Violent Interventions

Selected Proceedings of the
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the
York Centre for International and
Security Studies

Edited by Mark Ayyash and Chris Hendershot

**York Centre for International
and Security Studies**

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academics, policymakers, practitioners, and activists across Canada and around the
world. Our members include York faculty and graduate students, and visiting scholars
from inside and outside Canada.

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Editorial Foreword

Mark Ayyash and Chris Hendershot

The York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS) held its 15th Annual Conference on 7-8 February 2008. Entitled *Violent Interventions* and set against a backdrop of recent and prospective military and humanitarian interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, and Darfur as well as past interventions in places such as India, Congo, and Zimbabwe, conference participants were tasked with the goal of interrogating practices, processes, and perspectives of violent interventions. For the purpose of exploring the logic(s), breadth, and scope of violent interventions, conference participants were encouraged to investigate the methods, sites, and justifications of and for violent interventions on a global, transnational, local, and personal level. With such a broad call, the conference sought to push understandings and interpretations of violent interventions by bringing together critical scholars from a variety of academic disciplines. To this extent, it could be said that the conference was a resounding success as scholars from Political Science, Sociology, Geography, Anthropology, and Environmental Studies effectively tackled such issues as the militarization of and militarizing effects of interventions, the creed of 'good intentions,' the a/effects of violent interventions, images and imaginings of violent interventions, and theorizing violence. The following collection brings together a series of diverse papers presented at the conference.

Our proceedings begin with AK Thompson's consideration of violence's potential to break the 'representational paradigm' of the bourgeois political world. Drawing on critical social theory as well as the histories of social movements and modern terrorism, Thompson explores the epistemological connection between activists and terrorists. In this provocative piece, Thompson advances an auto-critique of activist discourse by calling attention to the limits of their conception of 'violence.' Although contemporary social movements have made considerable efforts to distinguish themselves from terrorists, both tactics arise from a common allegiance to and immersion in the representational sphere of bourgeois politics. According to Thompson, activist disavowals of terrorism conceal their common subordination to the bourgeois representational sphere while, at the same time, making it difficult for activists themselves to consider a genuinely political 'productive violence.' In Thompson's estimation, such violence could transform activists from 'resisters' and 'consumers' of the spectacular to agents of radical change and 'producers' of the unthinkable and new.

Highlighting the diverse avenues in which this conference was meant to explore violent interventions is Mike Larsen's piece on the 'violence of imprisonment.' While we often hear about violence in prison, Larsen points us towards the processes and discourses that lead to the securitization of migration in Canada.

By examining the discourses, institutions, and techniques of the Canadian security certificate regime, Larsen carefully illustrates the intricate intersections that have transformed and shaped the face of Canadian security, and most importantly, that have led to the indefinite imprisonment of 'security certificate subjects.' A variety of questions surrounding law, citizenship, government transparency, security, and violence are interwoven throughout the detailed analysis of an issue that requires much closer attention and scrutiny in Canada than it is currently receiving.

Addressing emerging interventions in the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the Canadian Arctic Jesse Ovadia and Lori Crowe respectively offer papers that focus on the complex interactions and intersections of militarization, resource extraction and environmental consequences, and imperialism and historical exploitation. For Ovadia the creation of Africa Command (AFRICOM) by the United States in 2006 can and must be understood as an instance of American Imperialism which secures its global economic interests through military intervention. In this case AFRICOM gives the United States a significant (military) presence in what Ovadia refers to as the 'new scramble for Africa.' Ovadia asserts that an increased American presence in Africa must be opposed in order to prevent a deepening of processes of underdevelopment and surplus extraction.

Citing recent announcements by the Canadian government to increase its military presence in the Canadian Arctic, Crowe offers a critical rejoinder, if not warning, that the Canadian Government must be better prepared to listen to Inuit and Innu peoples or risk repeating a history of social dislocation and economic exploitation. Reviewing the impacts of the installation of the DEW Line, establishment of the Goose Bay Air Force Base, and the forced relocation of people to Grise Ford, Resolute Bay, and Davis Inlet, Crowe maintains that although many avenues do exist for the Inuit and Innu to speak and be heard, historical interaction with the Canadian Forces has resulted in much social, economic, cultural, and environmental upheaval. As such, the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence must be prepared to create innovative initiatives in partnership with Inuit and Innu peoples.

Where Ovadia and Crowe locate interventions across and within state borders, Sanja Dejanovic offers analysis of violent interventions at state borders. Drawing on the works of Foucault, Agamben, and Doty, Dejanovic considers: 1) how historical conceptions of citizenship in the United States create 'illegal' and thus deportable bodies; 2) how the United States-Mexico border is performed and reproduced as a space of 'disciplinary partitioning' that further works to (re)produce Mexican migrant bodies as docile and thus economically exploitable, and; 3) how the combination of an illegal status and disciplinary

partitioning work to (re)produce Mexican Migrants as threatening bodies 'worthy' of a horrific death in the deserts of the American border states.

In Kristen Ali's paper the scope of intervention is much smaller, but by no means less significant, as she focuses on issues of bodily representation in the homes of American soldiers. Analyzing the distribution of 'flat mommies and daddies' to homes of deployed American military personnel, Ali contends that we can understand the flat mommies and daddies as revealing the necessity of the maintenance of a 'fantasy of the family' in the (re)production of spaces and boundaries, particularly national subjectivities that rely on a dichotomy between the domestic and the foreign. Moreover, Ali seeks to undercut this 'fantasy of family' by discussing how flat mommies and daddies demonstrate how this fantasy is always unstable and incomplete.

Representation's Limit: The Epistemology of Spectacular Violence

AK Thompson

Positing a conceptual identity between activism and terrorism has not customarily been a project of the Left. Exactly the opposite seems to be true. Since the 19th Century, the history of political repression reads in part as a story of precisely this opportunistic conflation. Invoking the specter of terrorism has been one of the means by which social movement actors have been excluded from the realm of legitimate claim making. Today, the expansive conception of "enemy" underwriting America's war on terror - now focused increasingly on the domestic threat of eco-activists[1] - confirms the relative ease, pervasiveness, and longevity of this conflation. Given the grave consequences of being labeled a terrorist, it's not surprising that activists have worked hard to distance themselves from the category. Because of terrorism's inevitable exclusion from the law, and given the extent to which social movements have relied upon the relative stability of rights to make political claims,[2] the activist denunciation of terrorism makes complete sense.

For the state, conflating activists with terrorists has been more than a smear tactic. Given the threat that social movements have sometimes posed for the rule of capital, and given the contradictions inherent in liberal rights discourse, it's understandable that the state has sometimes worked to cast activists as terrorists.[3] Although the tactic is not new, it gained ground during the period of

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[1] In their Terrorism 2002-2005 report, the FBI found that 22 of the 24 recorded "terrorist incidents" from 2002 to 2005 were allegedly perpetrated by "special interest extremists active in the animal rights and environmental movements."

[2] In his definitive historical account of the social movement as a discrete phenomenon, Charles Tilly emphasizes how the right to assembly, association, and speech that came into being under bourgeois rule provided the basis for social movement performances and routines, as well as a context for their displays of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (2004:64). The social movement as we know it today is a child of the bourgeois revolution.

[3] Even prior to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the ensuing "war on terror," Canadian law enforcement agencies were busy trying to classify participants in the short-lived "anti-globalization movement" as potential terrorist threats. The most explicit expression of this process was when the RCMP arrested members of the affinity group Germinal in the lead up to protests against the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April of 2001. Two days before the summit, seven members of the group had their apartments raided and were arrested on charges of "conspiracy to commit mischief that could present a real danger to the lives of

anti-globalization struggles that inaugurated the 21st Century. After September 11, legislative bodies in Canada, the United States, and elsewhere seized the opportunity to give the conflation new teeth.[4]

In order to get a sense of some of the uses to which this conflation has been put, it is useful to consider the case of Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) organizer John Clarke. In a first-person testimonial that circulated widely over the Internet, Clarke recounts how, after scanning his identification, the US-Canada border guard determined that he was a threat to Homeland Security.

> An officer asked me more questions about my intentions in the US, what anti globalization protests I had attended and whether I opposed the 'ideology of the United States.' My car was searched and I was taken into a room and thoroughly (though not roughly) frisked. I was then told that I would be denied entry to the US and that the FBI and State Department wanted to speak to me.[5]

During his time in custody, Clarke reports how security officials frequently connived to get him to disclose information or to contradict information they

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people", "possession of explosives with dangerous intent", and "theft and concealment of military equipment." It was later revealed that police facilitated the acquisition of these materials. The incident marked an important precursor to a practice that would be revitalized during the war on terror. In the summer of 2006, 12 Toronto men were arrested on similar charges. According to a CBC report, "Police accuse the suspects of planning to use bombs made from ammonium nitrate, a common fertilizer. They are alleged to have bought three tonnes of ammonium nitrate - three times the amount used in the bombing of a U.S. government building in Oklahoma City that killed 168 people in 1995 - from undercover officers."

[4] In November of 2001, during House of Commons debates leading up to the passage of Bill C-36, Canada's anti-terror legislation, Liberal MP John Bryden defended the Bill despite the likelihood that it would infringe upon civil liberties and the right to dissent. In his estimation, the Bill needed to be sufficiently broad so as to capture anti-globalization protest within its grasp. "What choice do we have?" Bryden asked. "These are not peaceful protests we are dealing with. We are dealing with violent protests and it becomes increasingly dangerous to have any kind of international conference… [A]s long as protestors are allowed to wear masks, as long as they use violence and as long as there is a chance that terrorists may be infiltrating such protestors wearing masks, I do not know what choice we have but to give the RCMP reasonable powers to bring peace to protestors" (Hansard, 29 November 2001). The bill passed.

[5] http://www.counterpunch.org/clarke1.html.

already had so they could arrest him for lying. On a number of occasions, their line of questioning pertained to the activities of high-profile Canadian activists and of US organizations like the Direct Action Network (DAN). However, it was just when Clarke thought he would be able to leave that things got absurd: "Out of the blue, [the interrogator] demanded to know where Osama Bin Laden was hiding. I knew were he was, he insisted. If I grew a beard I would look like Bin Laden… If I didn't want to go to jail, it was time to tell him the real story."[6]

Clarke's experience reveals the willingness of security forces to use the threat of misrecognition - a threat that takes as its premise the conceptual interchangeability of activist and terrorist - in order to regulate dissent. And while it seems unlikely that the conflation was meant to produce anything other than a ripple in an otherwise calm demeanor, it seems clear that the possibility of generating and justifying intelligible conflations has become a valuable asset in the contemporary arsenal of state intelligence and control.

During the course of exchanges like the one recounted above, activists have sometimes made efforts to counter state representations that cast them as terrorists. They have done so by actively condemning violence and actively denouncing terrorism as a strategy for social change.[7] However, in a context where protest is held in esteem as a visible expression of democratic rights and freedoms, attempts to cast social movement actors as terrorists inevitably run counter to devices marshaled by the state to legitimate its sovereign monopoly on political power and violence. One of those devices has been the interpellation of social movements as institutional supplements.[8] It is therefore not surprising

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Drawing on watered-down and moralized socialist orthodoxy, activists have regularly denounced terrorism as a form of social substitution. However, as Naomi Klein pointed out in a an article appearing in The Nation in October of 2001, the difficulty of preserving the distinction has arisen in large measure as a result of the ways in which both activists and terrorists have engaged in what she calls "symbolic warfare." After September 11, "politicians and pundits around the world instantly began spinning the terrorist attacks as part of a continuum of anti-American and anticorporate violence: first the Starbucks window, then, presumably, the WTC."

[8] In a recent edition of the London Review of Books, Slavoj Zizek made the relationship between democratic liberalism and social movements clear when he wrote: "The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don't agree with the government's policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even

to find Liberal Senator Sharon Carstairs (Manitoba) making efforts to draw clear distinctions between good and bad protestors during Senate debates immediately following the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in April of 2001.

> Let me begin by saying that I think the Summit of the Americas was a great success with respect to the manner in which the police forces behaved and with respect to the way in which those individuals who were peaceful demonstrators - and they were by far the vast majority of participants in Quebec City - behaved. One very poignant moment for me was when one young student, who clearly was there for peaceful activism, waved his hand to gain the attention of violent protestors and said, "Don't you understand? You are ruining it for the rest of us."[9]

Because of the personal and political consequences associated with being found on the wrong side of the law, it's understandable that many activists have conceptually aligned themselves with the "respectable" protestors intended by liberal rights. However, by tacitly supporting the state's differentiating taxonomy of contentious claim-makers, these activists have often provided the state with additional leverage. Following Carstairs' lead, many politicians seized upon the ambiguities of activist self-identification in order to draw deeper distinctions between the "good" law-abiding protestor and the "bad" terrorist element. Ostensibly designed to regulate the bad elements, the logic of regulation meant that - because of the possibilities afforded by the threat of misrecognition - both groups came under intensified control.

For activists, it was troubling to see that the organizational nomenclature adopted by social movements in one moment could become part of the policing strategy at a subsequent action. During the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, in the interests of making the protest as broad as possible, organizers divided the demonstration into three separate zones, each designated by a different color (red, yellow, green) and a different degree of anticipated confrontation. Just over a year later, police at the G8 meeting in Kananaskis, Alberta used this same color code to generate a risk-based taxonomy of troublemakers. Added to the color scheme - and to the top of the list - were the gold-colored terrorists. The conceptual distinction between gold and green

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profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it'" (15 November 2007).

[9] Hansard: 1st Session, 37th Parliament, Volume 139, Issue 27. Tuesday, 24 April 2001.

might have afforded some activists some breathing room. However, because state officials have reasoned that terrorists might lurk amidst crowds of good law-abiding demonstrators, the vigilance of law enforcement must be extended to all present.

Despite activists claims to the contrary, a historical investigation of the connection between social movements and terrorism reveals that both formations share a common provenance. Modern forms of social movements and terrorism arose in the late 18th Century and came into their own during the 19th Century. Both were made possible by the contradictory dynamics of the bourgeois public sphere. Both are the bastard children of a political world the bourgeoisie created in its own image. That world was shaped first and foremost by the problem of representation. During the 19th Century, because "the public" was viewed as a political object that was not yet a political actor, the trick was to relate to it in a manner that would compel it to yield desired outcomes.

Unlike socialism (which, by virtue of its emphasis on production, began to develop a post-representational conception of dual power), social movements became contentious actors *within* the representational paradigm of the bourgeois public sphere (Tilly 2004: 138). Whether or not it was their intention (although often it was), social movements managed to provide a means for people to identify with the bourgeoisie's legitimating structures. Or, to put it another way, social movement's legitimated the "is" of the public sphere by demanding that it live up to the promise of its "ought." Although their methods were different, terrorists gravitated toward this same point of ambiguity.

Recounting the actions of Auguste Vaillant, an anarchist who threw a bomb in the French National Assembly in 1893 and said "the more they are deaf, the more your voice must thunder out so that they will understand you," Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf explain how "the unequal chances of expressing oneself, brought about by the rise of the big press, contributed to the rise of terrorism as 'expressive' politics" (1982: 11). Both the social movement and the terrorist sought to affect the public by launching assaults on constituted power in order to intervene in political processes to which they had no direct access. Both perceived the public in representational terms. In contrast to socialism, both social movement actors and terrorists viewed the public primarily in terms appropriate to the market. The public was thought to react to inputs; through its demands, it would eventually get what it wanted.

Initially, both social movements and terrorists were able to produce significant effects within the bourgeois public sphere. Perhaps one of the most significant victories (and one of the points at which social movements and terrorism most fully overlapped) came from the struggle for women's suffrage. Historian

Trevor Lloyd recounts how, in the year 1913, militant suffragettes "burnt a couple of rural railway stations … placed a bomb in the house being built for [British Cabinet Minister] Lloyd George at Walton Heath in Surrey, and … wrote 'Votes for Women' in acid on the greens of some golf courses." What's more, "these attacks were meant to hurt" (1971: 89). While suffragettes prior to 1913 broke the law in the hopes of becoming martyrs and to make speeches at their trials, their exclusion from the official channels of representational politics led them to seek out alternate means of entering that domain.

The change of tactics corresponded to a shift in the optimism that movements felt about the opportunities afforded by the public sphere. As that sphere began to narrow through the course of the 20th Century, both social movements and terrorism became estranged from the public. This situation produced an impasse. Having accepted the public sphere as their terrain of struggle, and having acclimatized to its later spectacularization, both social movements and terrorists - despite their radical programs - became ensnared in the representational machinery of bourgeois politics. Although they contested the content of bourgeois rule (and although they critiqued the moribund character of the representational apparatus), they nevertheless started by taking the bourgeois commitment to representational politics as self-evident.

By refusing to identify the significant continuities between the activist and terrorist orientation to the representational politics of spectacular capitalism (by failing to consider the epistemological continuity between activist and terrorist orientations to "the public"), social movements have forfeited the possibility of engaging in a form of auto-criticism that could significantly enhance the consequences of our political activity.

The proposition that activists should turn their critique of terrorism into an auto-critique should not be understood as an attack on the occasional use of violent tactics to which movements have sometimes felt entitled. In fact, the critique of social movement allegiances to the bourgeois representational sphere enables activists to engage *more completely and more productively* in forms of political violence. Specifically, the critique of terrorism as bastard inversion of bourgeois politics, when extended as auto-critique, enables us to begin envisioning our violence in the "pure" or productive form considered by Walter Benjamin in 1921. Paradoxically, contemporary activists are epistemologically closer to terrorists when they choose to make their interventions in the register of the spectacular rather than engaging directly in productive violence.

In Refractions of Violence (2003), Martin Jay recounts how the shipwreck can serve as the marker of epistemological moments. In ancient Greece, the shipwreck stood - for the witness, at least - as the mark of Nature's

irrefutability. Being torn apart at sea was a sober reminder of the relationship between man and his world. Later, for thinkers like Pascal, the shipwreck would provide the witness with a smug satisfaction. Good judgment and sure footing on dry land, Pascal intoned, would save some while others drowned. By the time of Nietzsche, all dry land had vanished. Cast adrift and lacking even a moral compass, the best one could do was to keep from being subsumed. The spectator and the shipwreck began to share an eerie proximity.

By the beginning of the 20th Century, the spectator celebrated (or was forced to deal with) sensorial immediacy as a regular feature of everyday life. At the world's fairs, people were treated to the possibility of riding whirling contraptions that, in some instances, were meant to replicate the feeling of being seasick. Once the precondition for moral reflection, the unmediated standpoint of the spectator had been totally supplanted by unadulterated presence. It is a state that shows no sign of abating. In hindsight, the story of the 20th Century may well be told as a story about the intensification of the simultaneous experiences of proximate distance and distant proximity. It was precisely this phenomenon that Guy Debord described in Society of the Spectacle.

Debord tells us that images become objects in their own right when they fuse with the stream of representations and when its orientation shifts from the objects they once signified to the world of images themselves (1983: 2). Even though the image ostensibly continues to represent the thing it signifies, it becomes increasingly difficult for the viewer to reconnect the image to the thing. In this way, representation - as formalized in bourgeois epistemology - makes it difficult for people to experience themselves as participants in the world of the signified. As signifier, the image emancipated from its referent becomes everything. Unmediated experience, like the fear and trembling that the ancient Greeks felt before the shipwreck, begins to recede into a mythological past.

How can radicals work to heal the divide between signifier, representation, and consumption, on the one hand, and the signified, the real, and production on the other? Since the advent of the bourgeois public sphere (and especially since its mid-20th Century spectacular transformation), political violence has often been marshaled to produce effects at the level of the signifier. However, violence as such corresponds more directly to the sphere of production and to activity at the level of the signified. Its attributes are identical to the attributes of the labor

process outlined by Marx in Chapter VII of <u>Capital</u>.[10] Reconnecting with violence as a productive act (an act where production happens directly and not by way of mediating proxy forces) will allow social movements to move away from terrorism and enable them to begin pushing against the representational limits of the bourgeois horizon.

In May 1968, students and workers took to the streets of Paris and nearly sparked a revolution. Among their other remarkable slogans was the wisdom "*sous les pavés, la plage.*" The point was simple, beautiful, and concrete. Underneath these cobblestones was sand. Underneath the order they had imposed was a world of unstructured time, a world of possibility. With every cobblestone ripped from the street and hurled at the CRS (Les Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité), demonstrators would come one step closer to uncovering what was possible. What was hidden would be revealed. The force of action would bring into view all that had been hidden.

In April of 2005, a demonstration and street party called *Karna[ge]val* also took to the streets of Paris. These demonstrators also aimed to uncover what was hidden. The *double entendre* of the name made clear what was at stake. The carnivalesque world of the spectacle had bracketed within it a moment of destruction. This bracketed ruin would be illuminated, however, by the carnival the demonstrators would unleash to confront it. And so, while the balance of the visible and the hidden had been flipped (in 1968, beauty needed to be uncovered; at *Karna[ge]val* beauty itself was the mask behind which carnage hid), the project appeared to be the same.

As I arrived at Place de la République on the afternoon of April 9[th], I was confronted with the beautiful site of thousands of people - mostly young and mostly crusty - taking over the park in the middle of the square. Circled around

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[10] This connection becomes clear when both violence and labor are considered as ontological categories. Violence implies the transformation of a thing in such a way that the connection between the thing and the idea that once designated it is ruptured (the experience of violation is confusing precisely because of the epistemic discontinuity arising from the ontological transformation enacted from without). Likewise, in German, the noun *gewalt* designates the ability to have one's own intention inscribed upon the world taken as object in such a way that the object comes into conformity, ontologically with one's intention. Is this not the same process described by Marx in his account of people's metabolic relationship to nature, where one transforms the world through labor on the basis of the idea - intrinsic to the producer - that existed prior to the labor process itself? Although Hannah Arendt disputed precisely this analogy in her treatise <u>On Violence</u> (1970), it is clear that the objection rests on moral or ethical grounds rather than ontological ones.

the edge of the park were dozens of vans rigged up with sound systems playing deep house music. The gathering stood out like a sore thumb in the middle of an otherwise well-behaved neighborhood. From the adjacent sidewalks, onlookers gathered to gawk or shake their heads in dismay. As I got closer to the center of the action, someone handed me a leaflet.

"Once again, we must reclaim the streets to demonstrate and affirm our artistic and cultural convictions…" The action was aimed squarely at the depravity of market relationships and the opulence of consumption. In opposition to this paradigm, which the organizers claimed required both "demagogy" and a creeping "securitization" of the public sphere, the activists gathered on that day spoke instead of the creativity flourishing outside (or beneath) the market. Here, the leaflet explained, people were producing without a thought for the spectacle and its endless supply of consumer clients.

Although it was not yet the festival of the oppressed promised by Marx, the gathering was nevertheless a striking counterpoint to the neighborhood in which it had assembled. Hundreds of kids gathered around sound systems and danced wildly in the middle of the street. Others climbed the austere statues in the middle of the park and, like spiders, began spinning colored ribbon in the wind. Below them on the grass, activists gathered in small and large groups and passed around bottles of beer and wine. Although the CRS could be seen at every corner of the square, they kept their distance.

Lacking a clear message or explicit goal beyond self-expression in the context of its general prohibition, *Karna[ge]val* encouraged people to create an alternative space within the constraints of the everyday. Although event organizers negotiated a parade route with the police, the gathering did not feel contrived. As an unruly presence within an otherwise tranquil neighborhood, it enabled a brief disruption in the immediate flow of what Debord called the "common stream in which the unity of this life can no longer be reestablished" (1983: 2). In this respect, *Karna[ge]val* exceeded the permits it had been granted.

But despite the possibility of energetic spillover, activists on the march made little effort to engage with the people on the event's sidelines. Maybe the organizers and participants simply sought to create an alternative space in which to enjoy the initial approximations of a new kind of community. But if community was all that was sought, then the point of staging the action at Place de la République is not entirely obvious. Certainly, feelings of solidarity could just as easily have arisen in the darkened warehouses of the dance scene - spaces that had furnished the vast majority of participants for the day's action. What

did the disapproving gaze of the mainstream bring to this event that would not have been there otherwise?

