Middle Eastern States
in the Global Military Order

Keith Krause

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Introduction

More than three-quarters of the weapons traded since 1970 have gone to the developing world, but there are few studies or rudimentary comparative theories that make sense of this process from the recipient state's perspective. Scholars who study the "global arms transfer and production system" have little understanding of the external and internal factors that shape defence and security policies in the developing world. Perhaps this was simply an inevitable part of the process of developing a theoretically-informed, well-supported literature; or perhaps analysts who study global arms transfers (as this author has done extensively) have systematically ignored important questions and issues. But it is appropriate, especially in a time of change and turbulence, to reexamine the way in which scholars have studied the arms trade and (intentionally or inadvertently) not given certain questions sustained research attention. In particular, I want to draw attention to four broad issues that must be addressed to strengthen our understanding of the processes and dynamics at work in the global arms transfer and production system.

There are two more specific aspects to this research problem. First, the growth in weapons arsenals and military establishments in the developing world has not been examined from the perspective of the states on the receiving end of this complex transmission process, which transfers not only military technologies, but also forms of military (and social) organization and concepts of security. Second, this transmission process has not been situated against the larger process of state-formation and regime consolidation that has accompanied the integration of the developing world into the contemporary world order. Tackling these issues requires, however, a deliberate shift in emphasis: away from changes in the annual flow of weapons and towards changes in the accumulated stocks in arsenals; away from the weapons and towards the military establishments in which they are embedded; and away from the inter-state dimensions of conflict in the developing world and towards evolving patterns of internal conflict and civil-military relations. It also requires a different language, in order to speak of the process of military development in the developing world, and its insertion into the global military order. "Military development" is the process that is catalyzed by the diffusion of "modern" military technologies and techniques of organization to post-colonial states. It goes beyond the simple transfer of the technologies of warfare to encompass three general aspects:

• the development of military doctrines (eg mass versus elite armies, centralized versus decentralized control, defensive versus offensive force postures);
• the concomitant forms of state and societal organization (eg a fiscal apparatus, educational system, and pattern of civil-military relations);
• the overarching concepts of security (who or what represents the "threat," and how best to counter it) that are accepted by (or imposed on) societies and states as the justification for constructing modern military establishments and acquiring weapons.

The analogy with the concepts of "economic development" and the "global economic order" is deliberate, and it alerts us to a notable lacuna in the scholarly literature. Briefly, the literature on "modernization" of the 1950s and 1960s did attempt to understand the

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at Columbia University, 4-5 November 1993. I am grateful to participants in that conference for their comments. This is a working paper, and comments are welcome.


4 The term "military development" has also been by Bruce Arlinghaus to mean "the growth and modernization of armed forces," Military Development in Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). My definition is much broader.
role of the military in the transition from so-called traditional to modern societies. Here, the military was seen as a generally positive force within post-colonial societies: a conduit for modernizing influences, an integrative organization in fractured polities, and an instrument of the "new middle class" that was considered the vanguard of modernization. This literature was, however, crippled by the same flaws that afflicted the broader modernization literature: it misread the evolutionary experience of Western and European societies, it mistakenly conceptualized the state and state/society relations in Western pluralist terms, it ignored the impact of external forces and relationships on domestic political change, and its concern with military rule or military intervention missed the "militarization" of politics and society that had occurred in many parts of the developing world, most prominently in the Middle East and some African states.

Theories of economic development that were proposed by the modernization theorists did generate a critique and counter-critique (e.g. dependency theory) that fuelled continued research and debate. No such development occurred, however, within the literature on "military modernization" with the possible exception of the literature on militarization. Perhaps the reason for this can be found in the general reluctance of scholars to deal with the organized use of violence, especially in light of the badly flawed analyses of the "military as modernizer" literature. But this strategy of neglect has made much scholarship sadly irrelevant to the concerns of people in the developing world who have coped with the consequences of the massive upheavals unleashed by the process of military development in this century.

This scholarly lacuna requires that I begin with a careful analysis of the questions that need to be answered, since I am far from being able to present definitive conclusions. Thus in this paper I will address four specific questions:

1) how have post-colonial states/societies been inserted into the global military order?
2) in what ways have they replicated or deviated from the patterns of military development that characterize Western/Northern states?
3) what have been the social and political consequences of their insertion into the global military order?
4) is the global arms transfer system best understood as a cause or a consequence of these processes?

