in the roles of the Canadian Reserves.

These developments, which have taken place since the 11 April meeting, have served to highlight the arguments that were made by the conference's participants and by this document's authors. Rather than eroding the need for foreign and defence reviews, the changing international and domestic environment reinforce our call for comprehensive, public, and transparent foreign and defence reviews.

Background

The York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS) initiated an ongoing project in the spring of 2003 to critically examine Canada's defence needs. The "Critical Defence Project" was born in response to the Department of National Defence's Defence Update, which was viewed as being insufficient to providing Canada with a relevant force for the emerging security concerns. YCISS hosted a conference at the Canadian Forces College on 11 April 2003, which brought together a select group of academics from across Canada, drawn primarily from Security and Defence Forum (SDF) centres, to discuss the questions of what a re-conception of security policy would mean for the organisation of the Canadian Forces, and how critical perspectives could make concrete policy recommendations for the CF. While the participants approached the topics from a range of perspectives, there was a broad underlying belief that the status quo was having a negative impact on the capacity of the CF to fulfil its assigned missions, and that the security environment facing Canada today is dramatically different from the one present in the early 1990s when the last Defence Review was undertaken. The conference successfully put a series of questions on the table for debate (Appendix 2) and the discussions that emerged illustrated the need for an ongoing project that will examine the issues of Canadian security and defence policy more deeply. It was evident to participants that the government requires a comprehensive defence review to address the growing gap between the capabilities the CF has and the roles it is increasingly being called upon to perform.

This policy paper is based on the discussions that took place at our April meeting, but does not necessarily represent the views of all of the participants. What we have set out to demonstrate is that a defence review is required and that it must commence with an examination of what Canada's security needs are prior to an examination of the threats that are, or may be, present. After these core arguments, we present one view of how a reconception of Canada's security needs in the context of the current and emerging international environment will result in changes in the manner in which the Canadian Forces are organised. Covering the range from domestic security through human security and international peace and security challenges including the traditional forms of robust military force, this policy paper advocates a re-organisation of the Canadian Forces that would ensure its continued viability, relevance, and effectiveness as a modern military.

Canada Needs a Foreign Policy and Defence Review

The current guidance for military planning is the 1994 Defence White Paper, a document which does not adequately reflect the national and international security concerns which confront Canada. The document, while backing away from a number of spending initiatives contained in the 1989 White Paper, is nevertheless grounded in a security environment defined by competing world powers. Within such a security arrangement Canada's defence needs were not altered substantially from the 1989 declaration. Canada is said to still require a comprehensive multi-role combat force capable of fighting with the best and against the best. Furthermore, the emphasis is placed on the country's need to fight as a coherent Canadian force within any such coalition. This is a significant issue as it precludes Canada from abandoning any combat capability.

What we see is that Canada's defence needs are defined by the guiding White Paper which establishes the broad needs of the Canadian Forces and proscribes the limits of the debate of what the CF should look like. In turn the White Paper is based on an understanding of what Canada's security interests are. In contrast to the process that led to the 1994 Defence Review, we believe that a review of Canada's defence needs must begin with an analysis of our security needs, and then examine the global environment.

Core Recommendations

1. The Canadian Government must embark on a full foreign policy review

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) recently completed its "Dialogue on Foreign Policy". This process illustrated the need for a full review of foreign policy. The [Report to Canadians](#) clearly lays out the complexity of foreign policy in today's international environment and reflects the desire of the Canadian public for a complete review of Canada's priorities. Of particular note within the document is the increased awareness and sensitivity of Canadians to the place of security in Canadian foreign and defence policy, as well as an appreciation for the link between them. Canada's defence posture and the force structure which accompanies it cannot be addressed in isolation from a debate about Canada's place in the world and the type of role Canadians wish the country to play internationally. At the same time a security and defence policy must be made in the context of Canada's international relations, placing emphasis on our relationship with the United States.

Dialogue contributions indicate an underlying desire for a more integrated foreign policy framework that clearly articulates Canadian values and interests, that is capable of achieving core objectives, and that is fully cognizant of Canada's international situation and responsibilities.

- A Dialogue of Foreign Policy: A Report to Canadians

The Dialogue on Foreign Policy was clear in stating that many Canadians desire the country to play an increased role in promoting its values abroad, and that Canada has a responsibility to protect peoples from

violence. This position has also been articulated by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and by the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which advocates that developed nations have a responsibility to protect people from genocide, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing. The desire of Canadians for a human security policy that is pro-active has crucial implications for the manner in which Canada will act internationally, and the Canadian Forces which would be an important tool in a more activist foreign policy.

A foreign policy review will enable the government and people of Canada to change the direction in which the country will proceed over the next generation, and to articulate what Canada's role will be in the increasingly fragmented international environment. The review would provide a sense of where Canada's interests lie, whether in closer ties with the United States, increased reliance on multilateralism on an issue and regional basis, in a revitalised United Nations, or as is most likely, some combination of these options. Further, the foreign policy review will help identify future risks and threats to Canada and to define the manner in which Canada is likely to respond. The relationship between foreign affairs and national defence is complex and is evolving. Just as the CF is not the only instrument available to government to address security challenges, so too the role and significance of the CF now extends beyond the confines of national defence and security.