In a kind of double move, where one invites the gaze of the public while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge it, the object of this demonstration became the participants' refusal itself. Whatever the disruption to the immediate flow in the common stream in which the unity of life can no longer be reestablished, there remained a more important assertion of ontological distance. *Karna[ge]val* was an exercise in negating the bourgeois representational order. By trying to arrest the flow of the modern spectacle's imperceptible immediacy, *Karna[ge]val* stood as a potentially important pedagogical opportunity. However, to the extent that its critique of the spectacle became spectacular (to the extent that it operated not at the level of the signified but rather at that of the signifier), it is doubtful that those pedagogical opportunities could ever be fulfilled.[11]

Recounting the rise of the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany after the decline of the New Left student movement, Slavoj Zizek recounts how RAF insurgents felt that the movement's failures demonstrated that consciousness-raising was no longer sufficient. For the mass of people, "a more violent intervention was needed to shake them out of their ideological numbness, their hypnotic consumerist state, and only direct violent interventions like bombing supermarkets would do the job" (2002: 9). At this point, Zizek asks the obvious: "does the same not hold, on a different level, for today's fundamental terror?"

The RAF is not ordinarily considered an exemplary role model for mass movements. Nevertheless, because of the conditions of their emergence and the orientation they adopted toward the spectacular world, they remain a significant reference point in any investigation of contemporary movement activity. Based on the experience of the RAF, it is important to consider how some approaches to activism - and here I am speaking not about violence but rather about the manipulation of signifiers - have tended to engage with the rupture at the heart of modern experience (where the logic of the surface is at odds with the truth of the substance) in precisely the same fashion as happens with the terrorist act.

In The Spirit of Terrorism, Jean Baudrillard advanced a now-familiar argument about the importance of images. Rehearsing positions established in his earlier

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[11] And here we need only to remember how, in Paulo Freire's radical pedagogy, the "generative themes" (1996: 87) that serve as object and means of investigation accord to the productive image in Marx's description of the labor process. As such, pedagogy itself requires productive activity at the level of the signified. There is no transformative learning without it.

work, Baudrillard argued that *the visual* had become central in the experience of terrorism. What remains in the aftermath of the attack are the images. The very experience of September 11, Baudrillard claimed, was *the same as* "the sight of the images."

> This impact of the images, and their fascination, are necessarily what we retain, since images are, whether we like it or not, our primal scene. And at the same time as they have radicalised the world situation, the events in New York can also be said to have radicalised the relation of the image to reality. Whereas we were dealing before with an uninterrupted profusion of banal images and a seamless flow of sham events, the terrorist act in New York has resuscitated both images and events (27).

Baudrillard's assessment says as much about the spectacular state of the present as it does about terrorism. Indeed, the "uninterrupted profusion of banal images and [the] seamless flow of sham events" seem to be derived from the same list of concerns that motivated Debord. However, for Baudrillard, it is in the terrorist act - and not "the situation" - that the power to rupture our cycle of endless repetitions is located. It is terrorism that elevates image and event to a new status. It is terrorism that brings image and event closer together. The disjuncture between signifier and signified seems to be resolved by the apocalyptic act.

Two accounts of epistemic and political resolution seem to be at work. In the first, image and event come together and things and their names return to their state of unmediated inseparability. In the second, image and event come together because the image - through its expansive mutations - consumes the event entirely. It becomes its representational proxy (the copy for which there is no original, Baudrillard's simulacrum). The experience of shock brought about by terrorism seems to promise the former but deliver the latter. However, because the latter (by its very logic) becomes all, it absorbs the former as a trace, a spectral possibility. In reality, there are not two strategies. There are only two phases of a single process by which the image is reenergized as a modality of the political. And so, while the *content* of people's experience is transformed by representational catastrophe, their *mode* of experiencing is not.

The fact that this disruption can feel radical arises not from an epistemological break but a political one, where a short circuit in the representational sequence causes it to momentarily come undone. However, while the terrorist act, as an attempt at sovereign assertion (as a bid to decide the exception), suggests that the terrorist is engaged in what Benjamin described as law-making violence, the act nevertheless remains bound by the representational logic of bourgeois epistemology. It is an action in excess of the law that serves in the end to

reaffirm the law itself. The sovereign claim-maker who does not (and cannot) attain to sovereignty itself ends by being "enemy" and, in this fashion, provides the basis for the revitalization of constituted power. In Debord's formulation, the state invents terrorism as its representational negation, the enemy other that confirms it (1990). The same can be said of contemporary state responses to social movements.[12]

Under the conditions of late capitalism, the image has increasingly come to be perceived not as distinct from but rather as constitutive of reality. Since this is the case, then the interjection of the spectacular act will tend not to the reconcile image and reality but rather to confirm (or further enable) the process of "resolution" whereby the image consumes reality and reestablishes epistemological unity by proxy. For Baudrillard and Zizek, the experience of sensorial immediacy that overcomes the viewer considering an action movie appears to be the only remaining register of experience in a world where the liar has lied to himself. In a world where action at the level of the signified is perceived to be the stuff of religion, the expert manipulation of the signifier becomes the sole stuff of politics. To the extent that those who planned the attacks spoke in a language their targets would understand (killing people without cameras would not have done the trick), they rearticulated the epistemological conventions of bourgeois "politics" in its spectacular-representational moment, where production is subordinated to consumption and where the signifier appears to have become the thing itself.

How do we account for the persistence of representation and its enduring role as epistemological substructure to bourgeois politics? How do we account for the fact that, even when shaken by events that brought the reality of the image to bear in all its visceral presence, representation (a concept that carries within it the spectral trace of the signified and, as such, is susceptible to immanent critique) has endured as the primary mode of political engagement? In order to answer these questions, it is useful to consider the location of the terrorist act within the realm of experience. Specifically, it is useful to delineate the way that terrorist acts intersect with and respond to the configuration of the public sphere in the period of late capitalism. Here, terrorism becomes a strategy aimed at disrupting the constitutive continuity of the exchange between *the mass* and *the*

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[12] As Ward Churchill and others have explained, the modern democratic state has made use of social movements as a kind of informal polling option. In this way, they have been able to repackage policies in order to make them more palatable without ever having to change overall policy direction (1998: 51-52).

passerby.[13] By simultaneously inviting the gaze and refusing to acknowledge it, the terrorist manages to momentarily disrupt the *mass-passerby* circuit. Nevertheless, the circuit's condition of possibility - its material substratum - remains untouched. Without a decisive challenge to bourgeois epistemology and its material substructure, even the seemingly pure act - violence as an end in itself - can be recuperated as image. And while the intensified image heightens the experience of presence for the viewer, this presence is not yet direct engagement with the material world. For that, another kind of violence is required.

We thus find, in the attack on the World Trade Center, an intensification of the basic epistemological move underlying *Karna[ge]val*. The bastard children of the public sphere know how to torment their parents; what they can't yet do is assume the responsibility of bringing to birth a new world from the ashes of the old. "Resistance" is confused with vying for power. In the end, despite the severity of their tantrum, the actions of both activists and terrorists conform to the bourgeois politics of demand ("recognize us") even as they deny the necessary allegiance to constituted power their demand entails.

Since we have yet to develop reliable means by which to map relations as they are occurring without dialectics and organizations that enable us to occupy two perceptual locations simultaneously, the remaining possibilities are to believe in what is immediately evident or to pray for Dionysian revelations. But though the social is brought closer by these strategies, it is never analytically clarified. As the epistemological fruit of contemporary activism and terrorism, this situation accords more or less to the modern fascination with disasters. Unable to live directly on account of the suppression of the signified yet stricken by a feeling of unending lack, the subjects of late capitalism are often left - like the narrator of Fight Club - to hope for a plane crash.

What emerges from the momentary short-circuiting of the representational cycle brought about by activist and terrorist acts is an open question. On the one hand, the rupture can take the shape of an illumination, a moment when all the contingent activity that makes up the social in its totality comes into view (a moment where crisis reveals the underlying ordering of social relations and the precariousness of their assembly). This is undoubtedly what activists hope for

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[13] In Society of the Spectacle, Debord recounts this relationship as follows: "In the spectacle, one part of the world represents itself to the world and is superior to it. The spectacle is nothing more than the common language of this separation. What binds the spectators together is no more than the irreversible relation at the very center which maintains their isolation. The spectacle reunites the separate, but reunites it *as separate*" (1983: 29).

when they set out to break the spell of the spectacle. The new situation, although it emerges through spectacular means, is meant to demonstrate that there are never really spectators, only participants. On the other hand, the rupture in the representational circuit can lead to a break with certainty that produces not illumination but atomization. Although people's experiences are increasingly individuated, the representational *mass* of spectacular capitalism operates as proxy for prior forms of collectivity for which people still long. The abolition of *the mass* achieved by overloading the representational circuit momentarily deprives people of this index. Caught in the representational field without an intelligible object to contemplate, *the passerby* retreats from the social. This outcome is of little use to activists. It doesn't do much for terrorists either.

If forms of representational action, no matter how critical (or how violent), have a tendency to reiterate the epistemological premises of the bourgeois world, what should activists do? How do we overcome the limits of the bourgeois horizon? As I've already suggested, we can begin with a reorientation from "resistance" to forms of engagement that systematically build counter-institutions capable of vying for power. This means reconceptualizing social movements as modes of production. In order get our bearings, it is useful to briefly consider the lessons to be learned from Walter Benjamin's essay on violence.

Describing the emergence of the modern spectacular realm of parliamentary politics, Benjamin noted how "when the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay. In our times, parliaments provide an example of this. They offer the familiar, woeful spectacle because they have not remained conscious of the revolutionary force to which they owe their existence" (1978: 288). Which is to say: to the extent that it remains sovereign, parliamentarianism rests not on law-making but rather on law-preserving violence. This kind of violence is managerial rather than productive. It commits people to custodial care for the existing world. In contrast to law-preserving violence, law-making violence entails a production, a contest between competing sovereign agencies. However, because the new reality is embedded *post festum* into law, it once again becomes representationally distorted.

Benjamin contrasts these forms of violence to what he calls divine violence. This violence is both productive and post-representational. It does not cede to law and is the preserve of neither activism nor terrorism. Its provenance is not the bourgeois public sphere. Its basis is not spectacular intervention or the attempted negation of contemplative perception. It does not seek to transform the meaning of the perceptually consumed object. Its vocation is production. Divine violence accords with the global materialization of the labor process

described by Marx in Chapter VII of <u>Capital</u>. Unlike representational politics, it transforms not the "what" of consumption but rather its "how." It reconnects consumption to production and unifies both under a single category - *sensuous activity*. By recovering access to the signified in this way, divine violence illuminates the lacunae at the heart of modern experience. It does so by producing something new.

This kind of violence is not available to activists in the first instance. In order to acquire it, activists must renounce their parents and leave the house of representational politics. They must journey beyond the proxy forms it was built upon. Because it necessarily entails the forfeiture of the state-granted rights upon which activists currently depend, it requires the willingness to assume all the obligations of a usurper. But even by orienting *analytically* toward this kind of violence, activists could begin to draw a clear distinction between themselves and the representational sphere. Because this distinction requires an epistemological break with the representational schizophrenia underlying bourgeois experience, it means that social movements - in order to not be like terrorists - will have to stop thinking like the children of the bourgeoisie. And while the superficial identity between activist and terrorist violence will continue to be an important consideration for the state, this does not mean that it should remain the primary consideration for activists.

Since activists operating under current conditions in North America are not yet able to assume the responsibilities of the usurper, and since the forms of political activity with which we have remained content to amuse ourselves seem destined to infuse the representational cycle with a new vitality, it is necessary to consider practical first steps in the direction of divine violence. Provisionally, it is worth contemplating what might be gained from a new asceticism of the act. If violence was presented as an analytic device, as a means of breaking the posited identity between a concept and the thing it represents; if violence was mobilized not in the interest of a physical but rather an intellectual confrontation with the bourgeois world, then it is possible that those of us engaged in activist struggles could - in some indeterminate future - envision forms of engagement that transform activism from a mode of representation into a mode of production. In this way, activists could transform themselves from being followers of causes to producers of effects.

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Governing Non-Citizens as Security Threats: Canada's Security Certificate Regime[1]

Mike Larsen

Introduction: "Protection" for Whom; from Whom?

In Oceana, the dystopian setting of George Orwell's <u>Nineteen Eighty-Four</u>, the official names of institutions and processes directly contradict their authoritarian character. The Ministry of Peace conducts perpetual war, the Ministry of Love identifies and tortures suspicious persons, and the Ministry of Truth creates and revises propaganda. In contemporary Canada, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act[2] (IRPA) empowers the state to indefinitely imprison without charge or trial, and on the basis of secret intelligence, those non-citizens it deems to represent potential threats to national security. This takes place through the issuing of a security certificate, which explicitly declares the subject to be "inadmissible" to Canada. On paper, this is intended to lead to the detention and subsequent deportation of the non-citizen, who may be a permanent resident or a refugee claimant. In practice, it can mean a prolonged, indefinite term of imprisonment on Canadian soil, described by the government as a "preventive measure" (Canada: CBSA 2006a: 9)[3] to "ensure Canadians are

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[2] The long title of the IRPA is *An Act respecting immigration to Canada and the granting of refugee protection to persons who are displaced, persecuted or in danger* (Canada: Department of Justice 2001).

[3]Security certificates are characterized by secrecy. While there is a great deal of open-source information available on the legal aspects of the security certificate process, there is almost no open-source information on the policies and processes that govern the everyday aspects of security certificate imprisonment. Accordingly, I have made extensive use of the federal Access to Information Act (ATI) as a methodological tool (see Yeager 2006). Some of the documents referred to in this paper, and particularly those dealing with the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre, were obtained through ATI requests, and are not publicly available. Where this is the case, a parenthetical note [Obtained through the Access to Information Act] has been made at the end of the relevant entry in the references section. Please feel free to contact me for more information on these documents.

protected" (Canada: CBSA 2006a: 4).

It is Orwellian, though sadly not unprecedented, that an act ostensibly for the protection *of* refugees has become part of an apparatus or *dispositif* of security (see Bigo 2005), where it is framed as a tool for the protection of citizens *from* risky non-citizens. As Bigo (2002) observes, the securitization of migration and the construction of foreigners as potential threats are central to the contemporary governmentality of unease, which is characterized by the de-differentiation of internal and transnational security, and the related blurring of distinctions between security practitioners such as the police, border officials, and military (see also Bauman 2004; Larner and Walters 2004; Pratt 2005). Migration is particularly securitized in the post-September 11 context, where prevailing (in)security narratives conflate notions of otherness and danger (Larsen 2006); where terrorism is simultaneously framed as an amorphous, transnational phenomenon and a locally experienced threat to the "homeland;" and where the rapid expansion of technologies of surveillance and control have enhanced the state's ability to monitor, screen, and profile those groups deemed suspicious or potentially risky. By framing migration through a lens of insecurity, the state brings to bear a variety of discourses, techniques, laws, and governmental processes. This produces change in national legal and institutional landscapes, as the exceptionalizing impact of securitization (see Krause and Williams 1997; Fierke 2007) transcends and remakes rules and norms. In turn, the transformation of the insecurity field and its practices influences shifts in official policy and discourse.

My intention with this paper is to trace a path between discourses and processes that govern migration as a security problem, and resultant shifts in institutional dynamics and everyday practice that take place within the Canadian (in)security field (Bigo 2002). This work is based on an ongoing study of the Canadian security certificate regime and the institutional architecture that has recently emerged for the purpose of incarcerating security certificate subjects. I have strong normative objections to the security certificate regime, grounded in a commitment to a substantive understanding of the rule of law (see Dyzenhaus 2006) and a concomitant rejection of (in)security discourses that seek to legitimize serious derogations from legal principles on grounds of citizenship status. At the same time, I admit to being fascinated by security certificates, primarily because they exemplify the mutagenic effects of security policies and discourses. By this, I refer to the demonstrable capacity of the "expansion of what security is taken to include" (Bigo 2002: 63) to alter those institutions that it comes to encompass. The securitization of migration through the security certificate mechanism has resulted in a unique intersection of security intelligence, citizenship and immigration, border control and correctional agencies and institutions, and in structural and operational shifts in the

governance and practices of these entities. This paper reflects the descriptive and analytic aspects of my engagement with security certificates, with less emphasis given to my normative arguments (but see Larsen and Piché 2007 and Deisman and Larsen 2008). The paper proceeds through two sections.

The first section outlines the security certificate process, and the discourses and legal regimes that enable it and seek to legitimize it. Security certificates are discussed as examples of the construction of migration as a security problem, and of the operation of counter-law, whereby "[n]ew laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm" (Ericson 2007: 24-25).

The second section moves to the micro level, with an examination of the rules and arrangements that govern the operation of the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre (KIHC): a unique facility specially constructed for the preventive, long-term, and indefinite imprisonment of security certificate subjects[4] (Larsen and Piché 2007). Continuing the discussion of de-differentiation, I describe the collaborative relationship between the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) that governs KIHC, and the resultant blurring of their mandates and institutional boundaries. This relationship takes the form of a contractual arrangement governed by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), reproducing within the state a dynamic more commonly associated with neoliberal forms of outsourced, privatized security (see Valverde and Mopas 2004; Johnston 2006). I refer to this arrangement as the in-sourcing of security.

The paper concludes with some brief remarks on the implications of blurred mandates and in-sourcing arrangements for critiques of policies like security certificates. I argue that critical scholarship can contribute to broader oppositional movements by working to render transparent the micro-dynamics that govern complex (in)security policies, and the relationships between official discourses, legal regimes, and everyday practice. In this case, that means working to supplement the predominantly legalistic debate over security certificates with an understanding of how laws and policies are rhetorically framed and operationalized in practice.

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[4] It is always difficult to decide which term(s) to use when naming individuals subject to security certificates, and the decision inevitably reflects both political and descriptive commitments. I opt for the term "prisoner" when describing those individuals formally held in custody under security certificates. For a broader descriptor that encompasses both imprisoned persons and those on highly restrictive bail conditions, I use "certificate subjects" or "security certificate subjects."

Before launching into a discussion of the security certificate process, it is important to locate this work within the broader discussion on violent interventions that runs through this volume. Coming from a background in critical and penal abolitionist criminology, I understand the sanction of imprisonment - state-initiated deprivation of liberty - to be an inherently violent process. Imprisonment, like the exercise of force by the police or the military, is a form of state violence, embedded in and operating through legal, bureaucratic, and governmental institutions and processes (Foucault 1977). Certainly, it emerges as such in prisoner ethnographies and other forms of prison writing, where the experience of incarceration is variously described as "disorienting, threatening, and total" (Gaucher 2002: 6), identity-stripping, dehumanizing, and exclusionary. It is important to note that these descriptions refer to the practice of incarceration in general, and not just to the instances and eruptions of violence that characterize everyday life in carceral spaces; in other words, they speak to the violence *of* imprisonment, as opposed to violence *in* the prison.

Imprisonment is simultaneously a violent process and an exercise of state power that is organized and structured through law (Cotterrell 1992). In the Canadian case, since the abolition of the death penalty, imprisonment has become the most severe coercive sanction that the state can impose through a legal proceeding. While acknowledging that the relative severity of such a disposition is - to an extent - a matter of subjective interpretation, it is possible to make some heuristic observations about where certain forms of imprisonment are situated within the spectrum of legally-sanctioned violence. The duration and conditions of a term of imprisonment are good metrics in this regard, and long-term confinement and administrative segregation are generally understood to be examples of the most extreme forms of punitiveness permissible to the Canadian state[5]. This holds true as far as Canadian citizens are concerned, but security certificates extend the potential limits of the violent intervention of imprisonment - for non-citizens - beyond the normal boundaries of the criminal justice system.

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[5] By "most extreme form of punitiveness," I refer only to the spectrum of sanctions available under the Criminal Code. This is not intended to ignore or minimize those forms of legally-sanctioned violence and punitiveness that are dispersed throughout social policies, institutions, and cultures. Nor do I want to suggest that duration and conditions of confinement are the only metrics of punitiveness that are relevant to a discussion of incarceration; indeed, the carceral environment is characterized by a diverse range of deprivations, impositions, and coercions, both physical and mental in form and target.

By combining the potential of long-term, indefinite imprisonment with the possibility of deportation to probable torture, security certificates occupy the outer extremity of the spectrum of violence available to the state as the outcome of a normal legal proceeding. This status is amplified by the secrecy and uncertainty that characterize security certificate cases, where detention - without charge or trial - may last for weeks, months, or years. At all times, the specter of removal to torture hangs like the Sword of Damocles over the certificate subject. Drawing on Lawrence and Karim's (2007: 7) argument that "[t]here is no general theory of violence apart from its practices," it follows that there is much that can be learned about state violence by examining the discourses, practices, and actors that constitute and operationalize a form of coercive sanction as extreme as security certificate imprisonment.

"A Danger to our Nation": Certificates as Securitization of Migration
Security certificates are one mechanism in the Canadian state's large national security toolkit. They are set apart from other anti-terrorism measures, such as the Anti-terrorism Act, by the specificity of their scope. While anti-terror laws apply equally to all persons within Canada's legal jurisdiction, security certificates apply to non-citizens only. There are presently only five persons - all Muslim men - subject to security certificates. To put this in perspective, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) removed about 12,600 non-citizens from Canada in 2006-07 on various IRPA inadmissibility grounds (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2008: 15).

Acting on intelligence provided by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), two Canadian Ministers can sign a certificate of inadmissibility, on grounds of "security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality" (Canada: Department of Justice 2001). If upheld by a Federal Court judge, the certificate becomes a detention and deportation order for the subject in question. The threshold for upholding a certificate is a finding of "objectively reasonable suspicion." This is considerably lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" threshold associated with the criminal justice system. Additionally, the certificate process is shrouded in secrecy at several levels, particularly because the state invokes the privilege of national security confidentiality to withhold almost all legally-relevant information about the cases. Even under the latest iteration of the security certificate regime, created in response to a Supreme Court ruling that the previous system violated the Charter, detainees are given only a summary of the intelligence dossier against them, and are reliant on security-cleared special advocates (whom they cannot communicate with) to challenge the state's case. Critics have long described these proceedings as "secret trials." This is a useful term of denunciation, and it highlights the problematic role of secrecy in the process, but it is also somewhat misleading; indeed, what makes security certificates so problematic

is precisely the fact that they are not trials at all, and have only superficial connections to the institutions of criminal justice. They are a component of immigration law, pressed into service as an instrument of national security (for additional legal detail, see Bell 2006; Larsen and Piché 2007; Deisman and Larsen 2008). I return to the legal nature of security certificates at the end of this section. First, though, it is important to discuss the significance of a national security mechanism that applies exclusively to non-citizens.

Pratt (2005) explores the diverse assemblage of institutions, technologies, knowledges, and discretionary practices that govern the border according to a hybrid crime-security rationale. This assemblage can be understood as an immigration penalty that operates at a variety of levels, ranging from discrete surveillance to detention and deportation, which Pratt (2005: 1) describes as "extreme bodily sanctions," a concept that emphasizes the aforementioned violence inherent in practices of imprisonment. The border operates as an "asymmetric membrane" that distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens, insiders and outsiders (Bauman 2004: 68). Of course, the assemblage of immigration penalty is not restricted to the geographic space of the national border, nor is the border itself a barrier that can be forgotten once crossed. The insider-outsider distinctions made possible by bordering processes such as security certificates can come into play at any point in time, provided the subject in question is a non-citizen.

Though the Canadian state rarely uses the certificate mechanism to formally brand non-citizens as threats to national security, the crime-security nexus drives immigration penalty in general. Refugees are increasingly seen as posers of risks, as opposed to rights-bearing subjects (Pratt 2005: 214), and a "problem" to world order (Nyers 2006: 1). This is particularly the case in the post-September 11 context, although the securitization of migration is not a 21st Century development. Bigo (2002; 2005) explores the prevalence of discourses and practices that frame migration as a security problem. He proposes that

> securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the *habitus* of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the foreigner but in the "immigrant." [...] It is based, finally, on the "unease" that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life (Bigo 2002: 65).

Though Bigo bases his conclusions on a study of European Union immigration-security discourses, all of these observations are relevant to a discussion of the Canadian context, and of security certificates.

The myth of the state as a "body endangered by migrants" (Bigo 2002: 68) is particularly applicable to the official discourse on security certificates, which effectively operates according to an immunological logic of inclusive-exclusion (Agamben 1998): through certificates, the state identifies threats of foreign origin, isolates and captures them, and either neutralizes them through incarceration or purges them from the Canadian territorial body. Consider the following statements made by Canadian politicians during the recent debates on the C-3 security certificate bill:

> This is precisely about putting up those obstacles at the border to keep people out (MacKenzie 2008).