My discussion could apply broadly to the post-colonial world of Africa, the Middle East and Asia, as it is states in these regions that have embarked on the processes of state-building and regime consolidation simultaneous with their insertion into the contemporary global military order (Latin American states having consolidated their states before the twentieth century). The analysis, however, will concentrate on the Middle East (with occasional examples drawn from elsewhere), since it presents in a stark form many of the features that can be found elsewhere.

By virtually any indicator one chooses, the Middle East is the most highly militarized region of the globe. Other states may have larger armies, arsenals, or defence budgets, but in comparative terms (relative to population or wealth), Middle Eastern states rank at or near the top. The potential for inter-state conflict remains great, and the degree of state terror and repression in most states of the region is also extreme. Violence, whether covert or overt, is pervasive. Further, through the past two decades the region has accounted for approximately 30 percent of global arms transfers, and several Middle Eastern states have been among the ten largest arms recipients. Thus


The Insertion of Newly-Independent States into the Global Military Order

The initial structure of military forces and doctrines in colonial states was determined primarily by the metropolitan or colonial power. Until independence, this meant that most Middle Eastern states possessed only small "constabulary" armed forces, suitable mainly for maintaining internal order and supporting the regime, and dependent upon the external patron for training, materiel and often leadership. In Iraq, for example, Britain undertook after 1921 to train the Iraqi officer core (which had inherited most of its personnel from Ottoman service), and to support the army with specific British-led forces (the Assyrian levies) and the Royal Air Force. Although Britain wanted to reduce the costs of maintaining Iraq's defences, it also wanted Iraq to create a small professional (non-conscript) army. Thus at independence in 1932, Iraq's armed forces numbered 11,500.\(^8\) The story was similar throughout the region: in Jordan, at independence in 1946 the Arab Legion numbered 6,000 (and was British led until 1956); in Syria the army in 1945 was 5,000 strong (not including the French Troupes Spéciales); in Egypt it was around 25,000; in Saudi Arabia it was probably around 10,000 in 1947 (mostly tribal forces).\(^9\) The same pattern was manifest in sub-Saharan Africa, where only seven of 32 independent states had armed forces of more than 6,000 troops in 1961.\(^10\)

These forces were almost exclusively used for maintaining internal order (often forcibly), and were seldom suitable for major war-fighting. In every case, however, the post-independence era witnessed a period in which the armed forces expanded rapidly. This growth was catalyzed by two distinct forces, and abetted by a third. The first force was the direct experience of inter-state war, which generated an immediate and pressing need for a more powerful army. In the core Middle East, for example, military growth in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria was catalyzed by the 1948 and 1956 wars. The Egyptian army rose from 25,000-30,000 soldiers in 1948 to 80,000 by 1955; Jordan's army increased from 6,000-10,000 to 23,000 in the same period, Syria's army grew from 5,000 to 25,000 and Israel's (which is a somewhat different case), from around 90,000 (including civilian reserves) to 250,000.\(^11\) Once new levels were reached, they tended to set benchmarks for further expansion.

The second force was the pressure to use the army internally as a vehicle to hasten the process of "state formation"; this pressure manifest itself in states that possessed low levels of legitimacy or weak and fragmented national identities.\(^12\) Iraq was a classic example of this: in the first four years after independence the army was doubled in size (to around 23,000), conscription was introduced, and nationalist political figures embraced the army as the symbol and defender of the nation. The coup de grâce was the crushing of a "revolt" by the Assyrians, which established the army's position as a critical prop for the central government and a force for national integration.\(^13\) The first military coup occurred only three years later. In Syria, the early rapid expansion of the armed forces in the mid-1950s


\(^9\) Figure for Jordan from John Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), 90; for Syria, from Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1970), 335; for Egypt and Saudi Arabia, from Hurewitz, 450, 250.


\(^11\) Figures from Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, 450.


\(^13\) See Hemphill, passim. The army was greatly reduced after 1941, but it reemerged after the Second World War with the same role and mission.
coincided with their use in the crushing of unrest and revolt among the Druze (and to a lesser extent the Alawis). A similar pattern was manifest in Saudi Arabia, albeit somewhat earlier. The Ikhwān (religious) and tribal forces of King Abdul Aziz conquered and unified most of the diverse tribes of the peninsula in the 1920s before formal "statehood" was achieved in 1932. The armed forces fell into disuse and disrepair until the 1950s, when the political threat from Nasserist Egypt to the Saudi monarchy (including coup attempts) triggered the establishment of a loyal armed forces which was quickly expanded (with American assistance) throughout the late 1950s.