2. A Defence Review is required to provide direction to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces and to ensure that the organisation is in a position to respond to the government's calls to action.

The recently completed Defence Update was counter productive to the needs of the Canadian Forces and missed a crucial opportunity to re-orient the CF structure to today's multi-faceted and complex security environment. The Update Process was not designed to solicit useful input, but was rather set up in such a way as to direct respondents to particular answers. Furthermore, the format precluded asking difficult questions about Canadian security needs and cut short any debate on the shape of the Department of National Defence. Rather than having a forward-looking process, the findings of the Defence Update were clear in asserting that the assumptions made in the 1994 White Paper were still valid. This statement was made in spite of the dramatic shifts in the Canadian security environment over the past decade. The use of the Canadian Navy to protect fish stocks, the emergence of new robust forms of peacekeeping such as was seen in Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the tragedy that befell Rwanda, through the emergence of non-state terrorism as a threat to Canadian interests are all examples of how our security environment has altered substantially since the 1994 White Paper. Clearly, continuing to plan and operate on the basis of a Defence plan that was based primarily on fending off a major military power is no longer the only, or perhaps even the main, defence need today. A defence review with active public consultation following a foreign policy review is necessary to ensure that the country has the forces in place that are most likely to be of use over the next fifteen to twenty years.

The Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians showed wide spread support for the Canadian military and a recognition of its important role as a tool of foreign policy. Following a formal review of Canada's international role, the Department of National Defence should be able to establish a force structure that is able to meet the demands placed upon it by the Canadian government. The CF is being called upon to intervene in intense conflict zones, and must have the resources necessary to operate in these situations. The military must be able to engage in the spectrum of operations from pre-emption through war-fighting to peacekeeping and to peacebuilding. At the same time it must retain an ability to operate alongside its allies and maintain a relevance to its NATO allies, especially the United States. Our privileged position and our history, no less than our geographic locale, demands this of us; that is, unless the Government of Canada decides fundamentally to alter its commitments concerning international peace and security operations and hence its expectations and demands of the CF.

While the Canadian Forces cannot do all things, especially if it is to function effectively given its current force structure and capacity, it must retain some significant combat capability. A defence review would enable planners to establish in which areas Canadian commitments can make a difference to international engagements in support of peace and security.

Canadian Security Policy

Canada's Security Needs

In some treatments, national and international security policies together provide an umbrella under which foreign and defence policy fall. Others use security policies to serve as the lynch-pin between foreign policy and defence policy. Admittedly, neither view is universally acknowledged, but an articulation of Canada's security needs and international security interests is a crucial precursor to establishing what its roles will be and from which its force structure can be developed. Security is a contested idea, perhaps more so today than any recent period. Global politics have changed dramatically since the Cold War, and security definitions rooted within a bi-polar conception of international relations are no longer relevant and should not be the basis of defence planning. The threats to Canada can no longer be defined exclusively by looking at foreign militaries; the number of states which possess a combat capability that could conceivably represent a threat to Canada or its allies is quite small, and reduces quickly to next to zero when you ask which states would willingly engage in hostile acts. The threat of former Soviet forces is limited if not non-existent and there is no obvious current successor to the threat. A security policy that is centred only on countering advanced militaries will not be sufficient in the foreseeable future. If the old approach to security is no longer relevant, then what are Canada's security interests?

The definition of security must begin with a statement of what is to be secured, rather than commencing from an assessment of risks. It is only through this process that the threats can be determined along with a suitable response.

It is our view that Canada's security relies on an international environment that is stable and peaceful. The best way to maintain such an environment is through the promotion of democratic governance, respect for human rights and the maintenance of human dignity. It should be clear from this that Canada's security policy must rest on an activist foreign policy that promotes the conditions for peace and security. All this is consistent with Canadian policy since Louis St. Laurent's 1947 Grey Lectures.

However, in the post Cold War world security of the country – its people, values, and institutions – no longer is, if ever it really was, the sole responsibility of the Department of National Defence. Canada's position as an advanced industrialised country with a high standard of living comes with responsibilities. The placement of such a notion of security closer to the heart of Canadian security thinking will have important implications for the force structure of the Canadian Forces.

Canada's security needs can be defined by:

- a stable and peaceful international environment where dignity and security of peoples are assured;
- an international system governed by the rule of law;
- the prevention and amelioration of acts of violence against Canada and its allies; and
- the protection of Canadian citizens within Canada from acts of violence and disasters beyond the ability of civilian agencies to handle immediately.

Canada's Place in the World

Canada enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world. Residing in North America we are faced with no immediate state-level threat to the country. At the same time Canada shares the continent with the United States; a relationship which has profound effects on Canadian foreign policy. The bilateral relationship between Canada and the US dominates Canadian international relations and should remain a priority in our thinking on security matters. In this we must consider how our policies will affect our neighbour as well as how we can contribute to American security. Our economic relations with the US must be considered in making defence decisions. For example, this relationship must be considered when examining Canada's involvement in NORAD and NATO. However, while not uncritically accepting and supporting American initiatives, when Canada does determine it is appropriate to act, it can gain credibility without compromise by fulfilling particular roles which the US cannot or will not undertake within the global division of security labour.