> We must always make the assumption that people are innocent until proven guilty, but this is a special case and surely we must have room in our justice system to protect ourselves against these people who would engage in such nefarious activities (Epp 2008).

> While we encourage immigration, Canadians also insist on vigilance against people and organizations taking advantage of our generosity and openness. They pose a danger to our nation and, in some cases, to other nations around the world. They have committed serious crimes, or violated human rights or even taken part in terrorism. These people are not welcome in Canada (MacKenzie 2007).

> Is the hon. member saying to give the benefit of the doubt to somebody of whom a judge has said, and of whom a number of judges have said, that there is significant enough evidence to link this person, let us just say, to a terrorism network, so that person should not be put in some other jurisdiction, as he said, but sent back to their country of origin? He is saying that we should give the benefit of the doubt to the person who has evidence against him or her, certified by a judge, that shows him or her to be a possible imminent danger. He says to give the benefit of the doubt to that person instead of to Canadians who deserve to be protected (Day 2008).

These excerpts are representative of the narratives of proponents of security certificates. They operate according to a binary logic of "us" and "them,"

differentiating the Canadian deserving protection from the threatening immigrant. Since "security" and "otherness" are the foundational concepts upon which security certificates operate, it should come as no surprise that the official discourse on certificates represents an extreme or hyper-securitized crystallization of broader discourses on citizenship and migration. The border is framed as a security barrier, and suspected threatening persons originating from outside are not subject to the mechanisms of procedural justice associated with internal criminality; rather, they are depicted as unwelcome and dangerous intruders, penetrating into a rights-bearing polity, but - by virtue of their foreignness - not rights-bearers themselves. Certificates can only ever be applied to non-citizens, and this point is emphasized as often as possible in official discourse, which speaks to a Canadian audience that is framed as being both imperiled by threatening foreigners and immune to the violence of the regime set up to address this threat, as the following statements illustrate:

> We must always remember that we are not dealing with Canadians. We are dealing with non-Canadians. The security certificate provisions do not involve Canadians, only non-Canadians (Lee 2007).

> I would encourage all colleagues to set aside partisanship to realize that the security certificates have been proven not to threaten the individual rights and freedoms of Canadians. As a matter of fact, the security certificate cannot even be applied against a Canadian citizen. It can only be used on foreign nationals or those who are not Canadian citizens (Day 2008).

> Mr. Speaker, I would like to point out with great clarity that the people addressed by this bill are not citizens of our country. Our primary responsibility is to protect Canadian citizens (Epp 2008).

The discourse emerges as a textbook example of governing through security; it simultaneously describes a source of insecurity, circumscribes a threatened constituency, differentiates that group from a threatening other, and positions the state and its managers of unease as the providers of protection.

Issuing a security certificate is both a speech act and a legal maneuver (on speech acts, see Krause and Williams 1997; Bigo 2002; Fierke 2007). The signing process itself is as explicit an example of the securitization of migration through discourse as one is likely to find, in that it: 1) declares a non-citizen to be a threat to Canadian national security; 2) subsequently deems them to be inadmissible to Canada, and; 3) requires the signatures of both the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. This latter

requirement foreshadows the inter-departmental dynamics that follow from the securitization of migration through the certificate process, discussed in the next section.

The first objective of this section was to demonstrate how security certificates reflect the securitization of migration, and to highlight their discursive framing as mechanisms designed to protect Canadians from non-citizen threats. The operationalization of this framing - that is, the technical transformation of discursive principles into policy and practice - occurs through the creative manipulation of law.

Security certificates are a form of counter-law, which is characterized by a precautionary logic, a preventive approach, and the alteration of legal standards according to these principles (Ericson 2007). The aim of counter-law is to manage uncertainty, and uncertainty is future-oriented. Zedner proposes that we are moving towards a pre-crime society, characterized by a shift in the "temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so" (Zedner 2007: 262). Along the same lines, Ericson suggests that we are increasingly engaged in the "criminalization of the merely suspicious" (2007: 2). Such forward-looking attempts to manage uncertainty run into problems when they encounter the norms and procedures of the traditional criminal justice system, which generally preclude the imposition of sanctions for acts that might occur in the future. The goal of the modern state in such situations is to achieve the ends of criminalization, through non-traditional means. Accordingly, as Ericson documents in <u>Crime in an Insecure World</u> (2007), a roster of new laws and processes have emerged to govern suspicious conduct, and existing laws have been re-tasked to coincide with the precautionary - as opposed to prosecutory - agenda. With security certificates, this involves the use of immigration law to address a national security concern. Certificate proceedings under the IRPA allow for arrest, an official declaration of dangerousness, long-term indefinite detention, the imposition of sanctions, and potentially deportation - but they do not require the state to adhere to those standards and norms of the criminal justice process designed to protect the rights of individuals, notably the right of *habeas corpus* (Bell 2006; Butler 2006; Larsen and Piché 2007; Deisman and Larsen 2008).

To recap: Security certificates are an exceptional, counter-legal mechanism that allows for the detention and deportation of non-citizens deemed to represent threats to Canada's national security. As components of immigration law, they operate according to a legal threshold that is considerably lower than that of the criminal justice system, and as tools of national security, they are shrouded in secrecy - to the extent that certificate subjects are only partially informed of the allegations against them. Certificates are issued at the recommendation of

Canada's intelligence agency, but they must be formally signed by the Ministers of Public Safety and Citizenship and Immigration, which is illustrative of the contemporary conflation of security and migration. The next section moves beyond law and discourse, to examine the transformative effects of this hybrid process on institutions within the Canadian (in)security field.

In-Sourced Detention and the Blurring of Mandates

Although the government maintains that security certificates are intended to facilitate deportation, in some cases this is practically impossible. As a signatory to the UN Convention against Torture, and pursuant to Article 3 of that Convention, Canada cannot "expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" (UNHCR 1987) . In the cases of the current security certificate subjects, whose countries of provenance are Syria, Egypt, and Algeria, there are substantial grounds for believing that deportation could result in torture, and counsel for the men have launched numerous court appeals based on this. When deportation becomes legally impermissible, detention pending deportation turns into long-term, indefinite imprisonment.

While the IRPA provides a legal basis for the imprisonment of certificate subjects, it does not provide details on where this ought to take place. Prior to April 2006, security certificate imprisonment took place in a provincial correction facility, such as the Metro West Detention Centre (see Pratt 2005). The conditions at these facilities - which were never designed for long-term imprisonment - were the subject of numerous hunger strikes by security certificate subjects, and the construction of the Kingston Immigration Holding Centre - a facility designed exclusively to house security certificate detainees - was a response to mounting public pressure on the subject.

On April 24, 2006, the CBSA issued a press release announcing the opening of KIHC on the grounds of Millhaven Institution, and reporting that the four individuals who were - at the time - subject to security certificate detention had been transferred to the new facility. Millhaven is a maximum security prison located in Bath, Ontario, and as such, is staffed and administered by CSC. KIHC is not technically a CSC facility, though; as an immigration holding centre, it falls under the authority of the CBSA. It is unique and exceptional in this regard, both because it is currently the only facility of its type and because, historically, no federal prison has previously housed such a structure. At full capacity, KIHC could hold six security certificate detainees, and it has never housed more than four. As of June 2008, only one detainee - Hassan Almrei - remains behind bars, as the others have been released on highly-restrictive bail conditions. It is worth noting that all four of the individuals who have been detained at KIHC have been males. Canadian federal prisons do not have

mixed-gender units, and it is unclear as to how the existing detention framework would respond to a female security cetificate detainee. As KIHC has a single common area and yard, it would be almost impossible to simultaneously detain males and females without radically restricting detainee access to facilities.

The Memorandum of Understanding governing the relationship between CSC and CBSA as it relates to KIHC is a noteworthy document for a number of reasons, not least because it resembles the type of arrangement normally associated with the neoliberal outsourcing of security, despite the fact that both parties to the contract are government departments. This intra-governmental contracting or in-sourcing makes possible the merging of mandates and capacities. It recognizes CSC as "the main provider of federal detention services at the present time" and notes that while CBSA has the authority under the IRPA to detain persons "for administrative purposes", it "does not have the capacity to detain those persons at the present time" (Canada: CBSA-CSC 2006: 1). Through this arrangement, CSC lands and services are contracted out to CBSA, which remains the "detaining authority" (Canada: CBSA-CSC 2006: 2). This arrangement is highly selective, in that it provides for the incarceration of security certificate detainees, but specifically recognizes them as a category of individuals wholly separate from the 'normal' inmates supervised by CSC. The government has routinely reminded critics that KIHC is not a correctional facility, and that the imprisoned certificate subjects are not technically inmates. Some documents refer to them as detainees, while others (Canada: CBSA 2006b) refer to them as individuals subject to security certificates, or ISSCs. Additionally, the operational guidelines in place at KIHC include specific policies to ensure that detainees do not come into contact with the "convicted population" serving sentences at Millhaven, and, save for visits to the Millhaven medical facilities (during which time inmates are placed in lockdown), security certificate detainees do not leave the fenced-in KIHC compound.

Security certificate subjects held at KIHC occupy an ambiguous space created by the overlapping mandates of CSC and CBSA. This overlap has definite implications for the individuals imprisoned at the facility, particularly when their special status acts to limit their access to resources that would be available to 'normal' inmates at Millhaven. For example, as ISSCs, security certificate subjects are not detained for purposes of rehabilitation. As such, they have no access to CSC educational programs. Nor do they fall under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI), an arms-length ombudsman mandated by the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to respond to the grievances of CSC inmates. Instead, the certificate subjects have their own redress process, outlined by KIHC President's Directive 081, which appears robust on paper but nevertheless stands apart from the OCI process in that it does not involve a neutral third party (Canada: CBSA 2006b).

The ambiguity associated with KIHC's overlapping mandates seems to consistently work against the imprisoned certificate subjects, constructing them as beings without the rights enjoyed by inmates while simultaneously subjecting them to the modes of observation and control associated with the prison setting. It is a hybrid facility where the sovereign power to deny admissibility associated with the border (see Pratt 2005) meets and merges with the space of the prison and the governmental and disciplinary modes of power that operate there. This hybridization, the product of the de-differentiation of internal and transnational security, has a transformative impact on the institutions involved - particularly CSC.

Immigration detention has nothing to do with a correctional mandate. KIHC and Millhaven exist, according to the Government of Canada, for entirely different purposes, with the common denominator being prolonged, officially-sanctioned deprivation of liberty. At first glance, the location of KIHC on the grounds of Millhaven may seem unremarkable, even logical. It allows CBSA to take advantage of the existing security infrastructure of a federal penitentiary, and it allows one government agency to meet the needs of another through in-sourcing. Closer examination, however, raises a number of issues, which encourage us to consider the scope of CSC's mandate. With the construction of a single facility and the signing of an MOU, the Correctional Service of Canada effectively became the Detention Service of Canada, able to contract its expertise in detention to other federal departments. This is a significant shift in direction for CSC, which is technically "the federal government agency responsible for administering sentences of a term of two years or more, as imposed by the courts" (Canada: CSC 2007). In fact, all CSC literature references the location of the agency within the Canadian criminal justice system, the goal of rehabilitating offenders, and the importance of the rule of law. The staffing of KIHC by "CSC multi-functional detention officers" (Canada: CBSA 2006c) is significant, in that it does not involve the criminal justice system, has no rehabilitative goals, does not deal with offenders, and, for reasons outlined in the previous section, has a questionable relationship with the rule of law. Indeed, KIHC is the institutional reflection of counter-law - an entrenched and normalized exception.

Conclusion
In this short paper, I have outlined the Canadian security certificate process, reviewed some of the main elements of the discourse associated with it, and explored the ways in which the operationalization of this discourse in practice has a transformative effect on the institutions involved. Although security certificates are rarely used, their continued existence presents an extreme example of the broader and ongoing securitization of migration. Through

certificates, anxieties about immigration and otherness merge with future-oriented concerns about public safety, and the result is a counter-legal hybrid. Dealing with the long-term detention that results from this process of securitization brings the CBSA into close contact with CSC, resulting in a blurring of mandates and the creation of another hybrid, this time physical and architectural as opposed to legal.

This paper has provided a cursory sketch of the interrelationships between discourses, laws, and institutions and practices associated with security certificates. At the risk of depicting too tidy a picture, I suggest that the certificate example is illustrative of the transformative, mutagenic effects of contemporary forms of securitization; exceptional measures and extraordinary (counter-)laws quickly become normalized and entrenched in institutional frameworks, and boundaries between mandates are blurred and remade in the process (Agamben 1998; 2005). As time passes, I find the existence of KIHC less and less surprising, despite the break it represents from historical forms of Canadian federal imprisonment (Larsen and Piché 2007). Instead, the creation and operation of the facility appears as the logical consequence of a discourse and associated set of laws and policies that are characterized by de-differentiation - of internal and transnational security, and of the mandates of the federal agencies that are part of the (in)security field. Paradoxically, this institutional de-differentiation and blurring is operationalized through the reinforcement of distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, insiders and outsiders.

Moving forward, I hope that this discussion highlights the importance of understanding and critiquing securitization processes in an integrative manner, with particular emphasis on their relationship to individuals, institutions, and everyday practice. Critical engagement that targets only one aspect of the discourse-law-practice triangle is by definition partial and incomplete, and the state is able to respond and adapt. The history of challenges to the security certificate process bears this out. A comprehensive approach must engage all three aspects - and the relationships between them - simultaneously. Such an approach would have to critique both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the security certificate process as they relate to law and counter-law; it would have to reflect an in-depth understanding of the practice of security certificate imprisonment, and of the range of actors and institutions involved in each stage of the certificate process; and, in order to avoid becoming too myopic, it would have to actively and publicly question the underlying logics and mentalities of legal-governmental regimes such as IRPA. In particular, this would involve challenging the deeply problematic idea that citizens and non-citizens possess

and deserve radically different sets of rights and that the security of the former group can be achieved through the precautionary exclusion of members of the latter.

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List of Acronyms	
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSC	Correctional Service of Canada
IRPA	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
ISSC	Individual(s) Subject to Security Certificate
KIHC	Kingston Immigration Holding Centre
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

Development and Security in Africa's 'American Lake': The Political Economy of Oil and Exploitation

Jesse Salah Ovadia

I. The Creation of AFRICOM

On February 6, 2007, President Bush announced the creation of a new Africa Command (AFRICOM) for the US military. AFRICOM reached initial operating capacity in October 2007 and is now in a transitional phase, operating out of a separate part of Europe Command (EUCOM) headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The US military command structure currently includes five unified commands, each of which reports directly to the Secretary of Defence. When the new command is fully operational in October 2008, a sixth command will be added, responsible for the entire African continent except Egypt, which will remain under US Central Command (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 - United States Africa Command (Adapted from Reed 2007)

In the context of Africa's current 'oil boom,' this paper will argue that AFRICOM is part of a larger project to create an 'American Lake' (a term first used to describe a sphere of US influence in the Pacific Basin carved out by a heavy military presence), in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea in order to facilitate the extraction of natural resources - primarily oil. The American Lake is conceived of as ranging from Ivory Coast to Angola, including Ghana (which also recently discovered oil), Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, as well as São Tomé and other islands in the Gulf. Angola and Nigeria in particular are already crucial to US energy supplies, while the US military presence in the region will be anchored by a massive new naval base on São Tomé, right in the middle of the Gulf.

Figure 2 - The Gulf of Guinea

Unlike any of the other commands, AFRICOM integrates the military with the resources of the US State Department and Agency for International Development. This links interventions in the name of regional development to US economic and strategic interests. AFRICOM is a project of securing Africa's resources for US empire.

AFRICOM is still based in Germany, alongside EUCOM. For many months it was unclear when (or if) it will find a headquarters on the African continent. Consultations with Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Djibouti, and Kenya following the announcement of AFRICOM found than none of these countries were willing to commit to hosting the new command. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), along with Nigeria and Ghana also oppose hosting AFRICOM in their territory. In June 2008, the Pentagon admitted to making mistakes with the implementation of the new command and announced that AFRICOM would continue to be based in Germany for the foreseeable future (De Young 2008). However, since US diplomatic and foreign aid activities in Africa will be routed through AFRICOM, it is going to be increasingly difficult in the future for countries to say no to AFRICOM requests for military basing rights and other courtesy privileges (Volman 2007).

The imperialist nature of this project is clearly shown by Michael Klare and Daniel Volman (2006), who elaborate on the historical context of the relationship between military power and US reliance on foreign oil using the

example of US Central Command (CENTCOM). In 1980, President Carter designated the free flow of Persian Gulf oil a 'vital interest' of the United States and declared that the US would use "any means necessary, including military force" to defend its interest. Out of this policy, widely known as the 'Carter Doctrine,' the US Department of Defence established CENTCOM to oversee a greatly expanded US military presence in the Gulf region. Mirroring Carter, President Bush declared that African oil is a strategic national interest of the United States and announced the creation of AFRICOM. CENTCOM went on to coordinate combat operations during the Gulf War in 1991, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is therefore not at all surprising that African countries reacted with suspicion to the new command and to an expansion of US military presence in Africa.

In 2003, EUCOM was hardly directing any of its resources toward its African responsibilities. Just prior to Bush's announcement of AFRICOM in 2007, EUCOM was devoting 70 percent of its time to African affairs (Foster 2006b: 7). The growth of EUCOM interest in Africa began under President Clinton with Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which offered training and nonlethal military equipment (generators, vehicles, night goggles, etc.) to African militaries. This was soon replaced by Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) after 9/11, offering offensive military equipment in order to train African troops to conduct peacekeeping operations in hostile countries. Additionally, in 2003, EUCOM initiated a small project to combat smuggling and prevent cross-border crime and terrorism in Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). Two years later in 2005, this was replaced by the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI), a much more ambitious project (Volman 2007).

In addition to these programs, AFRICOM will take over the implementation of a host of military, security cooperation, and security assistance programs, which are currently funded through either the State Department or the Defence Department, such as bilateral and multilateral joint training programs and military exercises, the International Military Education and Training Program, the Foreign Military Sales Program, the African Coastal and Border Security Program, and the Excess Defense Articles Program. AFRICOM will also take command and control of US military operations in Africa, which include the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (which conducts naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean and is based in Djibouti), the Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (which conducts counter-terrorism operations and surveillance in North and West Africa out of an airbase in Tamanrasset, Algeria), and will help coordinate naval operations in the Gulf of Guinea (Volman 2007).

Africa's new significance is perhaps best summed up by Alain Faujas, a columnist for Le Monde, who wrote in a November article "Aujourd'hui, l'enjeu n'est plus de rallier les Africains à une idéologie, mais d'exploiter leur sous-sol" ("Today, the imperative is no longer to rally Africans to an ideology, but to exploit their natural resources") (Faujas 2007). Far from conspiracy theory, the link between AFRICOM and African oil is supported by various statements from Bush Administration officials and think-tanks aligned with the American conservatives. In an article entitled "Creating an Africa Command: Bush Administration Makes the Right Call," Brett Schaefer of The Heritage Foundation puts forward an explanation for the creation of AFRICOM that meshes completely with the voices of more critical authors:

> The Heritage Foundation has long advocated an independent command for Africa. AFRICOM is necessary to address the increasing importance of the region to U.S. national interests and better equip the U.S. in meeting the unique challenges of that region. In an increasingly globalized world, the U.S. cannot afford to ignore Africa or relegate it to a tertiary priority. Africa is a vital source of energy and other mineral resources. Weak and failed states in the region offer fertile ground for the spread of terrorism (Schaefer 2007: 1).

The US already imports 16 percent of its oil from Africa in 2001. The US National Intelligence Council (an internal CIA think tank) estimates that by 2015, the US will import about 25 percent of its oil from sub-Saharan Africa (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006; Ghazvinian 2007; Hanson 2007). This fact, above all others, has garnered attention from the American security establishment and the oil prospectors in the White House. A backgrounder on AFRICOM produced by the Council on Foreign Relations notes that "some experts suggest the command's creation was motivated by more specific concerns: China and oil" (Hanson 2007). The report also makes mention of the widely-cited figures on the growing importance of Africa to the US oil supply. The widespread acknowledgment of the oil motive in determining the creation of AFRICOM suggests the need for a closer look at the current 'oil boom' in the Gulf of Guinea in order to investigate the motives that lie behind the growing US interest in the region.

II. The New 'Oil Boom' in the Gulf of Guinea

A new and burgeoning literature has emerged declaring that Africa is in the midst of an oil boom, or 'oil rush,' and that a new scramble for Africa's oilfields is now unfolding (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006; Klare and Volman 2006; Watts 2006). The extent of the reserves in the Gulf of Guinea are unknown. Only a few years ago, the technology to do deepwater drilling was prohibitively expensive. New technology has been central to making exploration and

extraction of Africa's deepwater oil feasible. Africa's 76.7 billion barrels of oil reserves (7.2 percent of the world total) are larger than North America's (54.2 billion barrels) and Eastern Europe and the FSU (58.4 billion barrels). West Africa alone has 46 billion barrels - and with more exploration underway, this could jump to 100 billion by 2007 (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006: 86).

The statistics on the boom are impressive. Oil investment, expected to total $30 billion between 2005 and 2010, already represents over fifty percent of all foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Before the boom, oil extraction was already well established onshore, primarily in Nigeria and Angola. Between 1995 and 2001, FDI inflow totalled an average of $7 billion per year. Two-thirds of this went to three countries (Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa), while half of Africa's states effectively had no FDI inflow. Two-thirds of all FDI was derived from three countries (the UK, Germany, and the US) (Watts 2006: 3, 8). Finally, while FDI has gone from $7 billion to $18 billion per year, four mining/energy economies still account for fifty percent of all investment (Watts 2006: 8, citing World Investment Report 2005).

The first scramble for Africa was launched with King Leopold of Belgium's famous remark "I do not want to miss a good chance of getting us a slice of this magnificent African cake." As seen from even a cursory look at the 'oil boom', the new scramble for Africa's resources has already begun. The militarization of Africa must therefore be understood in light of this scramble. Thus, responding to the announcement that AFRICOM was remaining in Europe, Democratic Sen. Russell Feingold, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations African affairs subcommittee, remarked that despite the best of intentions, AFRICOM had "a neo-colonialist feel to it" (DeYoung 2008).

In the opening of his book, Untapped: The Scramble for Africa's Oil, John Ghazvinian describes his experience attending the opening dinner of the 18th World Petroleum Congress, held in Johannesburg, SA:

> And it has to be said that the evening would not have been the same without the desserts. The organizers had decided to give us each a little chocolate mousse and sponge cake carefully molded into the shape of Africa. It was hard not to admire the culinary artistry involved, but as I looked round the Dome, I wondered: was I the only one to pick up on the symbolism of 3,500 drunken oil executives devouring the Dark Continent, bite after dribbling, chocolaty bite? (Ghazvinian 2007: 5).

Sen. Feingold's comment pointed to the shared motive of extraction in both the first scramble for Africa and the current one. Explaining that Africa is often seen "as the object rather than the subject of its future" (1993: 1) Jean-François

Bayart contends that metaphors of consumption and eating are common in the language of post-independence African politics, particularly in neopatrimonial states. He refers to this as "*la politique du ventre*" ("politics of the belly"). Noting that 'politics of the belly' is "a system of historic action", Bayart writes that "the 'politics of the belly' is firmly located in the continuity of the conflicts of the past" (1993: ix, 241). As if the prospect of a 'new African cake' would not be enough to attract the attention of the world's most powerful nation, the African oil boom coincided with the events of September 11 and anti-Western sentiment in many Middle Eastern countries. In the eyes of US planners, the political risk in West Africa is minimal compared to Middle East since there is no "combative culture" (such as radical Islam), nor "radical ideologies" (such as communism). Therefore, there is little risk of a joint embargo (El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006; Bond 2006).

Emblematic of the hype with which some have embraced the oil boom, J. Peter Pham recently called the Gulf of Guinea the "new Gulf" in the <u>Journal of International and Security Affairs</u>. This "new Gulf" has many advantages over the old one. Deepwater drilling, which predominates in the Gulf of Guinea, is free of sabotage and threat of civil strife, which causes so much risk and loss in other countries. New floating production storage and offloading vessels (FPSOs) act as massive factories that process and store petroleum and then offload it to supertankers. As Ghazvinian notes, "from start to finish, no one ever really needs to go onshore" (2007: 11, 84-5). Finally, not only is West African oil insulated from political instability by being easily loaded onto supertankers offshore, it is also strategically significant because it can be shipped to the US in even less time than it takes to ship oil from the Persian Gulf (Bond 2006).