The third force, which was not a catalyst per se, was the systemic or external influence of the projection of the American-Soviet rivalry onto the developing world, the availability of a large surplus of relatively modern weapons from the Second World War, and the more diffuse influences that came from the new states' insertion into the global military order. There have been, however, two ways of thinking about the effect of these influences. The first asks "to what extent did military assistance relationships (training, weapons, etc.) shape a client state's world view in accord with that of the patron?" Here, research has failed to find durable ties of influence between patrons and clients, and the "socialization" effect of military assistance has been deemed relatively small. This question, however, occludes a second, more important issue: "how have links with external powers shaped (and distorted) the pattern of military development of post-colonial societies?" As a simple counter-factual, one could ask whether or not, in the absence of links with external patrons, the Syrians, Saudis, Egyptians or Iraqis would have constructed the same formidable military establishments that emerged between 1960 and 1990.

A focus on systemic influences draws attention to the implicit definition of security that informs the structure of a Western armed force. In almost all cases, the armed forces that were created on the Western model were designed to defend the state against external threats to its territorial integrity and national interests. But as Mohammed Ayoob has pointed out, the main threats to security in the developing world come from internal threats to the regime, or to the stability of the state itself. The "external security" orientation of the armed forces that both sides in the Cold War helped create often masked a deeper concern with internal security, which the superpowers (and scholars) generally ignored.

Despite their Western veneer, military organizations in the Middle East reflected this primary mission to defend a particular ruling elite against internal threats to its control that arose from its narrow base of support, or from a fractured polity. They were designed in most cases to include a strong "national guard" or "royal guard" or "gendarmerie" component of semi-regular forces. For example, in Jordan until 1965, the national guard was as large as the regular army, and was incorporated into it only in the late 1960s. In Iraq, "for six decades the Iraqi army acted as an agent for internal repression." In Saudi Arabia as early as the 1950s, "for internal defense the Saudi clan continued placing primary confidence in the tribal forces [the White Army]," which were as large as the regular forces. The White army (renamed the National Guard in 1963) was also an important means of maintaining loyalty to the Saudi regime and funneling money to tribal and village leaders. It was modernized in the early 1970s, and through the 1970s and 1980s it had 25,000 men, compared to regular forces of only between 35,000-45,000. In Syria, Hafez Assad's brother controlled (until 1983) a 50,000-man elite force (saraya al-difa')

20 Hurewitz, 251.
21 Cordesman, 173, 178, 218, 221, 229.
tasked with protecting the regime. This pattern has also been repeated throughout Africa via the creation of para-military forces, which in the 1980s regularly accounted for between one-quarter and one-half of the armed personnel (on many occasions being larger than the regular army). This was "often explicitly intended as...an alternative source of armed support for a chief of state should the regular armed forces come under the sway of disloyal or overly ambitious leaders."23

The consequences of this gulf between the "design" and "mission" that accompany the creation of a modern, Western, armed force, and the role that it has played in developing societies will be discussed below. When trying to analyze the "recipient" side of the global arms transfer system, however, it is important to understand the interplay of these three forces (inter-state conflict, state formation and systemic influences), and to view the arms transfer system as merely one part of a broader process of military development.

**Military Development in the Middle East**

The available data only allows one to present a schematic overview of the actual growth of armed forces and military expenditure in the Middle East, but at least this can provide some suggestive hints about causal connections for further analysis. For the sake of brevity, I have focused my presentation on seven Arab Middle Eastern states, which may not be representative of the entire region, but which together include 80 percent of the population of the Arab world. After this brief statistical overview, I will discuss the possible consequences of this pattern of military development, in particular the ways in which these states appear to have deviated from the evolutionary path that characterized Western/Northern states.

Table 1 below presents an overview "snapshot" of the states of the region as measured on five indices: size of armed forces, number of soldiers per thousand population, military expenditure, military expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product (MILEX/GNP) and military expenditure per capita. In a global context, many Middle Eastern states rank at or near the top of the world tables. With respect to MILEX/GNP, ten Arab Middle Eastern states appear in the top 25 states (Iraq ranks number one, Saudi Arabia number six and Syria number fourteen). Military expenditure per capita increased on a global level 40 percent in constant dollars between 1960 and 1986, but rose six-fold in the Middle East.24 In terms of armed forces per thousand population: Jordan ranks first, Iraq second, Syria sixth, Libya eighth and Egypt forty-seventh (Saudi Arabia is a low seventy-third, although this depends on some dubious population statistics).