The International Character of Canadian Security

The international character of Canadian defence is not only a result of the diffusion of threats to Canada or of the global dimensions of trade, investment and migration, but also arises from the changing nature of what it is to be Canadian. The centrality of Europe to Canada's defence is slowly waning. While Europe is, and will remain, a major trading partner, Asia has become an increasingly significant part of

Canada's economic and trade profile. Moreover, the changing patterns of Canadian demographics are having profound, but poorly studied, effects on Canada's social, economic, and political life, including in the Canadian military. Of interest is the manner in which Canada is being encouraged to consider overseas activities at least in part out of demands from Canadians that the government take action to promote peace and stability in the homelands of immigrants. This is a process that in some ways is similar to the manner in which Canadians were urged to participate in two world wars. All this is occurring at the same time as we witness both a connectedness with and vulnerability to the global community. The increasingly globalized nature of goods and services, and the manner in which terror is able to transcend state borders to transmit conflict out of its original geographic sphere is also forcing Western states to take notice of conflicts throughout the developing world. These trends all combine to demand an increasingly international outlook by DND for questions of Canadian security.

It should be clear that the security of Canada and the international stability upon which it relies is increasingly susceptible to social unrest throughout the developing world. The implication of the internationalisation of Canadian defence is that the military has to be capable of expeditions to remote parts of the world, and of operating in relative isolation from the infrastructures provided by developed states. Furthermore, the force structure of the CF must be such that missions to the developing world are possible

Domestic Impacts on Canadian Security and Defence Policy

Canadian defence and security policy is directly affected by Canadian society. The domestic impact on how we think about defence and security is a crucial variable in establishing a defence policy. Canada has enjoyed nearly 50 years of peace, and the people of Canada do not need to fear a war on Canadian soil. At the same time Canada is a country of immigrants, many of whom have left countries where the military does not protect society, but is rather the source of insecurity. The result is that there is little evident support for a drastically larger military. When this is combined with the affluent society within which we live, recruitment and retention into the CF is, and is likely to remain, an ongoing concern.

Canadian Defence, Multilateralism and Collective Defence

Canada remains an industrially-advanced state with a vast territory combined with a relatively small population concentrated along a narrow band along its southern border with the United States. While it may be necessary to better manage land border and coastal transit, military invasion is not an issue. The ability of the

*For Canada, the search for multilateral ways to encourage peace and preserve stability is not an option - is an essential element of our national interest and of our foreign policy.
-Defence White Paper, 1994, p. 12*

Canadian Forces to defend Canada against a modern military is simply illusory; at the same time there is no traditional military threat facing Canada. The implication is that the focus on defending Canada need

not be the primary role of the Canadian Forces. At the same time, Canadian security rests on both boundary control and international stability, and as such Canada is a partner to collective and multilateral security organisations aimed at maintaining global peace. The reliance on multilateralism and collective defence should continue to underpin the Canadian Defence Policy. NORAD, NATO, and the UN all have been crucial components to Canadian security.

These organisations were born or evolved during the Cold War and are struggling to maintain relevance to Canada. This does not mean that Canada should withdraw; rather Canada must strive to make them relevant to its security needs and to ensure they are positioned to respond to emerging security threats. Canada should continue to contribute to these organisations, but must also initiate dialogues with the organizations and the member states to examine where Canada can best contribute to the organization. This is a process that has been supported by NATO which has encouraged the adoption of specialized capabilities amongst its members, recognizing that few of the participants are capable of providing the full range of combat forces.

The United Nations

The United Nations is the only multilateral organization that can claim broad legitimacy due to its inclusive state membership. As such it is the organization within which Canada should focus much of its security interests. The promotion of human dignity and security is the best guarantee for future Canadian prosperity. A great deal has been made about the relative decline of the United Nations as a security apparatus over the past decade. Certainly, there has been a decline in the number of troops engaged in peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN. This, however, makes the mistake of assuming that the promotion of international security comes primarily through the use of military force. While armed troops have been necessary in a number of instances, they are required when other forms of security promotion have failed and the military is turned to as a last resort. Furthermore, this debate also ignores the manner in which peacekeeping has evolved and that the role the UN has played in the process of peace promotion has changed.

Robust peacekeeping, sometimes referred to as peacemaking, requires a far more advanced command structure than the UN is able to field. Instead lead nations or NATO have come to fill the void and to field the necessary troops to engage in operations such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. As the necessity increases for the deployment of troops capable of the full range of combat, the number of potential state contributors rapidly declines, eliminating many of the militaries that have traditionally sent troops to the blue-beret peacekeeping missions.

The move to collective defence organizations, such as the EU and NATO, providing the military command and control of operations to peacekeeping missions is unlikely to change in the foreseeable

future. This does not represent a decline in the United Nation's relevance, but rather an evolution of the relationship between it and regional security organizations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been the centre piece of Canadian collective defence thinking for the past 50 years. Despite the slow response of the organisation to the post cold-war environment it has managed to maintain relevance to Canadian security. It continues to provide a multilateral security arrangement that ties North American and European defence needs. The accelerating cost of maintaining a modern fighting force has been defrayed by some pooling of resources. As a member of the alliance Canada has access to a range of capabilities that it would be unable to field on its own. The Airborne Warning and Air Control System (AWACS), of which Canada is a principal contributor, is but one high-technology high-maintenance system. Furthermore, NATO has demonstrated its use both in its role in aiding the defence needs of the United States, and directly for Canada in providing Operational Planning and Headquarter assistance for the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan. NATO is no longer confined to the defence of the NATO members, and has grown into a military alliance willing and capable of deployment in support of peace operations outside of Europe.