Table 1 - Oil Producers in the Gulf of Guinea
(adapted from El-Khawas and Ndumbe 2006: 86-9)

Country	Rank	Notes
Nigeria	Sixth largest producer or crude oil in the world	Reserves: 30 billion barrels; Production: 2.7 million bpd. Production areas: Niger Delta region. Oil companies: ChevronTexaco, Shell, ExxonMobil,
Angola	2nd largest exporter in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria; most successful non-OPEC member in the world	Reserves: 7 billion barrels; Production: estimated to reach 2 million bpd by 2008. Oil companies: ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, BP
Gabon	3rd largest exporter in sub-Saharan Africa	Reserves: more than 2.5 billion barrels; Production: 350,000 bpd. Production areas: largest field is Rabi-Kounga
Republic of Congo	4th largest exporter in sub-Saharan Africa	Reserves: 1.6 billion barrels; Production: 283,000 bpd. Production areas: Moho and Bilondo oilfields (shared with Angola - profits will be split). Oil companies: ChevronTexaco, Total
Equatorial Guinea		Estimated reserves: 12 billion barrels; Production: 250,000 bpd. Will likely surpass Rep. of Congo soon in production. Oil companies: ChevronTexaco
Cameroon		Reserves: 740 million barrels; Production: 115,000 bpd. Oil companies: ExxonMobil, ELF, Shell
São Tomé and Principe		This tiny island state of 160,000 people has estimated crude reserves of more than 4 billion barrels. Therefore it has the potential to have the highest per capita income in the world.

In January 2001, the Washington DC Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies organized a symposium on the strategic importance of the oil-rich West African coast. That same year, the Cheney National Energy Strategy Report concluded that "West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market" (cited in Ghazvinian 2007). Soon after, the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) was formed, arguing that control of oil in West Africa was necessary to diversify US energy sources, and that this would require an American forward military presence in the Gulf of Guinea (Yohannes 2003). Africa's status in US national security policy and military affairs began to rise dramatically. It was shortly thereafter that the Bush administration declared that access to Africa's oil supplies would henceforth be defined as a "strategic national interest" (Volman 2007).

As US interest in the new scramble for Africa becomes more apparent, other important considerations come to light. As Sandra Barnes notes, the Gulf of Guinea is quickly becoming significant to the US for three primarily economic reasons. Firstly, the US directly purchased $17.8 billion in African oil in 2004 alone. Secondly, more than one hundred thousand jobs in the US are linked to African oil - many of them in Texas, Louisiana, and California, significant states in US elections. Thirdly, oil and gas equipment is the second leading US export to Africa, worth $717.3 million annually (Barnes 2005: 4). Understanding the actions of the American state, and in whose interest it carries out its foreign policy and security objectives, is more complex than many believe. Therefore, a proper analysis of the genesis of AFRICOM requires a deeper look at the American state.

III. The New American Imperialism

In order to understand the creation of AFRICOM and to develop a political economy of African oil, this paper uses the theoretical framework informed by literature on the new American imperialism. As John Bellamy Foster writes, "Empires throughout human history have relied on foreign military bases to enforce their rule, and in this respect at least, Pax Americana is no different than Pax Romana or Pax Britannica" (Foster 2006a: 55). He goes on to note that:

> The projection of U.S. military power into new regions through the establishment of U.S. military bases should not of course be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote the economic and political objectives of U.S. capitalism (Foster 2006a: 63).

With reference to America's new interest in the Gulf of Guinea, this is precisely the connection that needs to be made to understand the creation of AFRICOM as an initiative of the American state on behalf of European and American capital.

In particular, America's new imperialist posture is a project on behalf of the finance (especially American, British, German, and South African finance) and natural resource fractions of capital. While the natural resource fraction includes many mining and mineral-extracting companies, for the purposes of this essay, it shall refer primarily to the six 'supermajor' oil companies, headquartered in the US and Western Europe. Clearly though, in the case of energy, all fractions of capital have an interest in securing cheap and plentiful supplies by any means necessary. As Foster writes, "The primary goals of U.S. imperialism have always been to open up investment opportunities to U.S. corporations and to allow such corporations to gain preferential access to crucial natural resources" (Foster 2006a: 145). This corresponds to AOPIG's key recommendation that the US insist on privatization and deregulation in the critical areas such as the energy and mineral sectors, in which Africa enjoys comparative advantage. This would help foster rapid corporate penetration (Yohannes 2003).

In particular, US dominance internationally rests on its ability to control the sources of and transport for crucial energy and other strategic material supplies needed, or perhaps demanded, by the dominant industrial states - unimpeded access to affordable energy has always been a paramount strategic interest of the US. Fouskas and Gökay argue that: "Superpower status naturally requires control of oil at every stage - from its discovery to its pumping, refining, transporting, and marketing" (Fouskas and Gökay 2005: 21-3). Since West African oil is the easiest to control for the US, its strategic interest can and should not be underscored.

In this case, the interests of American capital coincide with capital in other 'advanced' nations. This is important in understanding how the US state acts as chief actor in the global capitalist order. This is best described by Panitch and Gindin, who write:

> The other core capitalist countries' relationships with the third world, including their ex-colonies, were imbricated with the American informal imperial rule. The core capitalist countries might continue to benefit from the north-south divide, but any interventions had to be either American-initiated or at least have American approval… only the American state reserved for itself the 'sovereign' right to reject international rules and norms when necessary. It is in this sense that only the American sate was actively 'imperialist' (Panitch and Gindin 2004: 16).

In American informal empire (Panitch and Gindin 2004; 2005), as opposed to previous formal colonial empires, the US has an exclusive role as the global enforcer. For Panitch and Gindin, it is American imperialism to the extent that

it is backed by the force of the US military.

The projection of military strength is the backbone of America's imperialist posture. The new use of bases is not just a military phenomenon but enforces US control over the global political-economic "rules of the game." It is, as Foster writes, "a mapping out of the US-dominated imperial sphere and of its spearheads within the periphery." In recent years, the creation of new bases in South Asia, Middle East/Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean has spiked, using the war on terror to justify such imperial expansion (Foster 2006a: 66). The militarization of Africa under US empire will have particularly negative effects given the continent's history of colonialism and underdevelopment, as well as AFRICOM's unique combination of development, diplomacy, and force. Additionally, Africa's richness in natural resources combined with its underdevelopment magnifies the dangers of AFRICOM for resource-rich countries.

IV. The 'Resource Curse'/'Dutch Disease'
To understand how the US agenda for Africa affects the region's development prospects, we must first understand what economists have come to call "the resource curse." The resource curse (also called the "paradox of plenty") is a popular notion, even among mainstream economists and World Bank officials, which questions how the oil boom can be of benefit to Africa.

As Alfredo Saad Filho has shown, "the 'curse' is the *outcome* of - rather than the background for - economic policy decisions" (Saad Filho 2007: 4). One set of explanations is found in the theory of the rentier state, a term developed by Hossein Mahdavy to refer to states dominated by external economic rent, particularly oil rent. Rentier states are inherently unstable because they are vulnerable to price fluctuations. In discussing the political economy of rentier states, Douglas Yates writes: "But what seems like a blessing is in reality a curse. *The inflow of external rent on unprecedented scales throws the input-output matrix of the economy into imbalance*, as both the state and the society become increasingly dependent on the continual input of this foreign revenue" (Yates 1996: 24, emphasis in the original).

In sum, Mahdavy argues that oil rents prevent the significant advancement of the *entire* social structure, "measured not merely by increased per capita income, but rather by a transformation of the social forces of production" (Yates 1996: 31 citing Mahdavy 1970). Whatever the reason, it is quite clear that even if development is defined only in terms of capital accumulation, the discovery of natural resources may set development back. According to the World Bank's own analysis, the *potential* for capital accumulation is most reduced in resource-dependent countries. Thus, for Nigeria, (with its high resource dependence and

low capital accumulation), the World Bank has concluded that if resources were not extracted, exported, and thus depleted, Nigeria would actually have greater capital accumulation (Bond 2006: 79-80). This suggests that violence is perpetrated by forced dependence on resource extraction alone. This is a large part of what AFRICOM is about. The carving out of an 'American Lake' through the creation of AFRICOM must therefore be understood as a violent intervention for the ways in which it underdevelops those economies and political systems.

V. Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa

The final section of this paper explores the US's new imperialist posture in Africa in terms of human development. From Section IV, it should already be clear that resource extraction provides minimal benefit to the majority of people in the exporting country and to the exporting economy in general. Euro-American resource extraction in the Gulf of Guinea, backed by the creation of a new 'American Lake,' is also a violent intervention in that it is more likely to perpetuate underdevelopment, which in turn reinforces inequality at the national and global levels. Understanding the violence of the project to secure access to Africa's natural resources is necessary to establish the links between the colonial and neo-colonial scrambles to devour the 'magnificent cake.'

Here, the term underdevelopment is specifically selected to refer to a framework for understanding that the current 'Third World' was constructed by the colonial powers and is maintained by neo-colonial social relations. Underdevelopment is first and foremost a descriptive concept, used to refute the common-sense notion of what Geoffrey Kay (1975) calls 'original underdevelopment,' or the idea that underdevelopment is an original condition in which all countries once existed. At the same time, underdevelopment is an analytic concept, highlighting the fact that the same processes of accumulation that characterize advanced capitalism in the Global North creates underdevelopment in the Global South.

In a 2005 conference, the South African NGO 'Groundwork' petitioned the World Petroleum Congress meeting in Johannesburg. In the preamble to their declaration, they wrote:

> At every point in the fossil fuel production chain where your members 'add value' and make profit, ordinary people, workers and their environments are assaulted and impoverished. Where oil is drilled, pumped, processed and used, in Africa as elsewhere, ecological systems have been trashed, peoples' livelihoods have been destroyed and their democratic aspirations and their rights and cultures trampled…
> Your energy future is modelled on the interests of over-

> consuming, energy-intensive, fossil-fuel-burning wealthy
> classes whose reckless and selfish lifestyles not only
> impoverish others but threaten the global environment,
> imposing on all of us the chaos and uncertainty of climate
> change and the violence and destruction of war. Another
> energy future is necessary: yours has failed! (Bond 2006: 76,
> citing www.groundwork.org.za).

According to a report by the African Labour Research Network (ALRN), a southern Africa-based civil society organization, the resource extraction industry often has a particularly devastating effect on socio-economic well-being and the environment. Although written with reference to gold mining operations, the conclusions of the ALRN apply more widely to extractive industries in Africa. In short, multinational corporations operating in Africa have little incentive to think about long-term damages and clean-up costs. The effects of mining also bear heavily on gender. Women are rarely considered for employment but are severely affected by the loss of land (ALRN).

Environmental concerns warrant further reflection. In his book Looting Africa, Patrick Bond discusses the North's "ecological debt" to the South. This is an idea gaining currency, especially in Latin America. Reasons include: 1) actualized costs of the future lack of availability of destroyed natural resources; 2) compensation for or costs of reparation (unpaid) of the local damages produced by exports (to the environment and health), or the actualized value of irreversible damage; 3) (unpaid) reparation costs or compensation for the impacts of imports of solid or liquid toxic waste, and; 4) (unpaid) costs of free disposal of gas residues (carbon dioxide, CFCs, etc.), assuming equal rights to sinks and reservoirs (Bond 2006: 85-6 citing Martinez-Alier 2003).

On their own, environmental concerns represent a formidable case that resource extraction underdevelops the Global South. However, the main mechanism by which the US empire underdevelops Africa as it intervenes to secure resources is surplus extraction. As Patrick Bond notes, Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1982) points to a drain of wealth along two trajectories. Surplus extraction can be an external relation from South to North (something Bond calls 'global apartheid'), or it can occur internally through appropriation of the surplus by domestic elites reproducing global apartheid's local agents (Bond 2006: 5). Each of these trajectories will be examined in turn.

Firstly, with regard to South-North surplus extraction, Bond's thesis is that "looting" is the basis for capital accumulation under conditions of extreme inequality (Bond 2006: viii). In an article entitled "Seeing like an Oil Company," James Feguson describes how capital "hops" over "unusable

Africa" and stops only in mineral-rich enclaves. The rest of the continent is "off the grid." For Ferguson, offshore oil extraction is "the clearest case of extractive enclaving" (Ferguson 2005: 378).

South-North surplus extraction is only one half of the real resource curse, as opposed to the unproblematic version the World Bank and IMF subscribe to. In his study of the rentier state in Gabon, Yates writes that there is a clear link between rentier states (especially those with oil in Africa) and authoritarianism/elite domination. Although examples of what we in the west call "corruption" can be found all over the Global South (and the Global North), surplus appropriation is at its worst in oil-economies.

This is most clearly seen in the case of Nigeria, where the political elites have engaged in massive appropriation of the country's oil revenues and amassed untold wealth. The "achievements" of Nigerian oil development include 85 percent of oil revenues accruing to one percent of the population. Current estimates are that of $400 billion in revenues as much as $100 billion have simply gone "missing" since 1970 (Watts 2006: 11-12). Additionally, oil has created massive political instability and insecurity in the Niger Delta. According to Michael Watts, "Civil violence among and between oil producing communities and the state security forces is endemic (it is estimated that more than one thousand people die each year from oil-related violence)" (Watts 2006: 14).

VI. Conclusion

Part of the project of resisting US empire is resisting the violent intervention that the creation of AFRICOM represents. In <u>The New American Imperialism</u>, Fouskas and Gökay write:

> Today's neoconservative agenda seeks what the U.S. ruling class has always desired, which is to impose a U.S. vision of the "free market and democracy" on the entire world, and in so doing secure economic resources and global markets under the control of U.S. authority. It is an agenda that can be themed as the "new American imperialism"… (Fouskas and Gökay 2005: 4).

There can be little doubt that increased US attention on oil-producing countries in Africa and the creation of an 'American Lake' in the Gulf of Guinea will deepen processes of underdevelopment and surplus extraction, while a more militarized Africa can only mean renewed wars for resources and power. In <u>How Europe Underdeveloped Africa</u>, Rodney writes:

> All of the countries named as "underdeveloped" in the world
> are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which

the world in now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural resources and labour. That is an integral part of underdevelopment in the contemporary sense (Rodney 1982: 14).

The new scramble for Africa must be met with unwavering opposition to continued underdevelopment and exploitation. In a world dominated by an 'Empire of Capital,' (Wood 2003; Saul 2008), the challenge for Africa is to finally break free of imperialism, old and new.

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Resisting the Re-Production of Militarized Violence and Hegemonic Ontologies in Canada's North[1]

Lori A. Crowe

> *Historians chronically speak of the military opening up the Arctic, as if it had been kind of locked and mysterious room before some clever army engineers happened by with the keys. Really, the military swept over the Arctic - first during World War II and more so during the Cold War - like an iron cloud, carpet bombing the place with boxes. Their job was the assertion of sovereignty. Every place a box landed became a beach head for industrialized society. The boxes soon became the foundation for the Canadian government, which the military had given cause to worry about its sovereignty. Boxes were added, and more and more of our society - with its various virtues and vices, machines and organizations, ideals, morals, values and goals - were shipped north. What adult Inuit recall when they look back, not always in anger, is decade after decade when the skies rained boxes. The skies rain boxes still* (McMahon 1988: 11).

> *Things had happened so fast - with the government arriving and then the mining and oil companies - that none of the dozens of bureaucrats and anthropologists and politicians who considered the changes in the native economy and culture thought there was any point in bothering to isolate the impact of the military. You could comb dozens probably hundreds of articles on the strategic significance of the Arctic and never read a word about the people who lived there* (McMahon 1988: 63).

> *We do not wish our traditional territories to be treated as a strategic military and combat zone between Eastern and Western alliances. For thousands of years, Inuit have used and continue to use the lands, waters and sea ice in circumpolar regions. As aboriginal people, we are the Arctic's legitimate spokespersons. Since our northern lands and communities transcend the boundaries of the four countries, we are in a unique position to promote peace, security and arms control*

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> *objectives among states of the Arctic Rim -Mary Simon*
> (Loukacheva 2007: 128).

In the summer of 2007 Canada announced plans to increase its Arctic military presence in an effort to assert sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. The promises made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper during his Throne Speech and in several policy speeches prominently featured an ambitious and costly (roughly C$5.3 billion over five years) commitment to military reinvestment, including: six to eight arctic patrol ships which will guard what he says are Canadian waters; a deep water port built near Iqaluit, a region the US Geological Survey estimates has as much as 25 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and gas; a surveillance system to detect submarines under the ice cap, and; plans to modernize the Canadian Rangers. Harper's announcement effectively returned the strategic importance of the Arctic for Canada's security and defense to the forefront of concern for many politicians, academics, and foreign governments.

The plan, however, was announced without any consultation with the Inuit who have occupied this region for hundreds of years. The Liberal MP for Iqaluit Nancy Karetak-Lindell said: "People here were upset," that the federal government was acting "like it was still the 1960s."[2] This glaring omission by the Canadian government of Inuit autonomy, and inattention to their concerns, is in step with a history of disregard by the Canadian government and military of the inhabitants of the Arctic. This is in spite of the centrality of the Canadian Arctic in past and future security and defense military activity which has undoubtedly and will continue to severely affect the economy, environment, politics, and living standards, and cultural survival of the residents of the Arctic.

This grave oversight also calls attention to a serious misnomer: the recent progress that has been made by the Inuit has led to overly optimistic analyses on the part of scholars and policy-makers with regard to the current state of Inuit economic, political, and social progress and the future of Canada-Inuit relations. There has undeniably been significant progress, due almost entirely to the

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[2] This lack of consultation is not so surprising: In response to a speech by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark to the House of Commons on 10 September 1985 which called for an increased military presence in the Arctic, national and regional Inuit associations issued briefs before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations stating sovereignty is "more securely founded upon continuing Inuit use and occupation of the area than upon its militarization." The committee responded with recommendations that called on the Canadian government to make Inuit interests a priority, and, interestingly, called on Canada to seek the demilitarization of the region, something the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) has been advocating for years.

activism and effort of individuals and communities that have resulted in vital gains for Inuit recognition and autonomy. These include the development of Inuit initiatives for the protection and promotion of Inuit interests and concerns, including institutional and informal actions; the creation of Nunavut and the NLCA (Nunavut Land Claims Agreement), and; the creation and continued participation of the Inuit in organizations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) (which is the vehicle through which the Inuit of Canada are able to exercise their mandate in the Arctic Council and maintain an involvement in the activities and decision-making processes regarding the Arctic). However, in spite of these positive movements in Canadian-Indigenous relations, the extent to which Inuit voices are being heard and are able to affect decision-making outcomes is seriously undermined (Loukacheva 2007: 122-123). This is occurring at the jurisdictional level and also as a result of an epistemological/cosmological divide which the Canadian government fails to recognize as a crucial component in Canadian/Inuit relations. Thus, despite the optimism with which scholars and government officials often view the future of Indigenous peoples in Canada, when it comes to issues of defense, security, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over policy making, legal and informal decision-making processes exclude the Northern aboriginal peoples in the most significant and detrimental of ways.

Historically, issues of defense, security, and sovereignty in the Arctic have been definitively and for the most part solely conducted by the military: "The Arctic," explains Østreng "has gradually been transformed from a *military vacuum* prior to World War II, to a *military flank* in the 1950-70 period, and a *military front* in the 1980s" (1992: 30). With recognition of the Arctic as strategically important during WWII, the military's "'discovery' of the North" (Loukacheva 2007: 136) resulted in a massive influx of money, military and civilian activity, the building of infrastructure, research, and extensive military operations and exercises, largely from the United States. This occurred on indigenous homelands, settlements, and burial grounds and radically impacted the environment, hunting patterns, economic development, and cultural survival of the northern indigenous peoples and even included the forced relocation of communities and the uncompensated appropriation of land without the consent of local populations. I am arguing that Inuit desire for and entitlement to involvement in international relations - particularly in matters of security and defense - is substantiated by the effects of historical Canadian decisions and actions in the Arctic: the strategic importance of Inuit homelands in security and defense matters and an understanding of how historically the local populations have been adversely impacted is adequate justification for formally including Inuit voices in contemporary issues of security and defence (Loukacheva 2007: 132).

What we are witnessing in the Arctic is part of a larger trend in civil-military relations and their implications for regional security and global security via the segregation of military/security/defense priorities from sustainable security. In particular Canada's military commitments have had devastating repercussions on and for aboriginal communities' culture and way of life, and much of what occurred in the past as a product of US and Canadian military concerns was "beyond the sight of even the Canadian government" (Loukacheva 2007: 136). The current failure of the Canadian government to consult with Northern aboriginal peoples prior to announcing its plans for a re-militarization of the North suggests that perhaps our primary concern should be Canada's reliance on the military as an approach in the North - which appears to warrant the complete disregard for Inuit concerns and desired involvement in the decision-making process - and is thus integrally related to any future development, research, and protection of the land and people in the Arctic North. Revealing violent interactions of the military with indigenous people in the assertion of sovereignty and defense in the past sheds light on contemporary challenges in remilitarizing the North and the effect this will have on culture, economics, and environment in these areas - particularly as we are already witnessing how colonial attitudes persist today in failing to engage with Inuit communities and organizations and a lack of adequate consultation mechanisms.

An excerpt from McMahons's (1988) book Arctic Twilight exemplifies the indifference with which the military flooded into Inuit homelands. The following passage describes some of the visible changes seen by Jack Ferguson, a researcher sent by Canada to report on the radar sites, when the US military began installation of the DEW Line radar sites in the spring of 1956 (I will elaborate on this example further below):

> In the boom camps encircling the radar sites the banging and trundle of construction reverberated through every Inuit tent and shack and was, Ferguson felt, disintegrating the foundations of social organisation. There was no time to go out hunting and what game there was nearby had disappeared. People started relying on food and clothing shipped to the sites from trading posts. When, as sometimes happened, the shipments didn't get through, men could eat in the military mess halls but women and children went hungry and were forced to beg at the back door (McMahon 1988: 34-35).

The traditional order of the Inuit communities, Ferguson reports, was being "turned on its head" by the military presence. Culturally, economically, and socially, communities were being broken down by the military incursion into Inuit society:

> …men no longer hunted together; old dances and songs, already frowned on by the missionaries, had become the property of the old, replaced for everyone else by American movies at the Air Force base…The work week left men too exhausted to play with their children or talk to their wives. Women, robbed of their own work, had been reduced by partners to babysitters. Kids were learning nothing. Elsewhere, some people who heard of the boom sweeping the land even stopped trapping in anticipation of the wind of wealth blowing their way (Ibid.).

The evacuation of the military from areas where they operated in the Arctic often created additional problems. Following the completion of the DEW Line, for example, the military essentially left an industrial wasteland of abandoned buildings and warehouses and leftover construction materials scattered across the land. Moreover, this sudden mass departure created mass unemployment for the Inuit who had been hired to work on the DEW Line, effectively producing a skewed social structure and financial insecurity in Inuit society. In one community for example, a liquor and oil reserve was abandoned that reportedly took the Inuit twenty years to deplete (Ibid.: 37). One old man recounted: "In those days, the Russians didn't realize there were some people living up here. Same with the Americans, they didn't realize. Same with even the government of Canada, they didn't even recognize that there were some Inuit living up here, even though it's there own country" (Ibid.). The Arctic turned out to be, "a kind of perfect military playground" (Ibid.: 39) - at the lifetime expense of the Inuit.

How Canada moves forward on the issue of sovereignty assertion in the Arctic requires reflection on the effects of militarization in the past: should Canada expand its military presence in the Arctic? Is diplomacy a better way to settle sovereignty disputes? Here I look briefly at three historical events in which actions by Canadian government in order to assert sovereignty and increase its military presence in the North resulted in militarized violences on Inuit and Innu bodies and an ethnocide of their distinct culture and knowledges. In looking briefly at the low level flight testing in Goose Bay, the construction of the DEW Line, and the forced migration of Inuit, it is important to listen to the accounts of the people who have lived in these areas and to engage with writings from outside of the academe and government policy papers - it is these voices who are largely ignored as having anything to tell us about security, sovereignty, and militarization, and yet it is these accounts which are most vital to any future decision making in the North.[3]

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[3] While I do not wish to speak on behalf of the Inuit or to propose that one voice can adequately represent their concerns, it is vital to recognize that the Innu and Inuit are not the 'passive victims' found in so many older accounts of Canadian history,

Goose Bay Military Base

When Harper made the announcement to increase its Arctic military presence in the summer of 2007 I was living in Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Labrador. The town is home to about 8,000 people (about 2/3 of which are of white ethnic background and about one third are Innu and Inuit). The land was selected in 1941 to build the Goose Bay Air Force and today it is home to the largest military air base in northeastern North America, CFB Goose Bay. Today the Base remains the most important economic driver of the economy of Happy Valley-Goose Bay, currently employing close to five hundred civilians (mostly private contractors) and one hundred military personnel. The creation of the Base was the economic stimulus for stores opening in Goose Bay and subsequently it became a government service area. I soon began to learn about Goose Bay's complex and controversial past as a site for low level flight training and subsequent political resistance to the military in these areas from the Innu. This remains a contentious issue today because Goose Bay's military flight training program is the primary source of employment in the area (CFB Goose Bay).