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24 Figure from Charles Tilly, "War and State Power," *Middle East Report* (July-August 1991), 39.
TABLE I
Military Effort of Selected Middle Eastern States, 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>AF</th>
<th>AF/000</th>
<th>MILEX (million $U.S.)</th>
<th>MILEX/GNP (percent)</th>
<th>MILEX/capita</th>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>20.0+</td>
<td>1,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3,499</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14,690</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,1</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 This includes only regular forces. Mobilized reserves bring the total over 1,000,000. Figure from *The Middle East Military Balance, 1987-88* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1988).

2 Figures for 1990, from *Military Balance, 1992-93* (London: IISS, 1992). This figure may be overstated because it does not accurately account for the devaluation of the Iraqi dinar. I have derived MILEX/capita from this figure (and hence it may be overstated), but used the ACDA estimate for Iraqi MILEX/GNP, which places it at more than 20 percent for 1989. Otherwise the Iraqi MILEX/GNP figure would be around 40 percent, which seems too high.

Table II charts the growth in the size of the armed forces of these seven states since the Second World War. Although it does not correct for increases in their population, the trend towards relatively massive military establishments is clear. The burden that the armed forces imposes on society, whether by its direct economic cost, or its social and political "weight" cannot be easily assessed. Studies that attempt to demonstrate a negative link between economic growth and military expenditure have not been conclusive, but in terms of other social and political opportunity costs, the burden has been large.25

The most difficult analytic/statistical task is to grasp the motive forces that drive this pattern of military development. Although military development has evolved in response to both inter-state and internal threats and insecurities, the precise way in which this has occurred is unclear. In particular, the role of systemic factors (regional conflicts and patron-client relationships) is difficult to specify, although this is critical to understanding the subordinate position of arms recipients in the global system. Are patron-client military relationships and arms transfers contributing causes of weapons buildups and arms races, or are they merely evidence of larger processes at work within states?

The figures presented in Table III and Appendix I attempt to untangle this, and to plot the possible relationships between the size of the armed forces, level of military spending (in constant dollars), and number of major weapons systems. There are major uncertainties with the data, but for each state I have illustrated how these variables have changed over time, in order to chart possible relationships among them. Table III presents the statistical data, while Appendix I illustrates these changes over time graphically (with the figures being rebased to 100 for 1970 to allow easy visual comparison of shifts).26 Arms transfers by themselves do not figure in this analysis; they are only captured by changes in the size of arsenals.

Several tentative conclusions can be teased out of these figures, but one should begin with the "ideal case": in the absence of systemic forces, severe regional conflicts or great domestic pressures, these three variables should change together. Decisions concerning 25

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25 *Ball, Security and Economy*, part II.

26 1970 was chosen as the comparison year because it follows a period of modernization in which some sort of "modern" force structure appears in all states. Earlier comparisons would be misleading; later ones would be too greatly influenced by contextual developments.
expenditures and force levels (however determined) should affect each other, and the size of arsenals should be determined by them, thus tracking these changes (possibly with a time lag). Deviations from this "ideal type" require explanation, as they imply that security policy making is driven by other factors that have a differential impact on these three variables. For example, a severe economic recession might force a cut in the military budget, but the political strength of the armed forces could prevent reductions in its size. Likewise, military assistance from patron states could facilitate arms acquisitions that rose more quickly than force levels, strengthening the argument that regional arms races and military planning have been driven by exogenous forces.

TABLE II
Armed Forces of Selected Middle Eastern States, 1946-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>5,000²</td>
<td>25,000+</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
<td>600,000+⁴</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,000³</td>
<td>10,000³</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>447,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6,000²</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>10,000³</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35,000³</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130,000³</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>101,000</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures from 1970-1989 are from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years. Figures prior to that are (except where indicated) from Hurewitz, Middle East Politics.