The usefulness of NATO is further demonstrated by Canada's role in the French-led European Union (EU) mission to the Congo. While this is not a NATO mission, it is receiving operational support from NATO through the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Planning Europe (SHAPE). Furthermore, Canada's ability to quickly integrate into the force is a direct result of its participation in NATO which has demanded interoperability with its allies and has provided experience working alongside the European states. The complementary equipment, supply system, and command and control systems have been invaluable assets for Canada's international role that have emerged from its participation in NATO.

NATO needs to continue to emerge as a leader in peacekeeping and peace support missions. The Canadian Government should continue to press the organization to evolve along these lines which also will augur well for enhanced capacity in support of human security challenges.

Canada should:

- reaffirm its commitment to NATO;
- work with like-minded countries to guide the organisation towards more peacekeeping responsibilities; and
- contribute troops to niche areas that meet both Canadian and NATO security needs.

Canadian Domestic Security - Assistance to Civilian Agencies

Of all of the parts of the 1994 White Paper, the domestic role of the Canadian Forces is the most out of date and most abbreviated portion of Canadian security planning. At the same time, the emerging awareness of the threat of non-state terrorism forces a re-examination of the place of the Canadian Forces in domestic security. In terms of interoperability a great deal has been done to ensure the ability of the CF to work alongside the NATO allies. In contrast, surprisingly little has been done to make sure that the CF can work readily alongside Canadian civilian counterparts. The CF is well suited to respond to massive disasters, providing a highly disciplined and highly trained force for rapid deployment to emergencies, as has been demonstrated in the Winnipeg floods, the Swiss Air disaster, and the Quebec Ice Storm.

The Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), which is discussed in greater length later, provides one excellent counter-terrorism tool to the Canadian government. However, in planning for disaster assistance and counter-terrorism, the CF is hampered by a lack of mandate to gather intelligence and plan for domestic operations. With proper civilian oversight and in co-ordination with other relevant agencies and departments, this ability must be put in place to ensure that the CF is prepared for disasters within Canada. Furthermore, greater training must be done to ensure that the procedures and policies are in place to facilitate an efficient and rapid response to any emergency. This does not mean that the CF would become the lead agency for civil emergencies, but rather that it could integrate more effectively into the response mechanism to aid and assist civilian organisations. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of the CF in civil emergencies the following steps should be taken:

- provide legislative mandate for planning for disaster assistance and counter-terrorism within Canada;
- engage in regular training exercises between Canadian Reserve Units and provincial and municipal emergency response agencies such as the RCMP, the OPP and the Sûreté de Québec; and
- strengthen the ability of the CF to respond both to disasters and to massive terrorist attacks within Canada.

Other Determining Factors

Terrorism

Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorism, and in particular the growing capacity of non-state terrorism, has been at the centre of debates on security. The responses to both state (or state-sponsored) and non-state terrorism must be multifaceted and focus on prevention through economic and political development assistance abroad and the strengthening of human security abroad. At the same time Canada must be prepared to respond to the threats of state and non-state terrorism both within Canada and abroad. Within Canada the primary responsibility resides with CSIS and policing

agencies. However, it is clear that the CF also has a crucial role to play. The threats posed by state and non-state terrorism are virtually non-existent in the 1994 Defence White Paper, and is mentioned only briefly under the “Other Defence Related Activities - Assistance to Civilian Authority” heading. Counter-terrorism has become a central role of the CF since 2001, and is poorly covered within the Defence White Paper. The nature of these newly heightened security challenges calls into question the relevance of large military organisations to respond to these particular threats. There is a disjunction between threats which are horizontally integrated phenomena and responding organizations which are basically vertically integrated. What has been seen is that the small commando unit JTF2 is our most capable military asset in the fight against international non-state terrorism. Furthermore, the risk of non-state terrorism demands that Canada improve its intelligence sharing between organizations, allowing the CF access to domestic intelligence, and that the ability of the CF to respond to an emergency be improved.

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

There is a healthy debate on whether the current advances in Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C⁴I) represents a true Revolution in Military Affairs. However, it is clear that the cost of acquiring and maintaining cutting edge technology is becoming increasingly prohibitive for all but the largest defence budgets. Even the United States is now forced to consider trade-offs in acquiring military technology. Countries such as Canada, with modest defence budgets, are faced with serious financial obstacles in acquiring the most up-to-date equipment, and certainly cannot do so across the spectrum of military systems. Canada can no longer afford to do all things, a position which it shares with the majority of its NATO allies. The recent Prague Summit advanced the ideal of embracing niche capabilities amongst the organization’s member states. The pursuit of a niche implies making a choice that one will have to live with for many years to come. However, by understanding the risks involved in making such a choice and adopting risk mitigation strategies, a flexible yet focussed force structure may be adopted.