The Goose Bay airfield was a major ferrying point for aircraft traveling to and from Europe during the Second World War and served as an important strategic location during the Cold War. From October 1942 until the end of the war, 24, 000 aircraft passed through Goose Bay, making it the busiest airport in the world during this time. During its 50th anniversary in the summer of 1991, the Goose Bay airfield was once again heavily used by Canadian and American militaries to transport troops and supplies to the Persian Gulf. The United States Air Force (USAF), which originally built the base, maintained a considerable presence in Goose Bay following the end of World War II. With the onset of the Cold War there was general consensus that security radar warning sites were required as safety precautions to the Soviet threat. Once again Goose Bay proved to be an ideal location. Construction of the Melville Air Force Station (located on top of a hill six miles northwest of the airfield) began in July 1951 and was completed in November 1954.

In the late 1950's the Royal Air Force (RAF) of the United Kingdom began using Goose Bay as a tactical flight training area for their Vulcan bombers and since 1979 Canada has leased the air base for low-level flight training, air defense exercises, and bombing practice by NATO air forces. The RAF were

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rather, they have been "active agents of commercial, diplomatic, and military relations" (Miller 2000: xii). We must, however, be exceedingly cautious that knowledges aren't appropriated, including written and oral Innu and Inuit histories, in order to service the Canadian governments' goals of military security, economic development, and sovereign control.

joined by the German Air Force (GAF) in 1981 and the Royal Netherlands Air Force[4] (RNAF) in 1986. In the fall of 1996 a ten year Multinational Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU) was signed with the RAF, the GAF, and the RNAF. In 1999 the Italian Air Force (ITAF) also signed into the MMOU. Goose Bay also hosts air defense exercises and NORAD exercises. In the 2001 flying season the various participants conducted a total of 7526 sorties (flights) at 5 Wing Goose Bay. In 2002, the Canadian Department of National Defence approved the inclusion of laser guided bombs. Flights often skim the ground as low as 100 feet at very high speeds and supersonic testing was undertaken for the first time in 2001 (CFB Goose Bay).

"Any distinctiveness the nomadic life of the Innu had" reveals Samson " their necessary attachment to the land, the open spaces, and the animals - was simply ignored" (2003: 109). The following passage clearly portrays the effects of flight testing on the Innu communities:

> While the Innu hunting families that are under the flight paths of the jets are largely invisible to military leaders and pilots, hunters say they are regularly subjected to deafening screeching noises and sonic booms. They are frequently startled by the sudden noises, causing them to duck down and wince. Their hearts pound. They breath hard. Some people fall to the ground immediately dropping their rifles, logs, and chainsaws to the ground. Older people and children often become frightened and anxious in anticipation of the jets. As a result, some people avoid altogether areas that are thought to be overflown. The Innu hunting families believe that low-level flying has affected many animals by reducing their numbers and altering their behaviour (Ibid.).

Samson interviews hunter Jean-Pierre Ashini who insists that animals have been hurt by the tests: he has found "dead fish floating on the surface of lakes, baby ducklings in marshes in November, well after they should have flown south, and caribou dead with no wounds" (Ibid.). Targeted bombing ranges used as part of these exercises are areas favoured by Innu for spring hunting: "For hunters, there is little doubt that low-level flying is anti-thetical to the vitality of the animals they depend on" (Ibid.). Elizabeth Penashue, an active and vocal opponent of the flight training, has stated: "The governments didn't look at the Innu way of life. They never even consulted us" (Byrne 157).

> Any distinctiveness the nomadic life of the Innu had - their necessary attachment to the land, the open spaces, and the animals - was simply ignored…There were no attempts to come to grips with how the Innu experience low-level-flying

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[4] http://www.mindef.nl/english/rnlaf1.htm

> or anything else…The low level flight training is sensed as a
> violation of the people, animals, and land that compromise the
> *nutshimit* life. The overflying tears away at the relationships -
> between people, between people and animals, between animals
> and people and their surroundings - that are essential to country
> life…The physical damage to the animals and the landscape is
> always closely linked not just to the physical survival of the
> Innu, but to the continued vitality of their distinct identity and
> world view. Violations of the animals and their habitats are
> seen as strikes against both the self and the people as a
> whole…(Samson 2003: 110-111).

Different and complex conceptions of land are an important part in the
livelihoods of Inuit and Innu - taking of land is felt as a kind of personal
disgrace: "The physical damage to the animals and the landscape is always
closely linked not just to the physical survival of the Innu, but to the continued
vitality of their distinct identity and worldview" (Ibid.: 101). In an interview
with Penashue, when asked if the Innu have a special relationship with the land,
she responded: "Yes, because we were born here. Our parents were born here
and survived on the land. My father delivered [my mother of] me in the country.
I was out of the country since I was a child." When asked if she thought the
low-level flights were a violation of the land, Penashue responded: "Yes,
because they are not only destroying the people, but the culture and the land.
White people have different respects. We respect the land and do not want it to
be destroyed" (Ibid.: 110). The concept of *owning land* is also distinct.
Translating for an Inuit man named Simon, to the author, the translator explains:

> For him, he doesn't feel that anybody owns this land, it's here
> to be used. Like, he's not greedy over it and he wouldn't want
> to be, you know. But it doesn't make sense to him if somebody
> says this area is mine and this other part of the land is yours. It
> doesn't make sense to him (McMahon 1988: 113).

Commenting on how such events can contribute to the social disintegration of
entire communities, Prote Poker, a former Innu chief stated: "People feel
powerless. Their anger is not directed at the government, but to each other and
towards ourselves" (Ibid.: 100).

In the late 1980's, Penashue and other women actively protested the low level
flight training through direct action on the military airport runways. In the
spring of 1988, several families set up camp and occupied a bombing range in
the country designated by the military for laser-guided smoke-bomb target
practice. They were periodically joined by supporters from solidarity based
organizations. A number of Innu women were arrested for their part in the

occupation of the runways and for refusing to sign undertakings to not protest again. Today, the Goose Bay program is vigorously promoted by the Canadian Department of National Defence, enthusiastically acting to expand on it. While well publicized Innu objections have been noted, they've never been deemed worthy enough to halt low-level flying, with objections continually being overruled.

DEW Line

One of the best examples of how the surge of military activity had vital implications for the Inuit residents in the Arctic is demonstrated by the creation of the DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line (which occurred in conjunction with the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD)) as part of Canada's overall cooperation with US military initiatives. The US, as Kenneth Eyre argues "used the Canadian North to carry the war to the enemy...The United States, its troops, its money, its construction firms and its employees dominated the North" (1981: 295). Signed in 1955 during the Cold War era, the DEW agreement between the US and Canada involved the building of a northerly line of radar installations which stretched from Alaska to Baffin Island - essentially a radar trip-wire that was part of the American led official deterrent strategy to detect anticipated Russian bombers or missiles. The DEW Line stations were to be built in Canada and were essentially "a necklace of domes and support installations embedded in the tundra every 50 miles from the Alaskan border to Davis Inlet" (McMahon 1988: 30-31).

While the agreement did in fact contain regulations regarding the Inuit, if the US desired to build military installations on Inuit homelands, explains Loukacheva, the US would be "entitled to remove Inuit settlements or burial grounds with the consent of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources" (2007: 137). What this amounted to was forced relocation of Inuit communities, the disturbance of hunting grounds, forced Inuit contact with outsiders, the proliferation of illness brought by the military, and a complete alteration in the living patterns of Inuit societies which skewed established social structures. As men became factory workers to fill the employment vacuum in the new construction sites, women became babysitters, communities were lost, and families began breaking down. Additionally, when the military's 'Cold War building craze' subsided, environmental contamination and mass lay-offs created an 'industrial wasteland' while the foundations of social organization disintegrated (McMahon 1988: 34-36). The following passage reveals the magnitude of the effects of the military industrialization on the environment, the people, and their means of survival:

> Building sections, steel towers, oil drums, electronic equipment, paint, wood, wire, plastic, and food barged up the Mackenzie River. An ocean-going fleet approached with more

from the east as did another from the west, 300 ships all tolled. Two hundred transport planes arrived. Convoys of steel-treaded tractors appeared on the tundra. Bulldozers were parachuted from flying boxcars, frogmen dynamited open harbours, thousands of soldiers piled ashore in amphibious landing craft. Between 1954 and 1957, 1.25 million tons of heavy machinery and 75 million gallons of petroleum blew into the Arctic. In a flash, the Inuit were overwhelmed (Ibid.: 31).

The long term disruption to the Inuit way of life and the permanent modification of their relationship with the land was a severe and lasting result of the economic exploitation that was entrenched within the military endeavors in the North:

After school he found work back at the military installation - a Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar site - which at first seemed a relative picnic. He shoveled, cleaned, swept, moved and washed things under the eye of supervisors who always seemed willing to explain. At first it suited him fine but the time came when he started wondering why he was doing all the work and they were doing all the explaining. He envied them, started to feel stupid and, eventually quit. Back home in Gjoa Haven he spent his days hunting with his cousins. So much time had passed since he was on the land that he had forgotten almost everything. He had turned into one lousy hunter. He moved back to the DEW line. (Thomas: "It makes me totally confused. I thought I was not going to make a good hunter and at the same time I was not going to be a good worker unless I went back to the DEW Line. That's the only place where I could earn a living to feed my family") (Ibid.).

From an international meeting on Arctic developments in 1952, an American Navy report:

The Eskimo [sic] is a potential source of manpower that will be invaluable to our future military efforts in that region and which, if utilized to the full extent, will result in a material saving to our government…The Eskimo compared favourably with the semi-primitive people of such Latin American countries as Mexico, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina…It is generally recognized that any Eskimo enjoys the privilege of civilization but it will take some time before they can be taught to assume the responsibility of civilization (Ibid.: 39).

Coerced/Forced Migration and Settlement to Grise Ford, Resolute Bay, Davis Inlet

During the 1950's one of the most traumatic events in Inuit-government relations occurred, often referred to as the 'High Arctic exiles,' in which the government of Canada 'coerced' and 'manipulated' (essentially forced) the migration of northern Quebec Inuit. The government moved a number of Inuit families from Port Harrison and Baffin Island to areas of the High Arctic that had been unoccupied for hundreds of years. They were moved to establish the small communities of Resolute on southern Cornwallis Island and Grise Fjord at the southern tip of Ellesmere Island - the Inuit of Grise Fjord became Canada's most northerly permanent residents. While the government argued its motive was to provide a land that could support the Inuit better, Inuit oral evidence and scholars condemn the relocation as part of a government effort to strengthen its claim to northern islands, and that Inuit people were exploited for strategic reasons (MacMillan and Yellowhorn 2004: 291).

The following passage provides an invaluable look into the effect that forced migration had on these families (the author begins by describing the processions of a meeting on August 10, 1953 in Ottawa presided by Col. F.J.G. Cunningham, director of Resources and Development for the Northern Administration and Lands Branch).

> Mr. Fraser, Chief of the Northern Administration Division, then asked Mr. J. Cantley, of Resources and Development, to explain the experiment. Mr. Cantley said that eleven Eskimo families were involved, all volunteers. They would be shipped to three locations, the particulars to be decided on the trip. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible. Mr. Cantley said the main purpose of the experiment was to see if people could adapt themselves to living in the High North. No one was certain what type or quantity of game was to be found there.
>
> Sgt. Lt. P.E. O'Neil, of the RCAF, hoped the Eskimos would not become dependent on the base at Resolute Bay for food and clothing if the experiment failed. Mr. L.T. Campbell of the Meteorological Division felt the same. Mr. Cantley assured both that these Eskimos were not looking for jobs, although no one would stand in their way if such was available. The meeting was assured that the planning of the experiment was such that the Eskimos would not be an inconvenience to the RCAF.

In any case, Mr. B.G. Sivertz, of Resources and Development, pointed out that the Canadian government was anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the North as possible for reasons of sovereignty. It appeared, he said, that in many cases the Eskimos were the only people capable of doing this….

They had come more than 1,000 miles due north and were now closer to the North Pole than to home. This was the place government officials had said would be a land of plenty. Scanning the horizon, they saw nothing but rock. They wondered if they had been misinformed. Reuben Ploughman, manager of the HBC store, was not surprised they believed the government's claims. He said they had an inordinate trust of the government, these particular Inuit did…

These were the first Inuit to live on Cornwallis Island since the Thule had been driven out by the Ice Age 400 years earlier. Quickly, they built up a camp, but their sense of abandonment grew. The sun had disappeared soon after they arrived. Now morose in their lamp-lit tents or groping over the land like blind men, they longed for the light. And food was wrong. All their lives they had been used to a steady diet of char, which tastes like salmon, and plants and musky caribou and delectable ptarmigan. Now they had to swallow walrus and seal and bear for supper everyday. And making clothes was a problem - the materials different and calling for new and unfamiliar methods. And there wasn't a store for hundreds of miles.

When it proposed the experiment, the government had promised they could go home in two years if they didn't like their new home. Amid their early difficulties they clung to this promise and, two years on, when the annual government inspection arrived, they called it in. They said: Thanks but no thanks. We'd like to go home now. And the government said: WE prefer that you stay. But, okay. You can go. You'll have to pay your own way though. That was the end of that[5] (Ibid.).

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[5] The passage goes on to describe how decades later it was discovered that their request to return to Quebec was more than mere homesickness: "The tiny village was so remote, the people so interrelated and the enmity between the Pond and Inoucdjouac natives so strong that children had few choices for mates. The Quebec people feared for their biological continuation" (Ibid.).

Testimony to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in 1993 referred to the "cruel and inhuman" policy of forced relocations and charged that the Inuit were used as "human flagpoles" to ensure Canada's sovereignty in the High Arctic. Inuit witnesses persuaded the Commission that they had a strong case for redress. While the commissioners recommended an apology and compensation for the wrong, at the time of writing no such steps for redress have been taken.

Legal Jurisdiction for a Formal Partnership
While the government's three pronged approach to sovereignty assertion in the North - which includes economic development, environmental protection, and the protection of national land, air, and water - is welcome by many, several warning flags in fact indicate the precariousness of Canada's new promises for coherent and strategic Arctic policies that will see implementation. First, historically, Canada's interest in the Arctic has been largely reactionary, first in 1969 by stopping the American SS Manhattan, second in 1986 by using legal measures following the passage of American ice breaker Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage, and then again recently in August 2007 following the Russian expedition to plant a titanium flag on the Arctic seabed (Vaidyanath).[6] Second, that environmental protection even factors into the government's approach appears to be grossly contradicted by the fact that: 1) Harper was until recently of the camp who denied climate change (Fenge 2007: 84); 2) Harper's promise to foreign business interests that "the untapped oil, gas and mineral riches of the Arctic are a major factor in his description of Canada as an energy and mining "superpower",' and; 3) the government "still does not have an overall plan for environmental monitoring" (Simon 2005).

Finally, despite the existing 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), which is the only treaty to include sovereignty provisions and processes that specifically mentions monitoring and offshore management, the government has

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[6] In fact, the Canadian government did not make its presence felt in the north until it felt its sovereignty in the Arctic was threatened - Canada was a reluctant and late entrant into a relationship with the Inuit and Subarctic First Nations, showing little interest in taking up responsibilities in the North, especially if it involved commitments to Native peoples. It was largely intrusions into the North by Americans, potentially threatening Canada's hold on the region, that altered this thinking. With World War II, the Arctic was considered essential for strategic military purposes and Canadian and American militaries began construction of airfields, barracks, hangars, roads, and other facilities. Essentially then, as McMahon notes, "The whole of Canada's involvement with the Inuit amounted to one big sovereignty exercise" (1998).

failed to implement it.[7] The reality has been, as the President of Inuit Circumpolar Conference Canada Duane Smith has pointed out, that the Harper government 'deals with' the Inuit using an "arms-length approach" (Vaidyanath). Promises regarding social and economic development and environmental protection evaporate under military sovereignty exercises; discussions around the fragile Arctic ecosystem and its importance to the Inuit inhabitants is brushed aside for the economic potential in the oil and gas reserves that lie beneath it. On her national speaking tour on Arctic sovereignty, Mary Simon, the president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, emphasized the importance of a holistic and long-term approach, arguing that sovereignty rests primarily in the country's inhabitants: "Arctic sovereignty rests on viable communities, sound civil administration and responsible environmental management, not just ports, training facilities and military exercises" (Ottawa 2007).

The historic and contemporary military significance of the Canadian North and the vulnerability of Inuit lands to militarization as a result of strategic military interests (Loukacheva 2007: 128) in combination with the reasons mentioned above suggest that it is not enough to pay close attention to the promises Canada makes and the lip-service made to consultation mechanisms with Indigenous peoples. Several scholars have begun to recognize that the government should respect the legal capability of indigenous people and "allow the Inuit direct participation in international affairs where their homelands are concerned and in security issues relevant to the development of their lands" (McMahon 1988: 4). Currently, the Inuit are able to actively participate informally in international relations via various forms of international cooperation and indigenous internationalism. The Arctic Council, which was established in 1996 by the eight Arctic States, is one of the most established informal arrangements that allows the Inuit of the Circumpolar North to have 'voice' in international forums. A Canadian initiative, the Arctic Council operates as a:

> …high-level forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among Arctic governments, indigenous communities, and other Northern residents on common Arctic issues. In particular, these include issues of environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic; the dissemination of information; encouraging education and promoting interest in Arctic related matters; and coordinating and overseeing activities established under specific Arctic programs (Brøndsted 1973: 555-6; Brøndsted 1996: 120-1).

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[7] In fact, the Nunavut Inuit issued a one billion dollar lawsuit against the federal government on this lack of implementation last year.

The Council can issue 'soft-law' recommendations/declarations for action and has produced initiatives such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report and the Arctic Human Development Report (Loukacheva 2007: 122). It is through the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a permanent actor in the Council, that the Inuit of Nunavut and other Circumpolar regions in Canada are able to express their mandate. Emerging in 1976 and formally established in 1980 with an official Charter, the ICC represents more than 155, 000 Inuit from Canada, Greenland, Alaska, and the Chukotka Peninsula. Since its infancy the ICC has advanced indigenous peoples' rights and interests from security and human right issues to economic and trade concerns. The ICC can make proposals to the Council, participate in all meetings and activities, and moreover, signifies the future potential for greater representation in the international arena and the collaboration internationally on Indigenous initiatives (Ibid.: 123-127). As Loukacheva importantly argues, "Indigenous internationalism and the ICC's influential role prove that 'Inuit have a legitimate, extensive, and varied role to fulfill in international matters'" (2007: 126; Simon 1985: 33).

Formally, however, the limited legal capacity of a subnational entity like the ICC and Nunavut in international and domestic law and the lack of jurisdictional power and limited capabilities of the Arctic Council restrict the Inuit from having any jurisdiction over decisions on security and defense policy in the Arctic (Loukacheva 2007: 103-127). The Arctic Council, and the ICC through it, is restricted in several contexts. First, as a 'high-level forum' it is not classified legally as an international organization under international law. Second, with no permanent resources or administrative structure, the Council's operation is inconsistent and therefore decisions can be unpredictable. Third, as an intergovernmental structure of nation states, Inuit (and Nunavut's) involvement through the ICC is significantly limited due to the restricted legal capacity of sub-national entities in international law. Overall, the Arctic Council has been criticized, explains Loukacheva, for its "limited organizational capacity, lack of authority to make binding decisions, severe shortage of financial and other resources, and an increasing overlap in its activities with other international actors in the Arctic region" (Ibid.: 122). Similarly, while the ICC in particular is playing an increasingly influential role in international policy-making, visible in successes such as facilitating diplomacy in the Circumpolar North and lobbying national governments,[8] its jurisdictional power is non-existent. Categorized as a non-governmental organization within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, the ICC retains

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[8] The ICC has, importantly, made several groundbreaking contributions to the promotion of Inui/Indigenous rights, including the establishment of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000 and contributing to the development of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People adopted by the UNHRC in 2006 (Loukacheva 2007: 126).

consultative status category 2, which limits its advisory status and voting rights (Ibid.: 122-126). In sum, despite such mechanisms for contribution to the international arena, the Inuit (and the new territory of Nunavut) are systematically excluded from the formal arena of politics and relegated to a passive role in our political social imaginary as representative figureheads.

It is crucial that the Inuit assert the legislated right to be involved in international activities and security policy-making, argues Loukacheva, and at the very least a significant role in the consultation process as part of a partnership with Inuit organizations, for several reasons: 1) the unique cultural, economic, linguistic, environmental, and geographical conditions of the Inuit require an expanded notion of legal autonomy in the area of foreign affairs; 2) existing Inuit internationalism and contemporary trends of globalization are already pushing in this direction, and; 3) this would allow for local concerns to be included in any decision-making process (2007: 104). Nunavut wishes to be involved in security policies and international decision making and is justified in this endeavor when the issue at hand involves their land and local concerns, and when as we've seen, national defense policies can and will have direct effects on Inuit territories - informal involvement, while significant, is not sufficient. These are, as Loukacheva declares, justifiable grounds for legitimating the voices of Nunavut in areas of security and defense and formally recognizing Inuit voices in a legal capacity when their lands are concerned (2007: 132, 143).

Moving Forward: Cosmologies and Consultations
What's happening in the Arctic cannot be disengaged from history - from the violent exploitation, cultural assimilation, and silencing of indigenous peoples.The events discussed above often served the dual purpose of exploiting the land and Innu and Inuit labour for strategic and economic reasons and solidifying military alliances or asserting sovereignty claims. Past and present government agents and missionaries have exercised authority over the Inuit and Innu as an accompaniment to economic, industrial, and military developments which have involved relocating and transforming the people, with little or no consideration to any adverse consequences that might follow from coercing a people to give up their way of life. These events are intimately connected to enduring colonial power arrangements that manifest in the Canadian government's actions and attitudes towards the Innu and Inuit; that is, the laws, institutions, studies, consultations, and other interactions with the Canadian

government have been homogenizing, silencing, colonizing, and contributed to epistemic violence and a cultural ethnocide which has and continues to rely on imperial attitudes and assumptions operating through a liberal order framework.[9]

This means that in addition to the material affects of militarized violence on Innu and Inuit bodies and societies, Canada's omission/inattention to Aboriginal ontologies and cosmologies are implicated in and constitutive of violent, oppressive, and silencing processes that have contributed to a reproduction of power hierarchies and the subalternization of Aboriginal peoples.[10] This reconstitutes imperial/neo-colonial practices, processes, and ontological frameworks. By critically investigating the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the Canadian government's engagement with Innu and Inuit peoples there lies the potential to uncover ways of disrupting rather than reproducing power relations. Absolutely crucial to any discussion of Arctic sovereignty is the recognition of Innu and Inuit voices and an understanding of the multiple ways in which Canada has been a site of contestation in which Innu and Inuit individuals and communities are actively organizing and resisting these violent interventions that have resulted in political, social, and economic instability. In each of the instances discussed above, colonizing attitudes resulted in a lack of consultation, failure to understand/ 'consult' on the Innu or Inuits' own terms, the failure to consider the different cosmologies, and reporting and research mechanisms on part of government and individual researchers that further perpetuated homogenizing attitudes and assumptions. McMahon explains: "The dramatic differences in outlook and way of life between the Inuit and non-Inuit populations require approaches to the development of autonomy in the Arctic that take into account indigenous values and knowledge" (1988: 4).