1 Figures for 1945/6 are from Be'eri, 335. By the end of the 1948 war Syrian forces had increased to 12,000.
2 Figure from Glubb, 90.
3 The figure of 10,000 "modern" forces is for 1943 from Hurewitz, 250. Cordesman, 101, lists forces in 1956 at 20-30,000, of which half were regular army (firqa), half Bedouin irregulars (liwâ). Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Endless Quest for Security (Harvard: Belknap Press, 1985), 68, notes that American officers estimated the number of regular Saudi troops at between 7,500 and 10,000 in 1953. This excluded the royal bodyguard, paramilitary and tribal forces, which would have more than doubled this total. I have thus selected 10,000 as the appropriate figure. The third figure is for 1963, not 1960.
4 This includes only regular forces. Mobilized reserves bring the total over 1,000,000. Figure from The Middle East Military Balance, 1987-88 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1988).
5 Algerian figure for 1962 is 189. It was made up of the regular "external" army (40,000) and the guerrilla forces (50,000). By 1964 the force had been reduced to 65,000.

Do such anomalies appear in the data? Only in the Syrian case do changes in all three variables appear to move together, with recent large reductions in military expenditures implying future changes in force structure. Changes in the two "domestically determined" variables (military expenditure and size of the armed forces) are not tightly related in the other six states, however, (ie: increases in the size of the armed forces triggering demands for greater spending, or vice versa), but military expenditure tends to rise more quickly than do armed force levels.

The two variables that appear to track each other the most closely are the size of armed forces and weapons arsenals (with the exception of Saudi Arabia). In almost all cases, however, weapons holdings increase more rapidly and earlier than do force levels. This suggests that exogenous influences on the arms acquisition planning process are strong, and that arms races in the region may be partly "supply driven," as states find it less difficult to acquire armaments via external patrons and military assistance than to increase the size of their armed forces. One should note that although these armies may have been relatively under-equipped in 1970, the failure of a consistent
relationship between personnel levels and weapons systems to emerge suggests that other forces are at work.\textsuperscript{27} This is most evident in Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis have chosen to treat technology as a "force multiplier," with arms acquisitions having almost no relationship to force levels after the early 1970s. The Saudis were forced to rely upon foreigners for much of the maintenance (and some of the operation) of their equipment, revealing a dangerous vulnerability. An additional problem, of course, is that the multiplier effect of technology can also work ultimately for one's opponents! In general, the data suggest that the easy availability of weapons between 1970 and 1990 meant various states believed (rightly or wrongly) that they could "buy" (either with oil revenues, military assistance, or alliance relationships) their way out of some of the dilemmas and threats posed by regional conflicts. In this way, regional conflicts may have been exacerbated, or their resolution postponed.

A full interpretation of these developments must refer to particular events. The impact of regional wars, for example, is clearly demonstrated by the upwards spike in Egyptian military spending in the early 1970s, or the decline (in the rate of increase) of Iraqi weapons holdings in the mid-1980s. Morocco's involvement in the conflict in the Western Sahara accounts in part for the upward trend of military spending after 1975. The policy choices (and dilemmas) facing Saudi Arabia since the early 1970s, with its small population and heavily armed neighbours, are graphically illustrated. Severe fiscal constraints are also manifest in the declines in military spending in all states but Algeria in the late 1980s, although to date these have had less impact on force levels in the region.

\textsuperscript{27} It is possible that the count of major weapons systems captures the wrong things, but I am doubtful. For a study of the growth of Third World armed forces, see A.F. Mullins, \textit{Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987). For another attempt to use weapons data in a comparative study see Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, "Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization," \textit{Review of International Studies} (1993), 321-347.
## TABLE III
Changes in Military Indicators, Selected Middle Eastern States, 1960-89

<table>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>230</td>
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<td>400</td>
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<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
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Sources: Listed in Appendix II.

The Consequences of Military Development in the Middle East

It would be simple, but unhelpful, to conclude that the consequence of the pattern of military development outlined above has been a pervasive form of "militarization" in the Middle East. Certainly the incidence of military or quasi-military authoritarian rule in Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq lend *prima facie* credence to the assertion. In other states, such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the military is a critical prop of the regime, and exists in a symbiotic relationship with state rulers. The term "militarization," however, suffers from two analytic defects. The first arises from the polemical use of the term in the debates in which militarization was characterized as a primary cause of underdevelopment or authoritarian government in the Third World, and as a product of the neo-colonial or neo-imperial influence of external powers.28 Although the emphasis on systemic factors is laudable, little work actually analyzes the way in which particular patterns

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28 See in addition to the sources in note six above, the excellent discussion of the literature in Andrew Ross, "Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World," *Armed Forces and Society*, 13:4 (Summer 1987), 561-578.
of military development may or may not have contributed to a pathological "militarized" socio-political environment. The debate thus tends to revolve without resolution around two sterile poles: one which either denies the existence of militarization or places the responsibility for it on factors internal to recipient states, and one which points to systemic factors as the root cause.