Canada’s decisions about which technologies it will adopt must grow out of a decision of which capabilities it needs to meet its security needs. At the same time the capabilities that Canada fields must be fully interoperable with its allies, allowing for the rapid integration of forces in multilateral operations. This is increasingly important given the rising cost of fielding a combat capable military. There are only a handful of states able to head a combat operation at or above the divisional level. Canada must be able to bring core capabilities to NATO that are of use in its planning and operations.

Canadian Intelligence Community

It is the intelligence capabilities of a state that provide much of the informational basis for the foreign and defence agencies as well as domestic security and policing, allowing the country to act in an effective and timely fashion. Canada must strive towards the prevention of conflict primarily through economic and political assistance, but with the ability to use the military as a last resort to provide for human security. This policy places an increased emphasis on Canada's intelligence community, because it demands that the agencies have a broad focus across the globe and an ability to understand dynamic political environments. Currently Canada's intelligence gathering and interpretation takes place in a wide range of departments, each of which tailors its roles to the particular government department's needs. DFAIT, DND, the Communication Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian International Development Agency, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada all conduct intelligence gathering on the international stage, with police agencies across the country, Revenue Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service all providing domestic intelligence. Unfortunately the co-ordination between these departments is lacking at present, with the assembly of the total intelligence picture being developed in an ad-hoc fashion within the Privy Council Office.

Canadian security depends on the formation of a formal mechanism to share intelligence across Government departments to assemble the most comprehensive picture possible, and then there must be a structure which ensures co-ordinated appropriate action.

Canadian Force Structure

The force structure of a military must be such that it provides the resources to the government to meet the defence needs of the state. The force structure then must be developed according to the security policy of the state and the expected or anticipated threats. The development of a relevant force structure is crucial to allow Canada to fulfil its foreign policy goals. The current force structure of the Canadian Forces will not allow it to meet the demands likely to be placed upon it in the years to come. Indeed the crisis of manning military operations indicates that the force structure already has reached its limit of usefulness. In considering a relevant force structure we have sought to balance the likely demands to be placed upon the CF with a respect for the fiscal limits the Canadian public places on the military. The construction of a force structure appropriate to Canada's capabilities and responsibilities is fundamental to our place in the international community. In this brief paper we can only begin the discussion. A serious analysis requires a full engagement of social, economic, and political factors along with a critical examination of doctrine and of operational contexts. Future conferences and workshops could prove useful in carrying out an analysis of all the various recommendations.

It must be stressed that we are not advocating a military that is less expensive for the Canadian public, but rather one that is more cost-effective. The rapid increase in defence technology comes attached to a high cost of both procurement and maintenance. Furthermore, as war-fighting becomes increasingly reliant on

high-technology the cost of training soldiers, sailors and air-personnel will continue to grow. While defence is only one component of a Canadian security policy, it is nevertheless important and costly. To fulfil our responsibilities as a developed and comparatively privileged and wealthy state it is essential that we possess the tools necessary to aid in the establishment of international peace and stability.

The tentative initial recommendations for changes to the Canadian Forces are broad in scope and are presented here to help shape the debate on what the CF should look like in preparing for the next 20 years. Particular attention will need to be paid to the case of procurement decisions that have provided equipment to the CF which is either of marginal use, or of questionable relevance given the cost of the platforms. Discussions of hard numbers have been eschewed in favour of a general debate of capabilities. The following recommendations do not reflect the view of all of the participants at the Critical Defence Symposium, but are representative of the majority.

Ability to Lead Deployments and Provide Rapid Response

The entrenchment of human security necessitates the ability to rapidly deploy forces to remote parts of the world. Security crises can develop quickly and require rapid response in order to prevent the escalation or development of violence. At the same time there is an apparent ambivalence by many capable states to lead missions to areas of the world that are viewed as being outside their strategic purview. Thus, the provision of security requires that Canada maintain the ability to command and control operations abroad. Furthermore, the CF must be capable of operating in the range of combat environments and be able to sustain itself in highly volatile and violent regions of the world.

The Canadian expeditionary capability should then be:

- combat capable;
- rapidly deployable;
- able to operate independently for short periods of time; and
- capable of filling a range of roles from full combat to peacebuilding.

Strategic Lift - Air and Sea

A string of controversies has shed light on the shortcomings of Canada's military to provide strategic lift capabilities. Within Canada the small size of Canada's military has necessitated the concentration of troops in a small number of bases which are generally removed from the population centres of Canada. For example, the lack of army units west of Edmonton precludes their rapid deployment to Vancouver or Victoria. By the same token Halifax is a four hour drive from CFB Gagetown. Without domestic strategic lift craft the deployment of the troops within Canada would be quite slow and would be unlikely to arrive during the initial phase of a civil emergency. While the need for the rapid deployment of military assets in Canada fortunately has not been an issue, the military has been extremely hampered in its ability to deploy abroad, relying on the strategic air lift of the United States, or on leasing a sea lift capability. In

both instances the rapid availability of the resources is not guaranteed, and in the case of air lift is dependent on the US support of the Canadian policy at that time. This represents a serious reduction of independent government action. Recent moves to enter into leasing arrangements with NATO allies could help address this problem, but any such agreement must allow the unfettered access of aircraft to Canada to avoid the problems that faced the NATO deployment of AWACS aircraft to Turkey. Having to secure NATO assent for a non-NATO Canadian-led mission abroad is not an acceptable policy. Furthermore, plans to replace the Canadian Navy's replenishment vessels with a larger vessel capable of providing a large sea-lift capability should be pursued.