It is this failure to recognize difference and distinctiveness and to attempt to understand the different cosmologies that represents one of the most problematic features of Canada's relationship with indigenous peoples (Beier 2005). Any discussion of military developments in the Arctic requires that we think seriously about how Innu and Inuit have been "forced into the neat, but pre-emptive, institutional, developmental, and consultative spaces and strategies of Euro-Canada. These arenas expect and demand acquiescence to pre-established formats and the materialist sensibilities of their antagonists"

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[9] For a significant and thorough examination of International Relation's inattention (specifically) and Western theory's omission more generally of Indigenous peoples see Beier 2005. See also Stern and Stevenson: 2006 for extensive anthologies of essays exploring the field of critical Inuit studies and methodological problems in Indigenous research.

[10] For elaboration on the concept of subalternization, see Spivak (1988).

(Samson 2003: 111). Consultation exercises in the past, for example, have been entirely ex post facto, and because the Innu and Inuit Nations often have no confidence in the fairness of the proceedings which are designed and run often by the government, they are hesitant to take part:

> Of course, the people had been consulted. Meetings were held, opinions solicited. They were even given the choice of two approved sites. What more could they ask? Yet, now they said, "We weren't too happy about it but we had to follow government regulations." Consultation to the Inuit means something quite different than it does to the government. One anthropologist wrote about the disappointment in a village when the promised consultation in the hiring of a teacher turned out to be the chance to scan applications, rather than, as people supposed, to invite prospective candidates to live among them for a time. The amount of say the Inuit had in government decisions about their lives had been steadily increasing, yet, even by their own definition, governments would never expect southerners to swallow what was often passed off as consultation in the North (McMahon 1988: 4).

> The dominance of the state is reinforced by the mandatory adoption of Western scientific methodology, governed by certain rationalist assumptions: that land, animals, and people can be abstracted and commodified; that accumulated measurements can produce relevant predictions, and that 'risk' can be assessed and managed…

> In the Innu communities, "traditional ecological knowledge" (TEK) has been gathered and its collation supervised primarily by non-Innu researchers who employ social science methods comprised of various kinds of paid interviews with the *Tshenut*, as well as film documentation and map drawing…TEK is of course a Western rather than a Native creation and its main aim is to assist with contemporary land management and industrialization strategies of the state…By contrast, hunting wisdom emerges in immediate and direct experience with the land, the animals, and the stories. All that is known is contingent. Knowing is an active process; it is always dynamic….What was fluid, changeable, non-material, and rooted in a peoples' experiences with the land and the animals that inhabit it becomes forced into contributing to a predictive objective of a state regulatory process (Samson: 116-118).

Interestingly, for the most part Inuit organizations have welcomed the renewed focus on the Arctic, acknowledging the importance of monitoring and research for the sustainability of the Arctic's unique environment as well as the potential economic benefits for the communities. Paul Kaludjak, president of Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. which oversees the implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, declared that Inuit organizations applauded Harper's announcement, aspiring for a more ambitious and active foreign policy - facilitated in partnership with the Inuit: "Inuit who live in the Canadian Arctic are proud Canadians, and we invite the government of Canada to engage with us to protect the Canadian Arctic" (Kaludjak 2006). Northern premiers have asked to have a say in security and defence developments that affect their lands, for instance, in Canada's negotiation with the US on the ballistic missile defence system, insisting that a 'positive role' would reflect a 'true partnership' (George 2003; 2004). *However*, Nunavut authorities and Inuit spokespeople continue to emphasize that security in the Arctic needs to go far beyond military operations and operations and needs to prioritize the living conditions for people in the Circumpolar North, including, most importantly, the economic and environmental problems caused by past disturbances of the military. Franklyn Griffiths proposes 'the practice of civility' as an alternative to military operations in the North (1993: 138-139; 1999b: 280-309). Inuit representatives have developed and written a report advancing sustainable security in the North as opposed to militarization, calling for the right of Nunavut's authorities to be informed on all security issues regarding their homelands, waters, air space, ice, game, limited resources, military action, and to be included in policy-making that concern these elements (Loukacheva 2007: 131). In fact, several Inuit authorities repeatedly emphasize that the best way for Canada to assert sovereignty over the Arctic is by making the homelands of Northern citizens a better place to live (Bell 2004). As Mary Simon, president of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (the national Inuit association, representing about 55,000 Inuit in Canada) argues, military policies - particularly in light of their impact on the Inuit historically, are insufficient at best when in absence of larger social, economic, and environmental policies:

> Coherent Arctic policies, both domestic and foreign, must be grounded in long-term strategic thinking and the substantial investment of time, talent and money in both infrastructure and the social fabric of the region…Arctic sovereignty rests on viable communities, sound civil administration and responsible environmental management, not just ports, training facilities and military exercises (2007).

At this point, the government has failed to effectively engage the Innu and Inuit on the security of the North and sovereignty assertion. There are a multiplicity

of voices that need to be included not only in these areas but which are also vital to understanding the implications and repercussions of policy-making on broader environmental, political, cultural, health, safety, and economic issues. Organizations, communities, and individuals need to be involved in the design process of consultations. The ITK have just released a report detailing their concerns and recommendations for a strategy in the Arctic that needs to be implemented (An Integrated Arctic Strategy 2008). The Canadian government cannot just choose to listen seriously to such groups; a partnership means that research is not done *on* aboriginals and policies scripted *for* aboriginals but *with* them.

The following are statements from several Inuit in Canada speaking on the issue of arctic sovereignty:

Mary Simon:

> *Act in partnership with us, not in disregard for our rights.*
>
> *Inuit believe that the Arctic can and should be governed and developed in constructive and creative ways that are, at the same time, good for Inuit who live there, good for Canada, and consistent with a more secure and co-operative international order.*
>
> *We take pride in being both Inuit and Canadians, and believe that the federal government should try to work in close partnership with us, not around us.*
>
> *My message to Canadians is that the best way to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is with the people. And the people in the Arctic, in the vast majority, are the Inuit. Ensuring the people and the communities are strong and healthy is important in asserting Canadian sovereignty.* (2007)

When asked to comment on whether or not there are concerns that, as indicated in Steven Harper's Throne Speech, plans to militarize Canada's claim on the Arctic will overshadow other Arctic policies, Simon responded:

> *Yes, Inuit do have concerns that the federal government will focus heavily on a narrow range of military measures. Inuit are patriotic Canadians, and we believe that Canada must have an adequate military presence and surveillance capacity in the Arctic. That said, an effective sovereignty and security program in the Arctic should be multi-pronged, and*

investments in that program, where possible, should be multi-purpose. For example, an Arctic based commercial fishing fleet, with appropriate port and harbour infrastructure, could bolster Canadian use of Arctic waters while creating stronger communities and badly needed jobs for the Inuit. The Nunavut Land Claims agreement calls for a Nunavut Marine Council to co-ordinate planning and regulation of waters within the Arctic archipelago - implementing this feature of the Agreement would both enhance sovereignty at a practical level and show good faith in honouring land claims rights."…. "As many Inuit leaders have stated, coherent Arctic policies must put the long-term needs of Inuit communities and households squarely at the centre, and that means tackling honestly and creatively the major social and economic problems that we face (2007).

The politics of security and sovereignty in the Arctic are complex - the feasibility of military operations, international law, and international organizations, environmental sustainability, colonial histories, and indigenous values and perspectives are all factors that must be taken into consideration. The implications of future decision making on Canadian citizens needs to be at the forefront of policy-making; security of a nation is founded upon the human security of its people.

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        ratedArcticStrategy.pdf>.

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Invisible Bodies, Illusionary Securing: The Performance of Illegality at the US-Mexico Border

Sanja Dejanovic

Manoeuvring as if 'ghosts' through the architectural wasteland of the US-Mexico borderlands in the year 2014, the technologically sophisticated and hypermasculinized soldier of the future is designated a simple and an urgent task to deter and erase borderhackers from infecting the American way of life. Acquiring a divine-like might, this band of cyborg soldiers featured in the video game Tom Clancy's Ghost Recon Advanced Warfighter 2, are "dropped into *hell* with only 72 hours to prevent an all out war" by securing a terrain of roughly two thousand miles.[1] On this terrain, there are no crystallized borders, spatial barriers, and architectural impediments that cannot be transcended by the omnipresent gaze of the game navigator. Such de-bordering, however, is also a mirror image of a practice of re-bordering through which human beings rendered as borderhackers are reduced to a biological existence. In such a scenario, the practice of border securing legitimates the bombardment and annihilation of undesirables. The production of their deaths is performative both in reifying a spatial partition between the US and Mexico, and in gesturing the safety of the American nation.

While the video game is set in a futuristic moment, the political topography on which the low-intensity war takes place bears traces of violence. The plot of the 'ghosts' defending American territorial sovereignty does not only represent a futuristic moment, but is also a parable of the present and reruns episodes of the past. Just two days before the Mexican-American War was declared in 1846, an American Daily Union columnist wrote; "the foreign foe dishonours and desecrates American soil by his footsteps, and has made it red with American blood."[2] The racialized depiction of the southern stranger as a dangerous brute and an inassimilable menace was instrumental in instilling anxiety and fear in American settlers. These were sentiments underlying the call for securitization that would be achieved through war. Such fabrication of a state of insecurity also played a vital role in border formation. After all, during the late 1840s American territorial expansion halted at the Rio Grande, where an arbitrary line was drawn in the sands of the deserts to prevent 'primitive' peoples from flowing into 'civilized' lands.[3]

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[1] Tom Clancy's Ghost Recon Advanced Warfighter 2.

[2] Hietala, R. Thomas. "Continentalism and the Color Line." The Impact of Race on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Reader. (Ed.) Michael L. Krenn. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999. 71.

[3] Ibid.: 79.

The brief consideration of both a non-fictional and a fictional account of the militarization of a political topography, racist exclusion along with the boundedness of the nation, and the reduction of the Mexican foreigner to a primitive being and bare biology, begins to illuminate how the US-Mexico border was and is performed and (re)produced. Above all, the accounts disclose how the illegal migrant as an undesired being, and, the border, are mutually and continuously constituted through two practices; a) through the configuration of borders as machines of 'social sorting,' but also as spaces of exception where exclusion is a marker that dehumanizes, and b) as theatres of securitizing where sovereign power, heavily hinging on bipower, is actualized and reenacted.[4]

This complicated nexus between migrant and border shall be explored in a number of ways. In the first part of the paper I consider snapshots of US socio-legal history as to illustrate how narrow conceptualization of citizenship and migrant legality have generated illegality, and the deportability of particular bodies.[5] In this section, I also show that in periods of exceptionality, illegality, as a category, has grown more pervasive and essentializing; solidifying the depiction of the border as a 'theatre of an enforcement crisis.' Such a crisis has incited further surveillance, militarization, and technologization of the borderlands. Although emphasis is placed on exceptionality, it is the normalizing function of exceptionality that I am concerned with most.

The second part offers a more proximal look at the way in which the border is performed and (re)produced. Drawing from Michel Foucault, I argue that the US-Mexico border is a technology of biopower and a type of threshold where entry of bodies is surveilled and controlled through a 'disciplinary partitioning' of citizens from foreigners, and legal from illegal migrants. While I do not go into the workings of the US shadow economy, I propose that disciplinary partitioning is pivotal to converting illegal or undocumented migrants into docile and economically efficient units rather than nationals or citizens. As such, I begin to explore how borderlands bring greater visibility to the way in which neo-liberalism manipulates foreign bodies in movement.

In the last part of the paper I continue to discuss some of the implications of disciplinary partitioning, in particular, how exclusion is a marker that dehumanizes and degrades migrant bodies down to bare biology or *bare life*. By engaging with Roxanne Doty's study of US deterrence policy, and Georgio

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[4] Agamben, Giorgio. <u>State of Exception</u>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005.

[5] De Genova, Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality.'" <u>Latino Studies</u>. 2(2004): 161.

Agamben's writings on the state of exception, I flesh out how the borderland is a precarious terrain where biopower, in its extreme form, is exercised. Like the fictional world of the video game, the US-Mexico borderland is an apparatus that manages life and death. To elaborate, the borderland is a space where the production of corpses has paradoxically allowed the state to raise an illusionary edifice of security.

I

A powerful myth of national homogeneity underlies the Eurocentric state system. This myth retains force because state formation is presumed to stem from sameness rather than difference or heterogenous life. Since its inception, the state system has been structured by locating heterogeneity outside delineated territorial boundaries of sameness, which has been (re)produced through an 'art of governance' that organizes, manages, and administers human life.[6] The production of spatially definitive political communities based on privileged membership, in this case citizenship, is, then, instituted and operates through logic of exclusion and inferiorization of externalized life.[7] Because externalized life, as a source of heterogeneity, signals the deterioration of homogeneity, it must be spatially contained through a number of biopolitical mechanisms, including borders.[8] This logic, a logic of closure, is not only an essential building block of national discourse, but also consolidates state biopower to constitute the identity and political status of human beings both inside and outside of its territorial boundaries.[9]

At this juncture we begin to map out the linkage between biopolitics and the 'art of governance' or state governmentality, as well as how both of these Foucauldian notions further our understanding of border politics and mobility more broadly. To elaborate, the 'art of governance' or the ability to mould, control, and direct human movement and life, is contingent on the production of knowledge about subjects, or the ability to constitute, classify, and quantify

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[6] Blaney, David and Naeem Inayatullah. "The Westphalian Deferral." <u>International Studies Review</u>. Special Issue: 29-64(2002): 31-2.

[7] Ibid.: 40 and Bosniak, Linda. <u>The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 45,124.

[8] Kearney, Michael. "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire." <u>Journal of Historical Sociology</u>. 4:1(1991). 53-4.

[9] Salter, Mark. "The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics." <u>Alternatives</u>. 31: 2(2006): 169. For a discussion on closure see Bosniak, Linda. <u>The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership</u>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 40.

their subjectivities. The following snapshots of US socio-legal history demonstrate how the production of the category 'illegality' has become instrumental both in the management of human life, and in re-bordering space - with surveillance, militarization, and technologization as its devices of disciplining.

There are very little quantitative obstacles to mobility when considering US migration laws in the first quarter of the 20th Century. While the implementation of the Immigration Act of 1924 and, the Quota Law of 1921 qualitatively curbed Mexican migration to the US since European immigration was preferred, there were no quantitative restrictions under law.[10] Instead, the US promoted Mexican migration to serve as temporary and flexible labour. Unlike European migrants to the US, Mexican migrants were not meant to gain citizenship status or have any socio-political rights. This prejudiced distinction was concretized in the late 1920s when US Border Patrol was created jointly with the Department of Labour to monitor and to curb the mobility of bodies when the supply of labour in the US economy was abundant.[11] In other words, rather than being a concern addressed by citizenship and immigration policies, Mexican migration has been perceived merely as an question of disposable, flexible, and productive labour meant to be administered.

The disposability of Mexican migrants grew more blatant with the racist rhetoric of the Great Depression when roughly half a million people were deported.[12] In such a period of uncertainty and volatility, the cohesion of an American homogenous nation relied on and warranted the expulsion of heterogenous life, in this case Mexican migrants, which signalled economic disruption and societal contamination. While the severity of the deportation policy of the Depression was reversed in the 1940s, the treatment of Mexican migrants as flexible and disposable labour continued with the Bracero Program. Jointly introduced by the US and Mexico in 1942, Bracero contractually engaged the Mexican state in auctioning labour from south of the border.[13] This would become classified as the 'legal' migrant.

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[10] De Genova, P. Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." Latino Studies. 2(2004): 162-3.

[11] Ibid.: 162.

[12] Ibid.: 164.

[13] Ibid.

While Bracero constituted the legal labour migrant, the program also generated the undocumented or illegal migrant. In an environment of economic growth, it radically relaxed border policing and (re)launched an 'open border' approach, thus substantially augmenting the entry of what became undocumented as opposed to legal border crossings.[14] Illegal also surpassed legal migration because US employers, able to evade taxation and other costs associated with importing labour, found it beneficial to underpay and overwork migrants without benefits and fixed timeframes of hire.[15] Such productivity was gained from migrants because of their subjugated status as 'illegal.' It is to this historical juncture, in particular, that one can trace the cultivation of a shadow economy in the US.

As I have argued, the stigmatization of Mexicans as just temporary and seasonal guest workers that maintain strong links to their national identity, served to reaffirm racial and physical or territorial boundaries between US and Mexico. Again, such demarcations are qualitative obstructions to mobility.[16] It was not until 1965 that quantitative measures were officially inscribed into law so as to limit Mexican migration to the US.[17] Although the seemingly egalitarian and anti-racist Hart-Celler Act of 1965 "sought to eliminate the bias against non-Europeans that was built into earlier immigration law,"[18] it imposed a rigid ceiling on 'legal' migration from the Western Hemisphere of 120,000 persons per year.[19]

This number is quite restrictive when one considers that in 1967, a year before the act was put into effect, roughly 150,000 Mexican migrants were deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).[20] Further, the act

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[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.: 164-5 & Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: The New York Press, 2005. 33.

[16] The use of qualitative and quantitative restrictions are borrowed from De Genova, P. Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." Latino Studies. 2(2004): 162-3.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: The New York Press, 2005. 32.

[19] De Genova, P. Nicola. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." Latino Studies. 2(2004): 169.

[20] Ibid.

permitted 'quota exemptions' for immediate family members of all naturalized US citizens.[21] This signified that while supposedly regarded impartially under the law, Mexican migrants would be unduly affected, since as temporary laborers and inassimilable others, citizenship for southerners was historically unreachable.[22] Because the act sought to reassert a narrow 'biological' and ancestral composition of the American nation through family reunification, and set firm parameters around the legal influx of bodies, it "became central to an unprecedented, expanded and protracted production of a more rigid categorical 'illegality' for Mexican / migrant workers."[23]

Within a decade of the act, there was an estimated six-fold increase in deportation of Mexican undocumented migrants.[24] Such severe deportation of Mexican migrants managed to (re)produce racist representations of the southerner as an unruly delinquent, and the US-Mexican border "as the theatre of an enforcement 'crisis.'"[25] This 'enforcement crisis,' emerging only after quantitative measures on migration were implemented, allowed the state to militarize the border by 'beefing up' Border Patrol, and investing in new technologies of surveillance and control.[26] Re-bordering in such historical moments of crisis or exceptionality was thus legitimated through the production of, and distinction between, illegality and legality.

This exceptional moment of intensified securitization was a powerful precedent that gradually became normalized. For instance, the Reagan administration amplified the public outcry for the US to "regain control of [the] border," so as to prevent communists and illegal migrants from breaching the US-Mexico frontier.[27] The heightened hysteria during the Cold War with respect to the porous nature of border spaces further naturalized the depiction of southern strangers as delinquents and as potential infiltrators, in particular because they

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[21] Ibid.: 170.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.: 168.

[24] Ibid.: 171.

[25] Ibid.: 171.

[26] Jardin, Matthew. "Review: The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home by Timothy J. Dunn." Z Dare. Electronic Document. Accessed 3 April 2007. <http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/jan97jardine.htm>.

[27] Ibid.

were merged with the communist threat. The fear of heterogeneous life also reified the state's control over the movement of bodies, both citizens and foreigners, through the expansion of disciplinary apparatuses at the border, and of the military industrial complex more broadly.

There was, however, a brief relaxation of migration policies in 1984 with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which legalized or offered resident status to roughly half (2.5 million) of all undocumented migrants, three quarters of which were Mexican.[28] The IRCA also put a cap on illegal migration by enforcing more rigorous inspections of workplaces. In spite of this, the act failed on two accounts; immigration officers were obligated to give employers a three day grace period to prepare documents and records, which meant that employers could abruptly release illegal labor upon notification of investigation,[29] and secondly, there was a stream of deportations along with exceedingly low tolerance of illegal migrants.[30] In effect, the act further fostered an atmosphere of emergency that became a defining feature of migration and border policy throughout the 1990s. Beginning with the Clinton administration's motto of 'prevention through deterrence,' a number of aggressive manoeuvres were institutionalized so as to augment US capabilities to monitor the mobility of migrants on wider terrain.[31] Initiated in 1994 alongside Mexico's merge into NAFTA, Operation Gatekeeper was one of such military manoeuvres that sought to appease both the pro-free trade neo-liberals and anti-immigration conservatives, who were petitioning for Proposition 187, also known as Save Our State (SOS).[32] This operation to securitize the border, like violent tactics in the past that gradually normalized military interventions

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[28] Zlotnik, Hania. "Policies and Migrations Trends in the American System." <u>International migration, refugee flows and human rights in North America : The impact of free trade and restructuring</u>. *(*Ed.) Alan B. Simmons. New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1996. 92.

[29] De Genova, P. Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." <u>Latino Studies</u>. 2:2(July 2004): 174-5.

[30] Ibid.: 174 & Jardin, Matthew. "Review: The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border 1978-1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home by Timothy J. Dunn." <u>Z Dare</u>. Electronic Document. Accessed 3 April 2007. <http://www.zmag .org/ZMag/articles/jan97jardine.htm>.

[31] Massey, S. Douglas. "Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration." Center for Trade Policy Studies. 29 (2005): 4.

[32] Nevins, Joseph. <u>Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the 'Illegal Alien' and the Making of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary</u>. New York: Routledge, 2002. 10.

in border zones, worked to reconstitute "the boundaries of the United States and [its] accompanying social practices [as] normal and unproblematic."[33] Such militarization was deemed unproblematic due to a history of disciplinary actions in times of exceptionality. In this case, re-bordering as a military practice answered the call of insecure American citizens who continued to perceive the southern migrant, amongst other things, as an inassimilable menace, while de-bordering took place to facilitate economic integration and the movement of goods. It is noteworthy here that illegality is not simply a classification that enables the militarization of the US-Mexico border, but also that such militarization itself reproduces the image of the illegal migrant as a volatile and untamed body that can only be contained through violence.

Following 9/11, xenophobia, fear, and paranoia of migrants have worsened. Extremely dangerous is the way in which the state has appropriated the event so as to validate legislation that criminalizes undocumented migrants. The Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act approved in late 2005 is just one example. The act did not just erroneously fuse illegal migration with terrorism, making undocumented an ambiguous status, but also reinforced this redefinition through a number of harsh measures. These measures include; imposing a prolonged detention of undocumented migrants instead of the previous 'catch and release,' and an 'option' to evade prosecution by paying a three thousand dollar penalty.[34] Further, the act rendered any activity that 'aids or abets' unsanctioned crossings as criminal, and most importantly, it made undocumented migration a felony.[35] The act illustrates how the status of the Mexican illegal migrant has drastically transformed since the early part of the century, with illegality becoming entrenched in the socio-legal system instead of being one of exceptionality. It also re-narrates the function that illegality has performed in positioning the state as the sovereign guarantor of border security.

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[33] Ibid.

[34] "House of Representatives bill 4437" at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/H.R._4437#_note-0> & see Library of Congress page on H.R. 4437 at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.r.04437:>.

[35] Ibid. & see Library of Congress page on H.R. 4437 at <http://thomas.loc.gov /cgi-bin /bdquery/z?d109:h.r.04437:>.

II

Migration and mobility is perceived as a high point of human agency; a type of subaltern resistance against the spatial confinement of the state system, and the (re)appropriation of autonomy away from the state.[36] It is discussed as a "world revolution of the barefooted," a "survival strategy,"[37] and "a critical tool against discipline, a 'line of flight.'"[38] However, having discussed snapshots of US socio-legal history, can we assert that borders are equally fluid for, and accessible by, all migrants? Whose bodies are insecure and secure through the mechanisms of surveillance stationed at borders?

Even while Mexican undocumented migrants demonstrate a degree of agency by virtue of their mobility, and through awareness that such mobility defies their exclusion, their subjectivity and (non)political status is greatly determined by the US socio-legal framework. In other words, the sovereign state designates the nature of their mobility before the illegal migrant approaches the border. It is by configuring migrants as illegal that the US is able to station devices of disciplining at the US-Mexico border, which is itself actualized and performed through the mobility of both illegal and legal bodies. The border is, then, a technology of biopower, a threshold if you will, that is performed through the entry of bodies that are regulated through a 'disciplinary partitioning' between legal and illegal.[39] I argue that through such disciplining, undocumented workers are made *docile*; they become "both a productive body and a subjugated body."[40] I further propose that illegal migrants internalize, and are conscious of, the subjectivity generated through mechanisms of surveillance.

I have thus far argued that state governmentality or the 'art of governance,' is contingent on biopower, that is, the ability to manipulate and control human mobility and life. Elaborating on Foucault's concepts, Judith Butler proposes that in spaces of exception, such as borderlands, where standard laws can be

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[36] Henke, Holger (Ed.). <u>Crossing Over: Comparing Recent Migration in the United States and Europe</u>. Toronto: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. 26.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Diken, Bulent and Carsten Laustsen. "Zones of Indistinction - Security, Rerror, and Bare Life." Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, 2003. 7.