The second defect is that the concept of militarization has often been reduced to specific measurable indicators, such as military expenditures, military rule and coup d'etats, or the size of the armed forces and level of armaments. Some of these indices are used above in a general overview of the Middle East, but they are conceptually flawed. The most effective exercise of military influence would be the complete absence of coup attempts, and hence a decline in the number of coups is hardly evidence that militarization is waning; likewise, a retreat of the military from formal positions of power says little about the way in which the boundaries of political debate may be set, and the constraints under which civilian politicians may operate. I want to step back from this debate, and briefly elucidate four possible consequences of the particular pattern of Middle Eastern military development. Some of these consequences are "dysfunctional" or "pathological," and warrant being considered as evidence of "militarization." others may not be. But hypothesizing all of them opens the way to broader comparative studies of how recipient states have been inserted into the global military order.

In contrast, this contrasts the role of the military in the process of state formation in the Middle East with the Western experience, and highlights the distorting impact of the Middle East's insertion into the contemporary global military order. The Western experience was one in which the military initially played a critical role in state-building, was slowly "civilianized" as civil society emerged, became subordinated to representative institutions, and shed its internal security functions to concentrate on what came to be considered as "traditional" external threats to national security. But the social and political roles of military establishments in the post-colonial Middle East have evolved in a very different fashion, and with different consequences. As Charles Tilly points out: "the extension of the Europe-based state-making process to the rest of the world...did not result in the creation of states in the strict European image...states that have come into being recently through decolonization have acquired their military organization from the outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled."

The first consequence has been that the process of "civilization" of the Middle Eastern military has been thwarted. Although the direct military role in politics may have waned (i.e., fewer coups, fewer army officers in cabinets), the balance of social and political power between the military and other institutions has not changed. The armed forces arguably have a larger weight and play a greater role in the political life of Middle Eastern states today than when they were small, faction-ridden, and coup-prone. This is manifest in such areas as economic development or in the maintenance of internal security and stability, two clear illustrations being provided by Egypt and Algeria. In Egypt, the army has launched several important agricultural, industrial and infrastructure projects, in part because of the inability...

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of the "private" sector to mobilize efficiently political and economic resources.33 In Algeria, the 1992 coup to stave off the election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) illustrates the continued importance of the army as the "custodian of national values" and its institutional weight vis-à-vis the discredited civilian political elite.34

This differs from the European experience, where the initial role of the army in helping create the apparatus of the modern state was modified over time as a symbiotic relationship between "war-makers," the state, and other social groups emerged. The state essentially promised its citizens a certain level of security, in return for the resources it extracted to purchase this security. In return, the armed forces had to submit to ever-greater civilian control, which reduced its relative weight in politics, especially as representative political institutions and efficient modern bureaucracies emerged. This does not appear to be happening in the Middle East, or it is happening slowly if at all. The reasons for this are doubtless complex, but two can be suggested. First, early military intervention in the form of "revolutionary" officers or reformist coups may have "fixed" a certain pattern of politics that prevents the emergence of other "modern" institutions (i.e. by institutionalizing economic corruption and inefficiency tied to satisfying demands of the armed forces, or by preventing the emergence of an independent capitalist or technocratic elite).35 Instead, as Raymond Hinnebusch notes in the Syrian case, "from the moment Ba'thi officers brought the party to power...it was likely that the military would be an equal or senior partner in the new military-party state, and that institution building would have to go on in concert with military leadership, not apart from it." Second, patron-client relationships with external powers have been conduits by which large sums of money have been made available to the military (directly or indirectly). This external support has meant that ruling elites have been able to avoid the "guns versus butter" trade-offs with other social groups that catalyze the "civilization" process, or have enhanced their position in this allocative struggle for resources by lining up powerful external supporters (imagine, as a counterfactual, the effect of huge levels of external support for democracy movements for thirty years!).