A domestic capability of providing strategic air and sea lift capabilities is a crucial component of maintaining an independent foreign policy and is essential to providing the timely deployment of the CF to stem violence and prevent the escalation of civil strife.

Canadian Army Force Structure

A reworking of Canadian security policy will define the broad types of operations within which Canada is likely to find itself. Currently the CF is structured to fight a mechanised war in Europe alongside its NATO allies, but as an independent organisation, a policy that was reflected in the recent brigade level live-fire exercise held at CFB Wainwright. The Army's brigade structure provides for a ratio of types of troops that is inconsistent with the experiences of the Canadian Forces over the past 20 years, let alone the likely involvement in the foreseeable future. The worries of over-working Canadian service personnel, seen in statements by the general staff and within the media, are a result of a high operational tempo, but have been worsened by the fact that many Canadian combat arms troops are simply not being deployed because they are inappropriate for the missions. The artillery and heavy armoured regiments have not seen use and are not likely to be used in peacekeeping operations. Notably, the deployment in Afghanistan that was a combat mission and continues today did not see the use of either of these resources. The maintenance of the present staffing levels within these elements should therefore be reconsidered. The limited financial and personnel resources could perhaps be more usefully re-deployed. At the same time as these groups have seen very low levels of deployments, the communications, combat engineers, and armoured reconnaissance units have been over tasked.

Any Defence Review must consider the impact of its recommendations on both the service personnel and their families. The social environment within which we live demands that the government ensure that the lives of the military families are affected as little as possible by the demands placed on the CF. Families are directly affected by the increased operational tempo of the military and have little or no control over their fates. The social upheaval of families and the impact of returning service men and women who have encountered extreme levels of violence can create a host of domestic problems and exacerbate existing family stresses. A more efficient use of CF members would lessen the devastating impact that the current arrangement has on the CF families that have been most affected by the recent stepped-up operations. The

impact on the families of the service personnel must be placed at the fore of any CF restructuring, and a significantly improved effort must be made to ensure a safe and stable environment is provided to spouses and children.

At same time as the defence review will allow a reconception of the military force structure, the increased focus on rapid reaction further demands a reconfiguration of Canada's armed forces. Canada committed itself to the United Nations on 15 December 1996 to contribute to the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) in cooperation with Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden. Additionally, NATO recently has embarked on a major reorganization that is focused on providing Very High Readiness troops capable of deployment within 48 hours, an ability Canada does not have. Yet these are the types of troops that would be of use in the immediate stages of a crisis, whether war-fighting, humanitarian intervention in the midst of violent conflict, or even in extreme types of disaster responses.

Canadian Navy Force Structure

The Canadian Navy has fared better than either the Air Force or Army in procurement over the past decade. The Minor Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs), the Halifax class frigates, and the Victoria Class submarines have all been recent additions to the fleet. The Navy will have to be positioned to continue its roles in coastal surveillance and interdiction, and alongside its allies in the range of naval operations from surveillance, through interdiction to full combat. The size of Canada's ocean territory requires an efficiently run navy that is capable of operating for extended periods of time away from the home ports. As such the possession of replenishment vessels is essential for the viability of the fleet. At the same time, as was discussed in the section on strategic lift, the vessels that will replace the current AORs should have the ability to act as a roll-on roll-off carrier for the support of expeditionary activities. Finally there is an issue with respect to the replacement of Canada's four destroyers which are rapidly approaching the end of their serviceable life span. The air-defence capability that is provided by these platforms must be present in the Canadian Navy if it is to operate on its own in a combat environment. Furthermore, to fill an operational command the command and control capabilities that are present on the destroyers will have to be replaced.

While the surface fleet is crucial to Canada, the issue of the submarine fleet needs to be re-examined. These vessels, though likely to be fully operational within a matter of years, do not meet Canada's security needs. The cost of maintaining the submarines is quite high and those resources could more usefully be spent on maintaining the surface fleet which is capable of sustaining operations at sea for far greater periods of time, can be readily deployed abroad, and can be used effectively in both alliance and coalition forces.

With respect to their roles as a surveillance platform, this ability could be filled more cost effectively through increased air patrols, or through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can stand

far off of a potential target without being detected, the same role that submarines are supposed to play. The other argument often advanced is that without the submarines the intelligence sharing between our Navy and others which possess such technology will be hampered, possibly representing a threat to Canada's sovereignty. Once again the Canadian expertise in anti-submarine warfare would in all likelihood off-set this capability.

Canadian Reserve Forces

The structure of the Air, Army and Navy Reserve has been the subject of significant debate over the past decade. The Navy Reserve has been the most successful in maintaining relevance. The Navy has made the decision to provide operational taskings to the Navy Reserve, providing the element with a *raison d'être*, a platform relevant to their role - the Kingston Class Minor Coastal Defence Vessel, thus providing a cost effective way of fulfilling some of the Navy's responsibilities. In contrast, the Army and Air Force have been slow to respond to changing military requirements. While some efforts have been made to eliminate duplicated costs by amalgamating the logistical support of militia units, their roles have not been updated in a significant manner over the past 50 years. The militia currently is viewed as a means of providing a surge capability to the CF in the case of a protracted crisis.