[39] Foucault, Michel. <u>Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison</u>. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 199.

[40] Foucault, Michel. "The Political Investment of the Body." <u>The Body: A Reader</u>. (Eds.) Miriam Fraser and Monica Greco. London: Routledge, 2005. 100.

disregarded, sovereign power and the 'art of governance'- a form of capillary power, are intertwined through techniques of disciplining.[41] As proposed earlier, governmentality depends on the state as the sovereign body that produces knowledge about subjects, and that solidifies and normalizes such subject formation through routine performativity and operability in border spaces.[42] At the core of the anatomy of disciplining is then performance of social scripts that hinge on the sovereign state's grasp of the physiology of the human body.[43] Foucault argues that such awareness of the physiology of the body empowers the state to "have an immediate hold upon it; invest it, mark it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, [and] to emit signs."[44] With regard to border politics, exclusion through illegality is a marker that dehumanizes, because it partitions, along with other apparatuses of disciplining, towards the extraction of labor power from the body, and the molding of the body into an economically efficient unit.[45] In other words, devices of disciplining at the border are not meant to convert illegal foreign bodies into nationals. Rather, the objectified body of the Mexican migrant represents an extractable and unlimited labor resource that contributes to the reproduction of American life.

How is the migrant body, however, made docile? Behind the state's overarching power over the body is a twofold aim; to structure its optimal functioning within a system of capillary power relations, and to make it vulnerable to external malleability. One of the ways in which the docility of the body is normalized is through an internalization of surveillance and disciplining in times of mobility, with the state no longer having to use direct forms of coercion to manage and contain it.[46] I have argued, however, that in spaces of exception, which are considered extra-legal nodes that sort citizens from non-nationals, both direct and indirect forms of control are evident.[47] This is precisely because the border,

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[41] Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Morning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004. 51.

[42] Foucault, Michel. "The Political Investment of the Body." The Body: A Reader. (Eds.) Miriam Fraser & Monica Greco. London: Routledge, 2005. 101.

[43] Ibid.: 100-2.

[44] Ibid.: 100.

[45] Ibid.: 100-2.

[46] Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. See Chapter 3 on "Panopticism."

[47] See Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Morning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004 for a discussion on extra-legality in spaces of exception.

interpreted as a 'theatre of an enforcement crisis,' is a stage that hosts spectacles of securing through militarization, technologization, and surveillance. While such devices of disciplining are largely stationed at highly populated areas, they, along with the illegal and criminal status that is projected onto migrants, are internalized in the form of self-surveillance. I argue that such internalization of self-surveillance in moments of mobility is pivotal to subjugating migrant bodies.

A number of authors portray borders as apparatuses of social sorting that operate through the inclusion/exclusion binary, and manipulate the movement of migrants.[48] In more recent years, especially after 9/11, these filtering systems have become increasingly discriminatory, "identifying, classifying, and managing groups sorted by levels of dangerousness," and by physiological traits.[49] Techniques of surveillance, including; electronic databases, passports, ID cards, cameras, visas, motion sensors, and others, are biometric mechanisms employed by the state to bring growing populations under surveillance by converting the body into a 'password.'[50] Those that have the incorrect code are denied access. But, of course, the state controls or manipulates both the code and the devices by which passwords are deciphered. Apart from verbal confirmations of identity, the scanning of retinas, fingerprints, facial profiles, and bodily dimensions, are but a few of the methods by which the body confesses before the sovereign.[51] That is, the body, rather than the voice, primarily confesses at the border.

Identities are thus written on, or 'bio-politically tattooed,'[52] by the state on both foreign and national bodies, for the purposes of ranking them and disciplining them as un/healthy, un/productive, un/desired, inferior, and/or delinquent.[53] Underlying such 'bio-political tattooing' is thus an encoded evaluation of the

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[48] Salter, Mark and Elia Zureik. Global Surveillance: Borders, Security, Identity. UK: Willan Publishing, 2005 & Walters, William. "Border/Control." European Journal of Social Theory. 9:2(2006): 187-203.

[49] Salter, Mark and Elia Zureik. Global Surveillance: Borders, Security, Identity. UK: Willan Publishing, 2005. 74.

[50] Ibid.: 84.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Agamben, Georgio. "No to Bio-Political Tattooing." Makeworlds. 2004. Electronic Document. < http://www.makeworlds.org/node/68>.

[53] Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 199.

'moral worth' and economic use-value of migrants.[54] Along with this is the classification of bodies for the purposes of re-bordering and 'risk management,' which is advanced by sentiments of fear, suspicion, resentment, and xenophobia of foreign bodies.[55] The biometric, and seemingly neutral, selection of bodies based around 'race,' gender, and socio-economic status, amongst other rankings, is pivotal to raising a virtual firewall around the territory of the nation-state as to obstruct the entry of criminalized bodies posing risk. This virtual firewall is also upheld by a number of high-tech gadgets, including ground sensors, search lights, helicopters, spotter planes, and cameras, which re-enact a spectacle of securing by 'holding the line'[56] between civilized and 'third world' peoples.[57] As has been argued, such high-tech gadgets and biometric mechanisms of control generate a spectacle of securing at the border. This spectacle relies heavily on the (re)production and performativity of subjectivities, especially those that are deemed to be high risk or illegal.

Because undocumented migrants mostly evade biometric technologies in highly patrolled border zones and thus circumvent the principle points of the confessional complex, one may erroneously deduce that they also subvert the disciplinary scope and biopower of the state.[58] What appears as a disruption is misleading however, as above all surveillance technologies do not sort undocumented migrants into 'low' or 'high' risk, but automatically bestow them with a criminal status. Lacking the physiological password and being undesirables, undocumented migrants are conceptualized as borderhackers. However, while they are bio-politically tattooed as deviant bodies, they are also perceived as exploitable bodies. To reiterate, Border Patrol regulates the influx of bodies through a disciplinary partitioning of legal and illegal, which positions the Mexican undocumented migrant as a vulnerable body from which productive power can be appropriated without accompanying socio-political

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[54] Ibid.

[55] Salter, Mark and Elia Zureik. Global Surveillance: Borders, Security, Identity. UK: Willan Publishing, 2005. 3.

[56] De Genova, P. Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." Latino Studies. 2:2(July 2004): 179.

[57] Koslowski, Rey. "Immigration Reforms and Border Security Technologies." The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) Border Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates. 1:7(2006): 1-3. Electronic Document. Accessed 9 April 2007. <http://border battles.ssrc.org/Koslowski/>.

[58] The terminology confessionary complex is borrowed from Foucault's discussion on the role of the confession in societies defined by sovereign rule.

rights.[59] More blatantly, while "foreign labour is desired…the persons in which it is embodied are not."[60]

Michel Kearney argues that Border Patrolling, along with the variety of technological methods of surveillance, is not conducted for the purposes of entirely deterring the entry of illegal labour. It is noteworthy that neither does the neo-liberal economic order stand apart from border biopolitics, and that it relies on labour power that is free from docility. The underlying principle behind crossings away from highly surveilled border spaces, and major nodes of the confessionary complex, is to subjugate bodies by forcing them to cross hazardous and infrequently monitored terrains in the desert.[61] Migrations through such dangerous terrains and spaces of exception subjugate the body by reducing it to a biological existence. Because of such life threatening dangers in the borderlands, an informal economy of *polleros* (smugglers) has been established. Smugglers or 'guides' were paid around $400 prior to the prevention through deterrence operations of the 1990s, and up to $1,200 thereafter.[62] While these 'guides' are considered essential to navigating the harsh topography of the desert, and to circumvent detection by Border patrol, they expose undocumented migrants to a number of risks. The following is an excerpt from Judith Hellman's in-depth interview with Pedro, a smuggler:

> The stories you hear about coyotes who rob the *pollos*, who collude with asaltapollos, and bandits who assault the *pollos* while they're in no-man's-land - all these things really do happen. You hear about coyotes who rape the women they have promised to deliver safely to the other side, or who abandon people who have a broken leg or twisted an ankle jumping over the fence.[63]

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[59] Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 199.

[60] Doty, Lynn Roxanne. "Crossroads of Death." The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror. (Eds.) Elizabeth Dauphinee, and Cristina Masters. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Much of the analysis in this piece is based on the findings in: Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel et al. "The 'Funnel Effect' & Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2005." The Binational Migration Institute (BMI), 2006.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Massey, S. Douglas. "Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration." Center for Trade Policy Studies. 29 (2005): 8.

[63] Hellman, A. Judith. Mexican Lives. New York: The New Press, 1994. 177.

Since migrants must journey through the ambiguous zones of the deserts, they frequently experience abuse by the very 'guides' that they employ. As Pedro's story illustrates, the desert is an extra-legal space where violence is sharply gendered, with migrants becoming vulnerable targets for criminals, and women's bodies, in particular, being vulnerable to sexual assault. These hazards, amongst others, which reinforce the vulnerability of undocumented migrants, cannot be read merely as experiences contained within the spatial and temporal frame of the borderlands. Rather, dangers of crossing the border function to "dissociate power from the body."[64] The very process of being smuggled insinuates the commodification of the body, and the violence experienced by migrants points towards their loss of personhood; especially as migrants shed their status as Mexican citizens to become the undocumented or invisibles.[65] What I am suggesting here is that stripping migrants of citizen status and socio-political rights is a practice that begins well before their entry into American society. The physical violence and dangers confronted in border spaces works at this degradation of personhood and division of power from body. It is this splintering, a splintering actualized through the classification of bodies as illegal, which works to configure the migrant body into an economically efficient unit.

Border surveillance further congeals the subjugation of undocumented bodies by constituting the subjectivities that migrants perform when crossing designated terrains. Although indirectly, it is by policing migrant mobility that the state reproduces and normalizes parameters around how undocumented bodies are identified, regulated, and administered. Given that undocumented migrants are criminalized prior to crossing the Mexico-US border, they are constantly conscious of their perusal, potential detention, and deportation by Border Patrol. As such, undocumented bodies are not only disciplined through direct surveillance, but they are deemed docile by internalizing the sovereign's 'seeing machine.'[66] Kearney's ethnographic reflections from migrants reinforce these observations:

> He was thinking, he says, that he felt like a criminal,
> like someone who had to hide because they were doing
> some bad thing. But, he says, he could not understand

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[64] Foucault, Michel. "The Political Investment of the Body." The Body: A Reader. London: Routledge, 2005. 104.

[65] Doty, Lynn Roxanne. "Fronteras Compasivas and the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality." Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 35:1(2006): 59.

[66] Foucault, Michel. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. 204.

> what bad thing he was doing for he is an honest man
> who comes to the United States only to work, to leave
> his sweat and earn some money…The other men agree
> that they feel the same when they are exposed to
> possible apprehension by the Border Patrol or by other
> police agents.[67]

This excerpt shows that migrants are conscious of the subjectivity generated through their surveillance. In particular, by internalizing the gaze of the sovereign, they are disciplined to 'feel like criminals.' Although this discussion is limited to border biopolitics, it is worth noting that such internalization of a delinquent status reinforces the position that illegal migrants are compelled to occupy in American society, in particular that they take on unwanted jobs that are 'off the books.'[68] Rather than being for the purposes of rehabilitating the criminal status that is projected onto them,[69] the surveillance of migrants serves to subjugate the body and manipulate its labor power. The (re)production of migrant criminality and illegality are pivotal to such an extraction.

This study of illegality and border politics demonstrates that *El Norte* continues to appropriate the labour of southern peoples through legally institutionalized discourses of illegality. One could make the argument that the once ambiguous topography of the colonial periphery has been substituted by the functions of the borderland, that is, it is posited as a threshold that reproduces the subjectivity of migrants as deviant, exploitable, and subjugated bodies. This discussion has also illustrated that escalations in policing and the sorting of bodies at the border are reinforced by constituting certain groups of people as 'risks' to national security. It is through such conceptualizations that the sovereign state fashions a spectacle of securing at the border, and ultimately normalizes its unrestrained power over migrant bodies.

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[67] Kearney, Michael. "Borders and Boundaries of State and Self at the End of Empire." Journal of Historical Sociology. 4:1(1991): 60-1.

[68] Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: The New York Press, 2005. 43.

[69] Walters, William. "Border/Control." European Journal of Social Theory. 9:2 (2006): 192.

III

Borderlands are precarious spaces. They are spaces of exception where bodies of illegal migrants are reduced to biological existence or, in Giorgio Agamben's term, bare life.[70] Border spaces, as spaces of exception, are mechanisms that do not simply exclude, but also are also apparatuses of biopower that manage human life and death. What is most shocking is that the production of death and corpses in the borderlands has been justified through discourse and rhetoric that construct migrants as threats to national security and as potentially devastating to national cohesion.

The US-Mexico borderland has become such a space; a space recognized through its mounting humanitarian crisis precisely because of the production of corpses.[71] Stemming from the implementation of US immigration laws in the 1990s, notably the initiation of 'prevention through deterrence operations,' the deaths of undocumented migrants, including, men, women, and children, have risen drastically.[72] The vast majority of deaths have occurred in the Border patrol's Tucson Sector in Arizona, a region covered in large part by the Sonoran desert.[73] Between 1995 and 2005, the corpses of roughly 3,600 unauthorized migrants were uncovered on the US side of the Mexico-US border.[74] These numbers become more devastating when one bears in mind that not all corpses are unearthed, and that deaths are under reported by Border Patrol.[75] For instance, Border Patrol does not always register unidentified 'decomposing bodies,' and those that have died of 'human causes' when detained.[76] As powerful as these numbers are, however, they do not expose how border practices and illegality as a classification are implicated in the management of

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[70] Agamben, Georgio. <u>Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life</u>. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. See Part 2 "Homo Sacer." 71-112.

[71] De Genova, P. Nicolas. "The Legal Production of Mexican/Migrant 'Illegality'." <u>Latino Studies</u>. 2:2(July 2004): 177.

[72] Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel et al. "The 'Funnel Effect' & Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2005." The Binational Migration Institute (BMI), 2006. 6.

[73] Ibid.: 5.

[74] Ibid.: 6.

[75] Ibid.: 9.

[76] Ibid.: 13.

human life and death, and, in turn, the production of bare life and corpses in the borderland.

While the US practice of 'prevention through deterrence' depends on the socio-legal production of the undocumented migrant as a security threat, it is less likely to be understood that its ontology revolves around the physiology of "human bodies in the moments of their mobility."[77] Roxanne Doty convincingly claims that the deterrence of migrants in the US-Mexico borderlands is founded on an awareness of the body's biological or basic needs, in particular, "the horror of the human body without enough water…other hazards such as dangerous terrain, the extreme cold of desert nights, [and] drowning in water."[78] She builds on this argument by noting that the deterioration of human perseverance, drive, and spirit, are core psychological elements behind the US Border Patrol's deterrence doctrine.[79] Deterrence here becomes a micro rather than macro-theory that delves into the complex functioning of the human body.[80]

As I have noted, to deter migrants from reaching American soil, the US is redirecting their mobility away from highly monitored, patrolled, and fenced border zones, towards crossing more extensive, dangerous, and uninhabited terrains.[81] One quickly thinks of Ironwood Forest in the Sonoran Desert, which stretches over roughly 129,000 acres of sand dunes, rugged mountains, sparse vegetation, occasional ponds, and unpaved trails. Here, it can get as hot as 57˚C.[82] This "'natural' power of the desert" itself has served as a biopolitical instrument in the US prevention through deterrence practices so as to render migrants as *homo sacer*, and the terrain they must cross into a space of

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[77] Doty, Lynn Roxanne. "Crossroads of Death." <u>The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror</u>. (Eds.) Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina Masters. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 28.

[78] Ibid.: 16.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid.

[81] See discussion in Doty, Lynn Roxanne. "Crossroads of Death." <u>The Logics of Biopower and the War on Terror</u>. (Eds.) Elizabeth Dauphinee and Cristina Masters. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 & for further exploration on the subject matter see Doty, Lynn Roxanne. "Fronteras Compasivas and the Ethics of Unconditional Hospitality." <u>Millennium: Journal of International Studies</u>. 35:1(2006): 53-74.

[82] "Sonoran Desert Climate." Electronic Document. <http://www.blueplanetbiomes. org /sonoran_desert_climate.htm>.

exception.[83] In Agamben's work, the space of exception parallels the state of nature, which is constituted beside the City rather than envisaged as existing prior to it.[84] It signifies the forest at the edges of the City where the "normal order is de facto suspended," and where the werewolf or homo sacer becomes, or is rendered as such, by being deprived of his rights as man.[85] State biopower is hence, exercised in this space by splitting the political from the biological, or bios from zôç, as to strip the body down to bare life, or a depoliticized creature that is neither human nor animal.[86]

Illegal migrants, like the werewolf in Agamben's allegory, are outcast to the desert, where they become stateless, rightless, and voiceless. In this ambiguous space, the US no longer upholds an edifice of morality or responsibility, but rather contains migrant bodies in zones where they shed their socio-political rights, only to be defined by their biological life. Quoted in <u>Arizona Republic</u>, INS Commissioner Doris Meissner points to the way in which the spatial topography of the desert was pivotal to reducing migrants down to bare biology and to deterring their entry into the US. She notes: "we did believe that geography would be an ally to us…It was our sense that the number of people crossing the border through Arizona would go down to a trickle, once people realized *what it's like*."[87] Meissner's comment also indicates that unauthorized migrants are conceptualized as mere numbers to be subverted, and their lives as worthless and disposable. Here, there is no ethical responsibility towards the precarious life of the non-national. At the same time, however, it is by having the authority to negate laws and ethical treatment in border zones that the state is able to reassert its sovereignty over space and bodies.[88] It is precisely because the migrant is rendered as homo sacer, a biological life that can be taken without ethical reprimand and border zones as spaces of exception that I speak of the

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[83] Agamben, Georgio. <u>Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life</u>. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

[84] Ibid.: 105.

[85] Ibid.: 173-4.

[86] Agamben, Georgio. <u>Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life</u>. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 1-9.

[87] Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel et al. "The "Funnel Effect" & Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2005." The Binational Migration Institute (BMI), 2006. 5. Emphasis added.

[88] For a discussion see Butler, Judith. <u>Precarious Life: The Powers of Morning and Violence</u>. 54.

dead bodies of migrants as corpses.

Tales of *what it's like* have been heard, but the stories of violent deaths only go so far in demonstrating the experiences of migrants. Stories such as the following:

> [the desert] claimed the lives of 14 people out of a group of 20 who ventured into its deadly terrain in May 2001. They have become known as the Yuma 14. The group included small-plot farmers, coffee growers, a school boy, and his father. Most were from the tropical state of Veracruz in southeastern Mexico. Most have never seen a desert before.[89]

It is estimated that for the duration of their five-day crossing through the desert, these undocumented migrants consumed roughly eight litres of water.[90] The recommended amount of water in dangerous terrains they were made to cross is a minimum of two gallons per day.[91] It is by containing migrants in border spaces where sources of life are removed or unavailable that operations of deterrence, such as *Gatekeeper*, seek to curb the mobility of migrants before reaching *El Norte*.[92] The deterrence of migrants like the Yuma 14 is thus ultimately a reflection of the sovereign state's biopower to manage human life and death. In addition to this, the state has the power to distinguish the sort of life migrants, citizens, criminals, asylum seekers, and others are to experience, that is, it decides who is to live a political or a purely biological existence.

The death of the Yuma 14 further reveals that by spatially fixing the contours around the nation, the state maps, manages, and controls the essence of outer topographies. As I have argued by looking at US socio-legal history, the excluded status of the homo sacer does not mean that he or she is outside of the purview of human law, but only that this status is determined through the *ban* or exclusion, as that of expandable and temporary labour, or as merely that of a corpse.[93] Sadly, the subjugation of the migrant body and deaths in the

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[89] Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel et al. "The "Funnel Effect" & Recovered Bodies of Unauthorized Migrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990-2005." The Binational Migration Institute (BMI), 2006. 11.

[90] Ibid.: 11.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.: 16.

[93] Agamben, Georgio. <u>Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life</u>. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 28.

borderlands can both be attributed to policies of exclusion and disciplinary practices that are actualized at the border. While such apparatuses of securing may give an illusionary sense of safety, they have also meant the insecurity of thousands of human lives; human lives of those whose corpses have left remnants of violence in the desert, and of those who continue to reproduce American life through their subjugation and exclusion.

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Flatlands: Bodies, Boundaries, and Fantasies in the Performances of Space

Kristen Ali

Welcome to Flatlands

> *I call our world Flatland, not because we call it so, but to make its nature clearer to you, my happy readers, who are privileged to live in Space* (Abott, 1984: 35).

In 2003, "Cindy Sorenson of Bismarck, North Dakota, ordered a life size photo of her former husband, Captain Dave Bruschwein, on a piece of foam board when he was stationed in Iraq with the North Dakota National Guard"; 'Flat Dave' was constructed at a photocopy shop for $75.00 (Zezima, 2006). In January 2006 Sergeant First Class Barbara Claudel of the Maine National Guard began a family support program issuing life size, from the waist up pictures or 'flat soldiers' of deployed Guard members in Afghanistan to their families in Maine (Maine National Guard Website, 2007). Since January 2006, the Maine National Guard has given more than 200 'flat soldiers' or, as commonly known, 'flat daddies and mommies,' to families who bring them to soccer practices, dinner, weddings, and even out to coffee (Maine National Guard Website, 2007).[1] As of November 2006, the National Flat Daddies Program in conjunction with SFC Graphics and the American Red Cross have provided American families with over 6,000 flat daddies and mommies (The Official Home of Flat Daddies, 2008).[2]

I first came across 'flat daddies and mommies' in February 2007, and from that point no small part of my initial shock, disturbance, amusement, and confusion has dissipated. If anything it has furthered my belief that there is something about flat mommies and daddies that speaks very pointedly to our current state of (in)security. Some of the many questions which guide this project are: what

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[1] Throughout this project I refer to the flat soldiers as flat daddies and mommies or flat mommies and daddies. The former has been used most often by the news sources I have come across and though I am wary of the patriarchal implications in continuing to place primary emphasis on the father, the images of the flat solider are by and large of the flat father and this project explores why this production is central to the construction of the family. My choice to use the former and latter ordering interchangeably is an attempt both to highlight the gendered nature of the productions as well as disrupt that patriarchal hierarchy within this work.

[2] Due to lack of funding the National Flat Daddies Program was suspended on April 9th, 2008.

might flat daddies and mommies make visible in the 'fantasy of the family'?[3] How can we understand the 'flat' body? What is the relationship of the body to the fantasy of the family?

This project explores how we might understand flat mommies and daddies as demonstrating the necessity of the 'fantasy of the family' in the performances of boundaries which produce national subjectivities. This is not just any family, but a very specific fantasy based on moral discourses and grammars central to the construction of the domestic-foreign and one, as flat daddies and mommies demonstrate, that is militarized. Further, my interest in the flat soldier lies in the manner that they illustrate the incomplete and unstable nature of this fantasy through the 'flattening' and aestheticization of the body-familial relationship. There is a necessary caveat before I venture further. To discuss flat daddies and mommies in this way I must necessarily engage in *ekphrasis*, the problem of verbal representation of the visual.[4] As W.J.T. Mitchell puts it, "A verbal representation cannot represent - that is, make present - its object in the same way a visual representation can. It may refer to an object, describe it, invoke it, but it can never bring its visual presence before us in the way pictures do" (1994: 152). This problematic of representation is a necessary condition for this work and one which I have tried to the best of my abilities to be ever conscious of as I discuss flat daddies.

With this in mind, the first section of this project discusses the performance of the boundaries of domestic-foreign in the construction of national imaginaries

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[3] The term 'fantasy' does not imply a break between what *is* in the present and the unconscious want or hope for something else. As Judith Butler reminds us, "[t]he unconscious is also an ongoing psychic condition in which norms are registered in both normalizing and non-normalizing ways," further "the *modus operandi* of the norm is the fantasy, and the very syntax of the fantasy could not be read without an understanding of the lexicon of the social norm…In this sense, the body must enter into the theorization of norm and fantasy, since it is precisely the site where the desire for the norm takes shape, and the norm cultivates desire and fantasy in the service of its own naturalization" (2005: 265-267). My understanding of fantasy is based on Butler's theorization that social norms order and demarcate the bounds of the fantasy and the fantasy functions to naturalize the norm. In this respect, the fantasy does not exist outside of the social, as an individualized product of the subject's unconscious, but is a crucial site in the performances which constitute the subject.