The second consequence of the pattern of military development experienced by the Middle East has been that the emergence of "pluralist" politics and a healthy civil society has been frustrated or suppressed. Here military development has obstructed both the fusion of a coherent national identity under which other forms of affiliation are subsumed and the emergence of criss-crossing patterns of identity that diminish the importance of ethnicity or faith. The way in which the military has prevented this is not by its direct role in politics (i.e. as an autonomous political actor), but by the fact that it is a tremendous reservoir of political power that can be captured by a particular group. In states with weak "national" identities, the Tiskits, Alawis, Bedouins or Hijazis can, by their predominant influence over the military, entrench their positions and hence thwart the emergence of more "pluralist" politics.37 This experience directly contradicts the belief that the armed forces would act as an integrative force in a fractured polity divided along religious, ethnic and other lines. It also opens the door to the third consequence, the pathological manifestation of repression and state terror as the armed forces become the enforcement arm of a particular form of totalitarian politics.


34 For a brief overview, John Erentis, "The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa," Problems of Communism 41 (May/June 1992), 71-81. This is a long Algerian tradition; the symbiotic relationship between Boumedienne and Ben Bella meant that "the civilian leader [Ben Bella] enjoyed the initiative, so long as he honored the inviolable character of the military domain." Hurewitz, 193.

35 This would appear to describe Syria and Iraq. As Ala'a Tahir notes: "to understand the nature of the [current Iraqi] system, one must return to its structural origins in the coup d'état of 1958." Iraq: aux origines du régime militaire (Paris L'Harmattan, 1989), 16 (my translation). On corruption and military control of the economy see Yasha Sadowski, "Patronage and the Ba'th Corruption and Control in Contemporary Syria," Arab Studies Quarterly, 9, 4 (Fall 1987), 442-461.


37 In Syria, for example in 1980 Alawis commanded half of all army divisions and controlled all the military intelligence services, although they comprise no more than 15 percent of the population. Sadowski, 444. The Saudi royal family offers a similar illustration, having tightly controlled the upper echelons of the defence ministry.
Few authors have attempted to assess directly the role of modern military technologies and forms of organization in creating new methods of surveillance, social control, and repression. Nor have scholars related social violence and terror (e.g. by secret police networks or resistance movements) to the broader pattern of military development (or "militarization") of post-colonial societies. I am not concerned here with the question of "supplying the instruments of repression," as Samir al-Khalil points out, "the local demand for investigatory and torturing expertise is logically prior to the availability of eager suppliers." Rather, I am interested in the way in which the armed forces' continued role in domestic intelligence and security affairs facilitated the emergence of the "mukhabarat (national security) state": "an authoritarian-bureaucratic Leviathan whose stability derives more from fear than legitimacy." This has been a crucial development in the politics of the Middle East, and it contrasts with the European experience, where by the late 1860s, armed forces had shed their internal/police functions with the new internal security organizations being subject to a greater degree of civilian control.

The best documented case of this is Ba'athi Iraq, where no less than eight intelligence gathering agencies operate competing and overlapping networks to keep surveillance on each other. Similar, if less brutal, processes can be seen, however, in Iran, in Syria, in Saudi Arabia, and in the activities of the military against Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt. This development goes far beyond "militarization" (defined as a prominent political role for the military) or even "militarism" (defined in terms of pervasive military values and attitudes in society), and touches upon the ability of a small elite to control a state, and to impose upon society a particular definition of politics, through extraction and terror. The most chilling examples of this can be found in the laws concerning political activity in Iraq, or Syria, and the way in which the Ba'ath movement in both these states has fused a party-army network of spies, informers and torturers. Much has been written on this, but few have analyzed the way in which the transformation from small constabularies to modern armies also brought with it the instruments of control (whether technologies or forms of organization) that made possible the phenomenon of the mukhabarat state.

The final consequence has manifested itself at the regional and global level, as Middle Eastern states became caught up in the rivalries of the Cold war and pursued regional hegemony or international status. Patron-client relationships with external powers often meant the flow of huge sums in military and economic assistance to states such as Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and privileged access to modern weapons for those states that could afford to pay for them (Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia). One simple way to analyze the consequence of this is to describe regional military development as a persistent "arms race," fuelled and financed by the United States and the Soviet Union. This overstates the degree of influence of external powers, and cannot be easily correlated with such things as the outbreak of wars. On a more subtle level, however, these relationships allowed regional rulers to avoid difficult compromises with local rivals, since the possibility always existed that a patron would help bankroll or support a bid for regional hegemony (or cover the losses from such a bid by replacing weapons, for example). Such behaviour was manifest by Syria and Iraq in the 1980s, in their respective conflicts with Israel.