The obvious problem is that the nature and speed of warfare has changed dramatically from when this doctrine was put in place. We are no longer in a world where we can spend time fielding forces and bring the level of training up to an acceptable level. As such maintaining a large number of militia units with the main responsibility being providing trained infantrymen is outdated. This does not mean that all such units should be eliminated, but rather that many of them should be reoriented towards other roles. This also means that the government has to find another way to maintain staffing levels on peacekeeping missions that too often have come to rely on reserve units. Conversely in some circumstances peacekeeping may be best done entirely by reservists if the situation is of a low threat level, such as was seen in Cyprus for the last decade of Canadian involvement.

The reserve forces do play an important role in maintaining a military presence in communities across the country. However, to make them of more direct use to Canada and its security, employment protection should be introduced that would enable the use of these men and women. Currently their use is voluntary and as such cannot be relied upon in any significant numbers. The participation of reservists in peacekeeping and other activities is a testament to their dedication rather than the support they receive from the government.

Contrary to the 1994 White Paper, reserve units should not be seen primarily as "replacement personnel for combat units". The roles of militia units should be tailored to provide niche skills to the CF that are beneficial to a reconceptualized security policy. Growing out of a human security orientation, some units could, for instance, be responsible to run water purification facilities, of establishing refugee camps, or

providing the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence (NBCD) capabilities that one fears may one day be required. After September 11th 2001, the risk of massive destruction to urban centres is a reality that we are forced to confront. The militias represent the closest military forces to virtually every major urban centre in Canada. As such every major city should have at least one reserve unit that focuses on disaster relief or defence against NBC attacks.

- Parliament should enact legislation providing job protection for reserve personnel;
- Units should be given roles that complement the regular forces; and
- Specific capabilities for the response to disasters should reside within reserve units.

Joint Task Force 2

The existence of Canada's Joint Task Force 2 has received a great deal of media coverage over the past few years and has been the subject of even greater speculation. Its role in Afghanistan, while poorly understood, represented an important contribution to the American led mission. JTF2 then represents a niche capability that can effectively and meaningfully contribute to allied operations. This allows Canada to meet some of its obligations under NATO, and to demonstrate to the United States that it is willing and capable of contributing to international security. Furthermore, it is a unit that has an obvious use in counter-terrorism within Canada and abroad. Due to its high state of readiness, training and capabilities, JTF2 is able to fill the void between police action and military action involving a much larger deployment of weaponry and personnel. The continued viability of Canada's special forces is seen as essential to meeting Canada's security needs. One also might imagine such an enhanced capability being useful to future UN sponsored operations, again placing Canada in the position of providing highly specialized support to the multilateral peace and security environment.

While the maintenance of secrecy is important for its continued usefulness as an elite commando force, the lack of parliamentary oversight runs counter to the Canadian values of democratic governance which are a corner stone of our security policy. Parliamentary oversight, or the imposition of an independent watchdog that could report directly to Parliament, should be put in place.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

The Disaster Assistance Response Team is a particular resource residing within DND which has proven to be a valuable foreign policy tool. The DART has been dispatched both within Canada and abroad to respond to a variety of disasters. The group has been sent to Honduras, Florida and Turkey to provide immediate relief which the local governments are unable to provide due to the scope of the disaster. This capability has been able to ease the suffering of peoples and to assist in the return to a condition of stability within the affected regions. Besides the capability that DART possesses to ease suffering in an environmental emergency, it also fills a capability gap in responding to terrorist attacks making use of weapons of mass destruction. DART is the logical starting point to build a capability to assist in the

response to, and clean-up, of biological, chemical or nuclear attacks. DART also could be viewed as an important contributor to Canada's human security policy.

Presently personnel are assigned to DART as a secondary duty. The result is that the team is not guaranteed to be available for deployment. As was discussed, the security interests of Canada depend on a stable international environment, additionally Canada has a responsibility to provide assistance to the developing world as well as to aid its allies. The provision of DART provides a means by which Canada can meet some of these obligations. It is our recommendation that DART be stood up as a formal unit with the added mandate of providing a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence capability.

Conclusion

This paper has grown out of the Critical Defence Project being coordinated by the York Centre for International and Security Studies at York University, and has received support from the Security and Defence Forum centres across Canada. The April 2003 symposium put a number of questions to the participants (Appendix 1) and asked them to speak to the issues in a general manner; these questions can be found in Appendix 2. Due to very positive feedback, the Project is evolving to include commissioned research which has as its goal the publication of a text that will fill a gap in Canadian security studies as well as to provide an essential teaching aid to Canadian defence studies. In addition the Critical Defence Project will continue to contribute to the debate on defence policy within Canada and to urge the government to implement changes within the CF that will provide the country with the military it will need to fulfill its international obligations in the years to come.