[4] Ekphrasis can be understood as the description of visual art through another medium which attempts to describe its essence and form in order to relate the work more directly to the audience. Please see Valerie Robillard and Els Jongeneel (eds.), Pictures into Words: Theoretical and Descriptive Approaches to Ekphrasis. Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1998, for further discussion.

and identities. Inextricably bound to this performance is the fantasy of a particular type of family based on historical-social moral grammars of race-gender-sexuality-class to legitimize a certain subject. This fantasy-family is what flat daddies enable us to see in a most blatant sense, and also how this fantasy is increasingly militarized. On this understanding of the performance-fantasy of the family-boundaries, I move to consider the function of 'flatness.' I discuss what the specific representation of the flat daddy and mommy may indicate in the relationship between the body and the fantasy, aestheticization of the family, and how we can understand flatness as integral to the function of the fantasy.

States of Performance

> *You, who are blessed with shade as well as light, you, who are gifted with two eyes, endowed with a knowledge of perspective, and charmed with the enjoyment of various colours, you, who can actually see an angle, contemplate the complete circumference of a circle in the happy region of the Three Dimensions-how shall I make clear to you the extreme difficulty which we in Flatland experience in recognizing one another's configuration?* (Abott, 1984: 54).

Flatland is fraught with a problem that 'square' describes for us: when everything exists in two dimensions, how do you identify each distinct body? In Flatland their solution is to feel, their understanding of self and others is based on the tactile, feeling the boundaries of bodies in an effort to identify their shape. For the inhabitants of Flatland the boundaries of the body serve as the primary differentiation between self and other and they must be performed in the act of touching in order to be. In <u>Writing Security</u>, David Campbell argues that states have no ontological being apart from those practices that constitute their reality (1998: 91). As an 'imagined community', the identity of a state is the effect of ritualized performances and formalized practices that operate in the name of the identity they construct (1998: 130). The central practice in the constitution of a state's identity to Campbell is foreign policy-Foreign Policy. The distinction he draws between the two is that 'foreign policy' are those practices of differentiation implicated in all confrontations of the self-other, the discursive economy of representation that is the condition of possibility for Foreign Policy (1998: 6, 73). Foreign Policy is one practice that constructs the identity of the state through utilizing the assemblage of representations and common senses made possible by foreign policy. These practices comprise the identity of the state through the continued (re)production of the domestic-foreign distinction. Understood this way the state's identity is constituted by performance, "In other words, foreign policy is a specific sort of *boundary*

producing political performance" (1998: 62). 'Performance' is based on Judith Butler's arguments that the gendered identity of the body has "no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality," and that identity is constituted, "not [through] a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition" (1990: 136). The identity of the state is constituted in much the same way, through the continued performance of boundaries that separate the inside from out, domestic from foreign, each being mutually constituted by the other and dependent upon it for meaning. The constructions of the domestic and foreign are relational, each space comes into being in and through the other and so it is impossible to understand the domestic apart and separate from the foreign and vice versa.

Similarly to Campbell, Michael Shapiro also problematizes the reification between domestic-foreign in the identity of the state through a Lacanian understanding of subjectivity. Shapiro contends that the desire drive functions in the construction of national subjectivities as the individual's symbolic participation in national entities derives from identification with the national body through discursive practices that define a certain imagined community and the ideal citizen participant. What the nation represents as a hostile object is a stand-in for the inward aim of unity, an attempt to assemble harmoniously those elements of the order which defy coherence (Shapiro, 1997: 59). However, because the coherence of the nation is always already impossible, the nonacceptance of that impossibility produces a fantasy to fill the subject's constitutive lack. In Shapiro's understanding, the domestic-national subjectivity is constituted by those practices which attempt to expel outwards differences that conflict with the stability and cohesiveness of the domestic.

Both Campbell and Shapiro demonstrate how the production of national identities is bound to the practices that differentiate self from other, inside from out, and that this differentiation is always unstable and incomplete, in constant need of reproduction. Both also enable an understanding that the boundary between domestic-foreign is tenuously maintained by representational practices which must be continuously rearticulated in order 'to be', for if a state has no *a priori* ontological existence to cease the performative constitution of the domestic-foreign spaces would be to expose this lack. In this respect we can understand that the performance of boundaries which comprise the state's identity - adding here Shapiro's analysis that this performance is formed from the desire drive and continuous substitution of arbitrary objects - means that both 'domestic' and 'foreign' are simultaneously constituted in these practices. The domestic space is constructed as a stable unified entity premised on racialized hetero-homo-normative representations of the ideal patriotic American citizen subject who supports the current (neo)liberal projects of

empire.[5] The foreign, by contrast, becomes the space of difference comprised of those deviant sexualities and races which are distinct from and threaten the stability of the ideal citizen body. Comprised of (re)producible enemies, the spaces of the foreign such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and military detainment centres within and outside (though controlled by) the US, are filled with the bodies marked as threatening to the domestic order. Each is the condition of possibility for the other and so the moral grammars and representational processes that construct and (re)produce the domestic as a particular space is due to and comprised of those representations of the foreign. The fluidity and instability of this boundary producing performance is a part of what flat daddies and mommies may indicate as the nation's identity, in this case the United States, is constituted by those practices which privilege certain representations and moral grammars as legitimate while repressing, or expelling, all those that may threaten this precariously maintained stability. Flat daddies and mommies are inextricably bound with these representations, demonstrating that what is considered a domestic (both in sense of 'home' and 'homeland') notion of the 'family' is in fact a crucial element in the production of the foreign and must be maintained for that representation to exist. This is the sense of what I mean in the 'fantasy of the family,' because as much as flat daddies and mommies illustrate the need to maintain a stable representation of the domestic, they do this through demonstrating how constructions of the family, or should I say of particular families, are always necessarily part of the performance of the foreign.

Familial Fantasies

> *If our highest pointed Triangles of the Soldier class are formidable, it may be readily inferred that far more formidable are our Women..Add to this the power of making herself practically invisible at will, and you will perceive that a Female, in Flatland, is a creature by no means to be trifled with* (Abott, 1984: 47).

The female form in Flatland is perceived as a threat to the social order because they are next to invisible in two dimensions and their extremities are dagger like points that inflict harm on those who unknowing cross the female's path. The social structure of Flatland restricts and dominates the female form, her movement and identity is made possible only through a male shape, just as the fantasy of the family is the constitutive principle which establishes the ontological status of its members.

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[5] For further discussion, please see Jasbir K. Puar, <u>Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times</u>. Durham: Duke University Press, 207.

Shapiro's <u>For Moral Ambiguity</u> is a helpful entry point in discussing the fantasy of the family as a central representation in performances of domestic-foreign. In his critique of 'family values discourse' within the United States, he argues that the goal of these discourses are,

> to install a commitment to the moral and political importance of the traditional family, a regulative ideal that is represented as both contractual and natural: It is centred in a legally and religiously sanctioned marriage; it is heterosexual; it is child-oriented; and, especially in recent decades, it is threatened by non-"family friendly" media representations of extrafamilial attachments, sexualities and lifestyles (2001:1).

In American (neo)liberal contemporary culture the family is represented as a historically stable entity that comes about as a result of 'natural' inclinations. The naturalization of the notion of the family as one of the founding units of the domestic space means that the representations which constitute it form a large and pervasive part of our internal understandings of what the 'domestic' is and should be. Anne McClintock reminds us of this when she argues that the invented distinction between the 'natural' and political sphere of the family was and is indispensable in the formation of a middle-class male identity because it was employed to restrict the liberal notion of sovereign individuality and so the emergence of a rational liberal individual took shape around the reinvention of the domestic sphere as the realm of natural subjugation (1995: 178). The naturalization of the 'family' removes the representation from its historical-social constitution legitimating certain grammars and discourses of class, gender, race, and sexuality which form the hierarchies within it providing validation for these oppressive structures to be maintained at a national level. Simultaneously the family is depoliticized and naturalized through the removal from the domestic (homeland), and its placement within the space of the domestic (home).[6] The representation becomes ever more pervasive because it is engrained and simultaneously hidden in the common senses and assumptions which structure the practices of power. 'Family' should be understood as a very particular representation predicated on and continuously producing certain gendered-raced-sexualized and classed hierarchies which constitute the domestic (home and land). These are not separate categories at play in the representation of the family, rather they are relational and it is in and through them which the category of the family is articulated. As Shapiro argues, the family values discourse in the United States has at its centre the aim of

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[6] I use 'domestic (home and land)' or a variation thereof here to indicate that this is never a discussion of a monolithic entity, rather as flat daddies and mommies demonstrate, it is constituted by various representations of different sites and the idea of the 'home' as 'traditional' white, Anglo, heterosexual, and middle-class remains central among these representations and so constitutes our notions of home-land.

preserving a notion that America embodies a culturally coherent nation which is reflected in a family-oriented heteronormal sexuality (2001: 12). Anna M. Agathangelou, M. Daniel Bassichis, and Tamara L. Spira point out that the recent movement for the legalization of homosexual unions is a manifestation of the (re)consolidation of sexualities required for the (neo)liberal order, "highly privatized, monogamous, and white(ned) docile subjectivity that has been decriminalized and invited into the doors of US national belonging through recent shifts in the gendered sexual order" (2008: 124). Discourses of homo-normativity, which now uphold and sustain heteronormal institutions such as state sanctioned marriage, have become part of the central sexual hierarchy that banishes those sexualities which fall outside the scope of hetero-normative ideals (2008: 128). This ideal or fantasy of the hetero-normative, nuclear, white, middle class family operates in and comprises the representation of a particular domestic (home and homeland) space wherein only certain bodies are marked as legitimate members of that community while those perceived as different, deviations from the regulative ideal, are violently oppressed or expelled from the imagining of the nation.

Flat mommies and daddies are expressive of these representational practices in several respects. The images are representations of the domestic (home), the everyday activities through which the performance of the family is enacted. All images are of a hetero-normative family, each depicting a male and female parent (one of which is flat) as well as young children. In my numerous months of searching I have yet to come across images of anything other than 'white' or European-American families. Significantly as well, though there are flat mommies, the images available are largely of the flat daddy and the national program is entitled Flat Daddies. These images of the father are almost always in their military uniforms and in a few instances are also armed. The productions of flat daddies and mommies posit a very particular understanding of what the American family 'is/should be': the white, heteronormal, patriotic, militarized, nuclear family. This family represented is a fantasy though, and this is what flat daddies and mommies enable us to see most clearly.

The desire-need for the family to constitute the stable domestic-space is manifested through the flat parents' attempt to maintain an ideal of the family that is obviously incomplete. What the production of flat daddies and mommies also make present is the naturalization of the family; they expose the construction through the use of the flat body, illustrating that this is not a family but the fantasy of one, moving the family as a category out from the domestic (home) to expose its role in the performance of the domestic (homeland) and the foreign. Weber's analysis of the ties between the desire for the domestic of state and the domestic of home also highlights the necessity of the family,

> what we need to do is construct a homefront that is worth

> defending (expressed as woman/mother/nation) as the basis of our patriarchal projection of power. In this way, the (usually) white, happy, heterosexual nuclear family is not just a convenient national myth; it is an international necessity for any United States-led just world order (2006: 117).

Flat daddies and mommies can be understood as a part of this discourse, constituted by and (re)producing it, and in so doing become a crucial representation in the constitution of a state's identity and the structuring moral grammars and contributes towards the organization of social relations of both the domestic and the foreign.

There is also the issue of the types of bodies being represented for these are not images of just *any* white heteronormative nuclear family, they are military families. Do the images indicate the increasing militarization of our everyday? Militarization is used here in Cynthia Enloe's sense of the term which she describes as,

> a step-by-step process by which a person or thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military *or* comes to be dependent for its well-being on militaristic ideas…Militarization, that is, involves cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic transformation (2000: 3).

Militarization should not be understood as being automatic or occurring in obvious places, rather it is a process through which things become dependent on or derive value from militaristic criteria and this may be as simple as a can of soup (2000: 291). The flat daddies and mommies in uniform are a rather potent display of the militarized family. Moreover, these families are represented in everyday activities such as soccer practices and eating meals thereby serving to reinforce the normalized notion of militarization. The flat daddy and mommy also symbolize the need to maintain the gendered hierarchies of militarization within the family. The parent in uniform must remain, even in a semi-phantasmic form, to provide a structure of authority and define the family in a particular way. If the current (neo)liberal projects of empire require the production of certain ways of being for the consolidation of a world order based on hierarchies of gender and race, militarization is part and parcel of the constitution of those ideal subjects, privileging masculinity through the manipulation of femininities and masculinities (Agathangelou *et. al*, 2008: 123). The images lend legitimacy to the body's absence, being a clear demonstration that the missing body is due to their military involvement and that they are required in some form to simultaneously tame the wilds of the foreign and keep the domestic homefront secured.

There is also something specific to these images that makes them present and simultaneously disturbs the fantasy. It is the 'flatness' of the flat daddy and mommy that often provokes responses. The flat body is both necessary for the fantasy of the family yet also makes the incompleteness of the fantasy hyper-visible through the very flatness of the body. How might we conceptualize the flat body's relationship to the family and the performances of foreign policy? In what follows I attempt a few suggestions to these questions and inevitably only raise more about dimensionality, the body, the family, aesthetics, and how these issues embodied (sort of) in the flat daddy and mommy are necessary to the representations that condition the performances of boundaries.

Flat Daddies and Round Bodies[7]

> *All beings in Flatland, animate or inanimate, no matter what their form, present to our view the same, or nearly the same appearance, viz. that of a straight Line. How then can one be distinguished from another, where all appear the same?* (Abott, 1984: 54).

Square aptly describes the primary characteristic of Flatland, two dimensionality makes all forms and shapes the same. The world of Flatland is static, an unchanging social order maintained by the very forms of representation which constitute that space. The production of the 'flat' body functions in much the same way, its dimensional form is part of the desire to maintain a stasis in the representation of the family. The Official Home of Flat Daddies describes them as, "life-size printed posters of parents who are actively serving overseas in the military" (2008). These flat bodies are available for free (shipping excluded); to order your own flat body all you require is an image of the person you want reproduced that can be sent electronically to the program, and in nineteen weeks your flat friend will arrive at your door. The body flattened into two dimensions seems to indicate the tendency towards the dematerialization of bodies in our contemporary moment. Miriam Fraser and Monica Greco (2005: 12) point out that what appears as an absolute given, the body, turns out to be a historical event dated from the Renaissance and consolidated by the Enlightenment; the sovereign subject, that autonomous being whose autonomy is manifest not only in the exercise of individual will, agency and choice, but in a bounded corporeality that is assumed to 'end' with the skin. Flat daddies and mommies offer a site to engage the ways in which bodies are represented and reproduced in the production of boundaries that constitute a state's identity as well as to

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[7] I would like to thank Professor David Mutimer for this title, originally written as a course paper for POLS 6225: Critical Security Studies (Winter 2007), Political Science Department, York University.

examine the relationship between the body and the fantasy of the family. There are two concepts that I address on the theme of the flat body, boundaries and families: the dimensionality of the flat body through a juxtaposition of the 'corpulent body' and the ways in which the flat body is directly implicated in the gendered performances of domestic-foreign.

Jane Evans Braziel and Kathleen LeBesco's (2001) work focuses on representations of corpulence and the juxtaposition between the 'fat' and 'flat' body is one of the most glaring oppositions of bodily representations that may produce insights into the tensions between second and third dimensions. They argue that the corpulent body is simultaneously produced and abnegated through the proliferation of commodities where each alludes to the 'fat' body as a marker of capitalist circulation. 'Fat' is indicative of excess and indulgence, a violation of order and space, the transgression of a boundary that must be limited and contained lest it disrupt the dominant representation of the closed, controlled, autonomous subject (2001: 6). As Le'a Kent points out, in contemporary culture the fat body is visible only at the margins, it is a 'spoiled identity' in the sense that it communicates its failure to conform to the dominant image of the body (2001: 132). The corpulent body is relegated to the margins of representation because it embraces the corporeal and affectual which may disrupt the continuous abstraction that closes and controls the body. Le'a Kent illustrates how the corpulent body and 'thin' or closed body are intimately related, the corpulent body must remain on the margins - be present but not quite; because as much as it functions as a condition of possibility for the closed, autonomous, sovereign subject it is also a disruption to that sense of self. How does the conceptualization of the corpulent body relate to an understanding of the flat body?

The flat daddy and mommy are severed images of the military, represented from the waist up. Beyond economical incentives (of the sponsors) to xerox onto cardboard, their symbolic function must necessarily be an 'almost but not quite body.' Based on the understanding of the 'corpulent body', there must be a relation, 'an-Other' body to mark those through difference. This body must be only semi-present, exist at the margins of representation because to make it anymore manifest would risk the stability of the 'sameness' of those defined in opposition to it. The flat body covers the disjuncture between the foreign and domestic through maintaining the stability of the fantasy of the family where other identities can mark themselves in and through it. The flatness functions as a reminder of the body's absence and the fantasy, filling the void for the family representation to be maintained, not to entirely cover over it or abstract the body for which it acts as a stand in. The technological discourses which construct the aesthetic of the foreign as a sanitized space dissolved of bodies are the condition of possibility for the 'almost but not quite flat body' which maintains the

domestic (home and land) imaginary by stabilizing the representation of the family while simultaneously leaving a trace, a remnant of that material body it represents through the movement of dimensionality.[8] The flatness of the body signifies the arbitrariness of the substitution as almost but not quite is precisely what serves to maintain the performance of the domestic-foreign by leaving a trace of both spaces in the gap of what is seen 'here' and what is left over 'there.' In other words, flatness is necessary to the illusion of the completeness of the US domestic home space, keeping the family intact so to speak and thus maintaining a stable coherent imagined community of the ideal white, hetero-homo-normal citizen, excluding those bodies which threaten and-or disrupt the strict gendered-sexual-racial boundaries of citizenship. It also gestures to the relationship with the foreign site of difference embodied currently in Iraq and Afghanistan by acting as a reminder of the absence of the body, but the foreign here is only hinted at - it is a presence within the flat body mediated by abstracting processes.

There is also something to be said about the fact that these are waist-up representations of the body, it is a body cut in half. Here again, this severing of the body, the incompleteness of the representation is a manifest reminder that this is an image of the body, not the replica. What does the severing say of the performance of boundaries? Here I think we can refer back to the discussion on the gendering and sexualization of representations of the domestic-foreign as well as why the flat body is almost always the daddy in these images. The head and torso remain 'in the family' while the phallus is detached, presumably off over there in the foreign securing the state's identity with all the virility and potency it can muster. The space of the domestic remains feminized as it lacks the hypermasculinized-hypersexualized symbol embodied in the phallus.

The National Flat Daddies Program also offers 'fabric families' that can be purchased. They are enlarged images of soldiers with their families printed onto blankets that can be touted about and wrapped around the children. On the website, the images of the fabric family are exclusively that of the female solider, she can smother the family to provide all the maternal comfort and warmth possible. The female soldier is represented in a more tactile way in contrast to the flat daddy who is stiff and solid; the fabric mommy and flat daddy reinforce the gendering of space, the mother as a comforting body compared to the father's solidity. The use of different media to portray the flat daddy and fabric mommy also reinforce the hetero-normalization of the fantasy of the family and the spaces of domestic foreign as well as demonstrate how the bodies are performed in and through the manner they are represented. To

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[8] 'Trace' could be understood here in Derrida's sense as the absent part of a sign's presence, what is left over after everything else is accounted and does not exist for presenting itself is self-effacing.

illustrate this more clearly I am invoking Butler's understanding of the 'performed body', that the:

> regulatory norms of 'sex' work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body's sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative (1993: 2).

Butler indicates how we might understand the flatness and tactileness of the flat daddy and mommy's bodies as a part of the performance of a state's identity, that the flat body is an integral piece to maintaining that fantasy of the family by filling the void left by the body just enough to allow for the performance of the family, but not entirely so as not to close off the representation's tender ties to the foreign.

The flat body is ultimately inextricably linked to the flatness of the fantasy of the family. The bodies and images must necessarily be flat because this is precisely the fantasy. The movement to two dimensions becomes the perfect form of the family, it is removed of all ambiguity and flaws that come with material, lived bodies; it is a closed, plastic, unchanging, stable representation of what 'we' should be. This flat family does not experience each other in the same ways as material bodies. Affect here is also flat, two dimensionality indicates stillness so that the family member's positions remain fixed; a perfect stable representation of what the domestic should be. So, the deflated representation can be understood as the fantasy itself and the flatness of the body as integral to its function. The flat daddy and mommy *must* be flat because this is the perfect form of the family - this *is* the fantasy: a stable, structured, heterosexual unit providing a solid home (life and land) against the flux and instability manifested in the foreign. That the flat body and the fantasy of the family are set in a site outside of time and space does not mean that they are devoid of those processes which constitute them. This is a particular aesthetic of the family, generating and mobilizing the desire for the domestic of home and nation and the pleasure of a hetero-normative union.[9] It is this understanding of the aesthetic of the fantasy as crucial to the performance of boundaries that can also be a space of interrogation and disruption to the racialization and heteronormalization of identities and spaces.

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[9] As Agathangelou *et. al.* explain, the (neo)liberal projects of empire require 'affective economies'- the mobilization of pleasure, fear, and repulsion which is used to emotionally invest subjects in a global capitalist order (2008: 122). The affects which flat daddies and mommies organize and mobilize should be understood in much the same respect.

Conclusion

> *Heavy weighs on me at times the burdensome reflection that I cannot honestly say I am confident as to the exact shape of the once-seen, oft-regretted Cube…nay, when even this hard wall that bars me from my freedom, these very tablets on which I am writing, and all the substantial realities of Flatland itself, appear no better than the offspring of a diseased imagination, or the baseless fabric of a dream* (Abott, 1984: 159-160).

Abbott published <u>Flatland</u> in 1884, it tells the story of the narrator's (unnamed square) journey through a two dimensional world, his relationship with sphere (from the three dimensional Spaceland) and the ensuing turmoil when unnamed square begins to think in multiple dimensions, disrupting the strict hierarchy of Flatland. Flatland's attempt to maintain their space and social ordering speaks to much of the same processes that flat daddies and mommies make visible. In both, dimensionality is key in the performative constitution of space, demarcating the subjects within it through an oppressive structure based on the hierarchization of shapes and bodies. Moreover, both Flatland and the flat daddy and mommy demonstrate the necessity of two dimensions in maintaining the fantasies inherent in those spaces; flatness as a mark of stability and cohesiveness against the flux of differentiation and change.

How, then, do we go about disrupting the logics of these images? Mitchell argues that the interaction of picture and text is constitutive of all representation and is always a relationship of power (1994: 5). He further argues that entailed in the representative-represented relationship is a politics of representation, that culture understood as representation helps remind us culture itself is a fractured concept which exploits the gap between representation and responsibility (1994: 421). What is that responsibility? For Mitchell it is to see representations as related to one another and to us. With flat daddies and mommies this means understanding how they produce an aesthetic of the domestic and make visible the fantasy of the family which is inextricably bound to the constitution of the foreign in the performance of national identities. Understanding the flat daddy and mommy in terms of this gap also widens our notions of possible disruptions. This lies in part on our ability to understand that the everyday/popular culture/art/official policies are not separable articulated categories. Each is brought into being in and through the other by the moral grammars and structures that govern representations. Flat daddies and mommies offer one such site to explore these mediations of power. Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira argue that we must strive towards a politics that reconstitutes connections and relations based on collectivity and healing through understanding affectual attachments as both a means and an ends of a political project (2008: 138).

Perhaps such a commitment would impress upon us an elongated stay in the Flatlands, that we do not understand them as trivial everyday objects but indicative of those violent hegemonic practices that mark and oppress certain bodies in the (re)production of power. Butler also speaks to the possibility of disruption to hegemonic practices, she argues that we must be more aware of how hegemony becomes realizable under present conditions:

> I presume that the point of hegemony on which we might concur is precisely the ideal of a possibility that exceeds every attempt at a final realization, one which gains its vitality precisely from its non-coincidence with any present reality (2005: 272).

Butler articulates why it is imperative for disruptive projects to be based on a principle of open-endedness, because the processes we seek to contest are themselves founded on a notion that is unrealizable and always to come. My hope is that this discussion of flat daddies and mommies can be understood within this commitment or risk perpetuating the erasure and expulsion of differences both epistemologically and materially in the performances of space.

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