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38 As Anthony Giddens puts it, we must "analyze the consolidated political power generated by a merging of developed techniques of surveillance and the technology of industrialized war." *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 295.
39 Ross, for example, lists "military regimes" as his only domestic political index of militarization.
and Iran (arguably the same could be said of Egypt and Israel). Relationships with external powers also shored up the domestic legitimacy of specific regimes, as was demonstrated by Nasser’s Egypt and the Shah’s Iran (Saddam Hussein’s Iraq also fits this category).45

Conclusion

Arms transfers to the Middle East cannot be understood without reference to the creation of "modern" military establishments, which in turn cannot be understood outside the framework of the state-building projects that regimes in the region have embarked upon. These countries are "states in the process of becoming" and hence the arms race in the Middle East has as much to do with the internal process of consolidation and legitimization as with specific inter-state conflicts and rivalries. Inter-state rivalries may in fact arise as part of this process of state and regime legitimization (for example, the rivalry between Ba’athist Syria and Iraq), or may be exacerbated by it. The weakness of most Middle Eastern states (qua states) also presents serious obstacles to regional conflict management projects, which depend on a great degree of internal cohesion and legitimacy to sustain the difficult political compromises and choices that must be made.

Perhaps the most important lesson for scholars, however, is that the consequences of "military development" are not simply manifest in regional arms races and conflicts, but most importantly at the domestic level.46 The relatively easy availability of sophisticated military technologies and the attractiveness of modern military organizations has distorted or mutated the process of political change in Middle Eastern states and societies, with often dramatically negative consequences for the security and well-being of their citizens. Thinking of states in the developing world as "recipients" within "the arms transfer system" misdirects us to ignore both these broader processes at work in military modernization (of which the arms transfer system is only one aspect), and the domestic, internal impact of military development. The above discussion suggests that "arms transfers" by themselves do not "cause" anything, but that they are part of a complex transmission system by which ideas and understandings about how to achieve security are also transmitted. Until we better understand the logic behind Middle Eastern states’ military development choices, and the way in which these may be shaped by systemic forces, efforts to explain only their patterns of participation in the global arms transfer system will remain of limited utility.

46 For a recent example of the persistence of thinking about military development in inter-state terms, see Anthony Cordesman, After the Storm: The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview, 1993). He discusses internal civil conflicts, but does not analyze in any way how the pattern of military development he exhaustively traces might be connected with them.
APPENDIX II

Sources for Table III

Figures for the size of the armed forces are taken from Table II, with one modification. The figures for Iraqi armed forces for 1985 and 1989 forces include mobilized reserves. Regular forces strength was about 520,000 and 600,000 in 1985 and 1988 respectively. From Military Balance, 1985-86 and The Middle East Military Balance, 1987-88 (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Post, 1988). The Algerian armed forces figure is for 1962.

Military expenditure figures are taken from the ACDA, WMEAT, various years, and have been converted to constant 1989 dollars. In all cases the most recently available figures have been used. The Iraq military expenditure for 1980 and 1985 from is from ACDA, WMEAT 1989. The last figure is for 1990, and is from the Military Balance, 1990-91. Since IISS figures (when compared to ACDA) appear to understate expenditures, it has been revised upwards to reflect this. It may be overstated because the dramatic devaluation of the Iraqi dinar has not been accounted for. The 1960 military expenditure figures for all states have been estimated from Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, by using the ratio between his 1965 figures (expressed in local currency and including internal security forces) and the ACDA 1965 figures, and recalculating his 1960 data accordingly.

Weapons arsenals includes all major weapons systems (heavy and light tanks, armoured vehicles, combat and transport aircraft, military helicopters, and major surface vessels). These have been calculated from the relevant issues of the Military Balance. I am indebted to Michael Barnett and Alex Wendt for this idea. Weapons arsenals for 1965 have been calculated from David Wood, The Middle East and the Arab World, Adelphi Paper 20 (July 1965). Aircraft totals for 1967 have been used in cases where the data from Wood was unclear, from Geoffrey Kemp, Arms and Security: The Egypt - Israel Case, Adelphi Paper 52 (October 1968). Saudi and Jordanian figures for 1965 are estimated from Peter Young, The Israeli Campaign 1967, (London: William Kimber, 1967), 51, 55.