This paper has been an initial examination of the issue of a Canadian defence policy and has argued that Canada must initiate a comprehensive review of defence policy, a process that must be undertaken in conjunction with a foreign policy review. These reviews must make clear what Canada's security interests are presently, and what they are likely to be in the future, prior to considering a risk assessment. It is only after this is done that a study of Canada's force structure can be undertaken. Moreover, any truly serious planning must be prepared to think outside the conventions established during the Cold War and maintained as the dominant ethos with the CF and DND. Canada is different; the international security and threat environments are different; the Canadian government's capabilities are different.

We have laid out one initial position on how Canada's military should be re-organised to ensure that the government has the ability to use the CF as an effective tool of foreign policy. Our starting position is not much different from that articulated over the past half century: that the CF must be prepared to function in a range of operations from the traditional war fighting, through robust peacekeeping in volatile and hostile environments through peacemaking to peacebuilding in traumatized societies struggling with post-conflict reconstruction. These roles demand a military capable of short term independent activity, rapid mobility, advanced military technology and a high level of professionalism. However, we do not believe

that it is possible for Canada to continue to be “fully combat capable” if this is defined as being able to field the full range of combat capabilities. Canada necessarily is forced to rely on coalition forces in any modern war, a reality that has been confronting the CF since the first Gulf War. In short Canada must make a number of difficult decisions of which capabilities to retain, and which must be jettisoned to ensure that the overall military is able to continue to be relevant to Canada and its allies.

To do so it will be necessary to ask basic questions about the CF, what its roles and responsibilities are, and what Canada is prepared to fund. Finally, we must re-iterate that this does not mean a military that is inexpensive; indeed, the outcome of the review process will most likely result in a call for increased defence spending. However, it does mean that the defence spending must be as effective as possible and ensure that the forces that are put in place are those that will be required. This requires a prior articulation by DFAIT of Canada’s priorities in being prepared to contribute meaningfully to international peace and security, just as it requires a clarification by DND along with other parts of the Canadian government of a coherent national strategy to address current and possibly threats to domestic peace and security.

Appendix 1

List of Participants in the Critical Defence Project symposium, 11 April 2003

Speakers:

David Dewitt and Ryerson Christie (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Opening Remarks

Barbara Van Haute (Carleton University)
Asymmetric Threats and C4ISR Needs

Sara Roberts Pash (University of Victoria)
Post 9/11 and Ethical needs of the CF

Haider Nizamani (Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad)
Post 9/11 Strategies to Combat Terrorism and Changing Public Values and Expectations in the Muslim World

Peggy Mason (The Norman Patterson School for International Relations, Carleton University)
International Law or the Law of the Jungle: Whither Canadian Defence Policy?

Ryerson Christie and Kyle Grayson (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Human Security and Implications for Defence Planning

Scott Fogden (Cultural Diversity Institute, University of Calgary)
'Security' in a Changing International Environment

Tami Jacoby (Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba)
Civil Society Policing and the CF

Andrew Latham (Macalester College)
The Transformation of War, Warfare and Warfighting: Implications for the CF

Samantha Arnold (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Irreconcilable differences? Cultural Diversity and Military Culture

Deborah Harrison (University of New Brunswick) and Lucie Laliberte (Children's Aid Society of Hamilton)
They Also Serve: Quality of Life Issues for Canadian Forces Spouses and Children

Martin Shadwick (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Non-Military Roles of CF Equipment

Scot Robertson (Royal Military College of Canada)
Inside the Iron Triangle: The Current Defence Dilemma and the Scope for the Future

Andrew Richter (University of Windsor)
Strategic Ambitions, Military Capabilities, and Fiscal Realities: Future Options for the Canadian Forces

Other attendees:

Elizabeth Dauphinée (Centre for International and Security Studies)

Cristina Masters (Centre for International and Security Studies)

David Mutimer (Centre for International and Security Studies)

Christopher Spearin (Centre for International and Security Studies)

Appendix 2 - Call for Papers

Critical Defence Project – Symposium – 11 April 2003

In developing the Defence Update the Department of National Defence has laid out a series of trends and challenges that face Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF). These trends are to be used as the basis for policy planning and to establish the bounds of the debate on defence policy within Canada. However, these trends themselves are left unchallenged and their relevance and impact are not adequately debated. This provides an ideal location for the project to cut into the debate and to provide an important contribution to the ongoing review. An exploration of the trends and challenges will in part demonstrate that the manner in which the trends and challenges are constructed can effectively preclude policy options. A breakdown of the ten trends, and a very brief explanation of DND's approach to them, can be found at: www.forces.gc.ca/menu/consult/current_policy/defence_portfolio/section_11_e.asp

To quickly summarize, the list is as follows: Changing International Environment; Post September 11; Changing Nature of Military Operations; Rapid Pace of Technological Change; Increasing Operational Tempo; Enhancing the Quality of Life of Canadian Forces Personnel; Changing Public Values and Expectations; Reform and Cultural Change; and Defence Reduction.

Papers should critically examine one of the trends laid out by DND. While the author's approach, and whether it is narrowly or broadly focussed, will depend on the individual, there are four general questions that the papers should address:

1. How does the trend limit discussion on defence policy?
2. How can the trend be opened up?
3. What is not being asked?
4. What are the implications of a critical analysis of the trend for defence policy in Canada?